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
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
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Premium Italian calfskin is the raw mater al from which these shoes are sculptured Antiqued and hand brushed for a look of polished sophist cation, with pre-flexed insoles and littleway stitched outsoles for a comfortable fit



CAMBRIDGE

Five eyelet baltie capitoe brogue Medallion toe Old Antin I cea Calf Fully leather ined

18010 Black 18070 Burgandy 18020 Brown

Sizes N 9 12 13 M 6 2 12, 13 W 7 II



CHESTER

Five eyelet balitie, wing tip brogue. Medall on toe Old Anilin licea Calf Fully leather lined

18320 Brown

18310 Black 18370 Burgundy

Sizes > 9 12, 13 > 11 6 2 12, 13 W 7 II



CLIFFORD

Wing tip, shawlik lite slip on Quarter acing and hanging tassel. Old An lin I cea Call Fully eather I ned

18410 Black 18470 Burgundy 18120 Brown

Sizes N 9-12 13 M 6 1-12 13 W 7 II



CECIL

Shawlik Itie mocitodish on Hand stained likea Calf Fully cather incd.

18710 Black 18770 Burgundy 18720 Brown

Sizes > 9-12 13, VI 6 2 12 3 W 7 II


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Scratch the surface of an oil painting and you'll reveal layers of painstaking detail. So it is with each Magli dress shoe Fuli leather in ngs, hand staining and burnishing, authentic brogues and cap toes these are the telling details of a mastercraftsman at work



TORIO

Concealed gore wing tip slip on Kiltle and hanging tasser Fully eather ined Nabuk Caf

05510 Black 05520 Brown 05540 Blue 05550 Bone

05596 Taupo

Sizes VI 6,2 12, 13



VERNON

Concea ed gore wing tip slip on Kiltie and hanging tasse Hand stained I cea Call

35810 Black 35820 Brown 35870 Burgundy Sizes ~ 9 12, 13, 14 15 11 6 12 13 14, 15, W 6 12



VINO

M 6-12 13 14, 15 W 6-12

Perforated mot toe slip on kiltie with tied hanging tassel. Rub-off Call, fully leather lined

32410 Back 32420 Brown 32110 Bue 32170 Burgundy 32490 Grey Sizes N 9 12, 13 14, 15



LELAND

Short wing tip kiltic tassel center gore stip on with scored vamp and quarter. Rub off Calf

Fully leather lined **18110** Black

4812() Brown 1817() Burgundy

Sizes N 9-12, 13 M 61/2 12 13, W 7 II



FRASER

Five eyelet bal tie oxford with cap toe Old Anilin licea Calf Fully leather ned

15210 Black 15240 Blue 15220 Brown 15270 Burgundy 15226 Brandy 15290 Grey Sizes N 9-12, 13 M 6/2-12, 13, W 7 II



FULTON

Five eyelet bal tie oxford with folded wing tip toe Old Ani in Ifcea Calf Fully leather lined

15110 Black 15140 Blue 15120 Brown 15170 Burgundy 15126 Brandy 15190 Grey Sizes N 9 12 13 M 6/2 12, 13, W 7 II



VARANO

Wing tip. five eyelet balit e oxford Royal Calfskin fully leather i ned

14510 Back 14570 Burgundy 14520 Brown 14590 Grey 14540 Blue 14596 Taupe

Sizes N 9 12, 13 14* 15 * M 6/2-12, 13, 14, 15, * W 6/2 II, II½, * 12*

*Biack, Brown and Burgundy on y



VOTUS

Five eye et balit e oxford with folded straight tip toe. Royal Caifskin, fully leather ined

14810 Black 14870 Burgundy 14820 Brown 14890 Grey 14840 Blue 11896 Taupe

Sizes 🦠 9-12, 13, M 6/2 12, 13, W 6/2-11







SUMMER

William piconcenied gore sip on Quarter neing admisse. Constructed of Rubioff Chifully leither ned. O1610 Bitck

01620 Brown 01670 Birginds

Szcs N 9 2 3 M 6 12 3 W 7 II



VANCE

Five eyelet ball tolded capitoe Old Antholleen Cart Fully earner ined

> 18610 Black 18620 Brown

186 (0 Bl√c

18670 Bargandy 18690 Grey

Secs N 9 2 3 M 6 (2 13 W 6 (1 M odthony



VANGUARD

Figure 1 to the second period cap too and received the large Roy Cotskin fully detectived

12410 Back

12125 T 12110 Bkc

12170 Bur (now

12170 Berlind 12190 Grey

5.65 Nº 12 13 M 6 2 13 W 7 II



ROMA

Focuse ct bit is three would be proceed and redal of Old An in New Calif

35010 Book

35020 Block 35070 Burgings

Sas N9 2 3 M 6 12 3 W 6 1

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SULIX
Short wing tip kilt e tassel gored slip-on
Imperial Calf - fully leather Lined

16410 Black 16125 Ian 16470 Burgundy Szes \$ 9-12 | 3 M 6/2 | 12 | 3 W 6/2 | 1



SETHFour eyelet bal wing tip Imperial Calf
Fully leather lined

19810 Black 19825 Tan 19870 Burgundy Sizes N 9 12, 13 M 6 2 12 13 W 6 2 11





ON ERTURE

Center gored is to in the ringe and tassle sip-on Medallion too Handistained I cea Call Fully leather red

11110 Back 11120 Brown 11170 Barg ndy

Szes N 9 12 3 M 6 . 12 3 W 7



ORIX

Mod roe with kitle and tasse is prolif Rubroff Call
Full pleather incd

08610 Black 08620 Brown 08640 Blue

08670 Burg, ndy 08690 Grey

Szes N 9 2 13 M 6 2 2 3 W 7



OCEAN

Positive fit kilt e with medal on tools pon Rub off Call. Filly leather med

08710 Black 08720 Brown

08770 Burgundy

Szes N 9 2 13 W 6 . 2 3 W 7



It is a rare accomplishment when a boot can achieve the comfort of a fine pair of snoes. Yet for Bruno Magli it is a routine feat. Classic boot styles combined with the plush level of comfort found in our finest shoes.

A OTIS

Plain toe, 7" Baby Nappa boot Side zipper, fully leather lined

1 1010 Black
1 1020 Brown
1 1070 Burgundy
1 1090 Grey

Sizes N 9 12 13 M 6 2 12 13, W 7-11

B OSBORNE
Plain toe 5'1" Baby Nappa boot 5 de zipper
fuly leather ined
14110 Black
14120 Brown
14170 Burgundy
14190 Grey
Sizes N 9-12, 13 W 6 2 12 13 W 7 II

EXOTICS

Crocodle rand ostrich in the hands of a master lexotic skins produce sturning shoes. Extraordinary combinations of color texture and contrast etched in extravagant luxury.



JAY

Positive fit ibaseball is fitned sup on with Genline Crocodile strap and plug. Artiqued Tumbled Cliff Fully eather fined

32810 Black 32826 Brandy 32870 Burgundy

Szes N 9 2 3 M 6 12 3 W 6 II



JERSEY

Positive fit ibasebili stitched slip on with Genulie Crocod leiplug. Strap and tasse made of Antiqued Tumbied Calf if tury learner lined.

32910 Black 32926 Brandy 32970 Burgundy

Szes N 9 12 13 M 6 2 2 13 W 6 2



CYRANO

Genu to handsow a moccas in with Ostrich legipling. Tumbled Calfskin kille and tasse. Fully leather lined

02610 Black 02670 Burg.ndy* 02620 Brown 02690 Grey* 02696 Tappe Szes N 9 12 13 M 6 2 13 M 6 211

M width of y



CYCERO

Genune handsewir moccas hiwith Ostrich og plug. Tumbled Calfskin Fully leather ined

02810 Black 02870 Burgandy 02820 Brown 02890 Grey' 02896 Taupe' Szes N 9 2 3 M 6 7 12 13 W 6 7 M width only







JESSUP

Positive fit baseball stitched slip-on. Vamp and quarter of Genuine Crocod le. Baby Nappa penny saddie. Fully leather lined.

10810 Black

40820 Brown

10870 Burgundy

Sizes N 9-12, 13 M 6 4 12, 13, W 7 II



JEROME

Positive fit baseball stitched slip-on. Vamp and quarter of Genu ne Crocodile. Baby Nappa tassel and saddle. Fully leather I ned.

15310 Black

15320 Brown

15370 Burgundy

Sizes N 9-12, 13 M 6/2 12, 13, W 7 II



JAQUES
Posit ve fit basebal stitched slip-on
Vamp and quarter of Genuine Crocod le
Baby Nappa k Itie and tassel. Fully leather I ned

40710 Black

40720 Brown 40770 Burgundy

Sizes N 9-12 13 M 6 12, 13, W 6 II



JAGGER

Genu ne all-over Crocodile tassel sip on Fully leather ined

33212 Błack Crocodie 33272 Burgundy Crocodile 33277 Brandy Crocodile

Sizes N 9-12, 13, M 6/2-12, 13 W 612 II



JARED

Genu ne Crocod e si p-on with shawl kilt e and hanging tassel. Fully earher ned

33912 Black Crocod le 33922 Brown Crocod e 33972 Burgundy Crocod le

Szes N 9 2 13 M 612-12 13, W 7-11



NORFOLK

Five eyelet ball cap toe. Genuine Lizard Fully leather inted

32512 Brack Rept le 32522 Brown Reptile Sizes M 6/2-12, 3



JENSEN
All over Genuine Crocodile slip on Hanging tasse and quarter lacing. Fully leather lined.

15012 Black Crocodie 15022 Brown Crocod e

15072 Burgundy Crocodie

Sizes M 6/2-2 13



NASH

Genuine all over Crocodile center gore slip on Fully cather lined

32112 Back Crocod e 32172 Burgundy Crocod le' 32177 Brandy Crocod le

Sizes N 9-12 3 M 6 . 12, 3 W 6/2 !! 'M width only



FORMAL FOOTWEAD

A complete formal look is the artistic coordination of impeccable style subtlety and understatement from head to toe. Magil formal shoes are the finishing touches of inconspicuous sophistication. Patent leathers, gros grains, and elegant ornamentation create the perfect formal attitude.





PEYTON

Ribbed gros grain fabric with satin pleated sash across vamp. Fully leather lined

OGTIO Black
Sizes Mi6 2 12 13



PADUS

Plan toe, positive fit patent eather formal shoe has gros grain pleated sash across vamp.

Fully eather lined

0.5810 Black

Sizes M 6' 2 12 13



BRISTOL

Plain toe positive fit patent leather formal shoe has gros grain penny saddle. Fully leather I ned O4 410. Black Patent Leather.

Szes W 6 2 12 13



GENE

All over gros grain center gore plain toe formal shoe has a gold and leather ornament. Fully leather lined.

18116 Black Gros Grain

18116 Black Gros Grain Szes N 9 12, 13 N 6 2 12 13



PUCCI

Patent eather formal shoe has gros grain bow and is fully leather lined

03910 Black Patent Leather

Sizes N 9-12 13 M 6 12, 13

FBI(24 cv 1564) 2613





MANZO

Genunc handsewil moccasin Folded Roya Callsk , vamp Center gore Filly eather lined

17310 Black 17320 Brown 17370 Burgandy Sizes N 9 12 3 N 7 12 3



JULES

Baby soft Nappa positive fit baseball stitched slip on Liced tissel Fary leather ned

08910 Buck 08920 Brown 08940 Bic 08950 Bone 08960 White 08970 Burgundy Szcs N 9 12 13 W 6 12 13 W 7 II



JAN

Baby soft Nappa positive fit basebal stiched's plan Kiltle and tassel fully either ned

09710 Back

09720 Brown

09740 Blue

09750 Bone

09760 White

09770 Burgundy Sizes N 9 12 3 M 6 , 12 13 W 7 1 Smooth, soft and buttery textures are the subtle characteristics that distinguish these avish slip-ons. The minute you slip into them, you'll appreciate the fit and feel of handsewn quanty



BEAU

Unlined, positive fit genuine moccasin slip-on Shawl kiltie and tassel. Tumbled Caifskin and Opanka sole

17010 Black

17020 Brown

17023 lt Brown

17050 Bone

17060 White'

17070 Burgundy

Szes N 9 12, 13, M 61/2 12, 13, W 7-11

* **W** width only



BAXTER

Unlined, positive fit genuine moccasin with tied tassel. Tumbled Calfskin and Opanka sole.

17110 Black

17120 Brown

17123 Lt Brown

17130 Bone'

17160 White'

17170 Burgundy

Sizes N 9 12, 13, M 6/2 12, 13, W 7 II

* M width only



BUCKLEY

Positive fit genu ne moccasin slip on Kiltie with quarter lacing and tassie. Fully leather lined Tumbled Calfskin and Opanka sole.

17510 Black

17520 Brown

17523 Lt Brown

17570 Burgundy

Sizes N 9-12, 13, M 6 2 12, 13 W 7 II

Recapture the lost shoemaker art of fiddle bottom construction in these lightweight slip-ons. Finished with wraparound opanka soles as only Bruno Magli could craft them





ТОРЕКА

Genuine Deerskin handsewn moccasin inset strapland tasse of Caifskin. Fully leather lined.

O1319 Black Tan Combo.

Sizes N 9 12 3 M 6 2 2 13 W 6 2-11



TATE

Genuine Deerskin handsewn moccasin. Kitte tasse ico lar and quarter acing of Caifskin Fully leather lined.

O1519 Back Tan Combo.
Sizes N 9-12,13 M 6 : 12 3 W 6 2-



AARON


Genuine handsewn moccasin Kitte tasse slip on with quarter acing Genuine Deerskin Fully cather lined 11610 Black 11640 Blue 11620 Brown 11650 Bone 11626 Brandy 11670 Burgundy Sizes N 9 2 13 M 6 2-12, 3 W 7 II



TAMPA

Genuine Deerskin handsewn moccasin. Kittle and strap of Calfskin. Ft. y leather lined. 01819. Black Tan Combo. Sizes N 9- 2-13. M 6-2-12, 3-W 6-2.







VAVAHO

Super soft Baby Nappa positive litis ip on Stiddle with horse bit ornament and tied tasse Fally without med

37210 Black 37250 Bone 37220 Brown 37260 White 37240 Blue 37270 Bargundy Sizes N 9 12 13 M 6 12 13 W 7 n



DARCY

Baby Napph wested not societies gore sipio with BRUNO MAGLI logo ornament Filly either ned

Filly enther ned

06610 Brick

06620 Brown

06610 Blue

06630 Borle

06660 White

06670 Burgindy

06690 Grey

Sizes N 9 12 13 4 5

VI 5 12 33 14 15, W 5 12




DARREN

Baby Nappa inverted not toe center gore slip-on


Fit y leather lined 06710 Bluck 06720 Brown 06710 Bluc' 06750 Bone' 06760 White 06770 Berguedy 06790 Grey

Sizes N 9 12 13 M 6 2 12 13 M 6 2 11 M width orly



M B

Today's casual ifestyle is a study in contrasts. Relaxed soph sticated and stylish a lin unison. The Club Collection is a unique selection of footwear designed to fit effort essity into an active man's world





SHERATON

Kirle wing tip's pion. Concealed center gore. Parma Calfskin upper with combination eather micro sole. Fully leather incd.

33310 Black

33319 Block Tip.

33320 Brown

33325 In

33319 Blie Green

33379 Burgundy Grey

33391 Back Grey

Szes N 9 2 13 W 6 12 3 W 7 II M width only



STEVEN

Four eye of wing tip ballic Parma Caliskin upper with combination leather in croisoic Fully leather fined

34019 Back Tan

34025 Inc

31019 Bue Green'

34079 Bargandy Grey

34094 Back Grey!

Szes N 9 12 13 M 6 . 12 13 W 7 II M width or y



STRAND

Four cycles wing tip balaic Rib of Calf apper with combination, eather micro sole fully eather ned

33010 Block 33017 Black Patent Calf

33070 Burgandy

Sizes N 9 12 13 M 6 12 13 W 7 II



STAFFORD

Four eye or ip air too ne. Riib off Calt upper with combinition either micro sole. Fully leather fined

33110 Back

33127 Back Patert Call

33120 Brown

33170 Burgundy

Szes N 9 12 13 M 6 12 13 W 7 II



SALSBURY

Positive fit. Parma Calfskin slip on. Hanging casse. and quarter acing. Combination, eather micro sole Fully leather I ned

33410 Block 33119 Blue Green

33419 Black

33179 Burgundy Grey Brandy 33494 Black Grey'

33420 Brown

33 125 Jan

Szes N 9 12 13, W 6 12 3 W 7 II

1 M width only

The best of all possible worlds merge in these ghtweight shoes Euxurious call uppersion a unique leather and micro sole for a truly original nt and fee





LUTHER

Three eyelet Nabuk leather blucher tie chukka boot Padded collar M cro sole and fully leather lined

36410 Black

36420 Brown

36426 Brandy

36440 Blue

36463 Winter White

36487 Olive

Sizes N 9-12, 13, M 6½-12, 13, W 7 II



LOGAN

Four eyelet plain too balltie. Nabuk leather with micro sole. Fully leather ined

36010 Black

36020 Brown

36026 Brandy

36040 Blue

36063 Winter White

36087 Olive

Sizes N 9-12, 13, M 6/2-12, 13, W 7-11



LINCOLN

four eyelet, moc toe bal tie. Nabuk leather with micro sole. Fully leather ined

35510 Black

35520 Brown

35526 Brandy

35540 Blue

35563 Winter White

35587 Olive

Sizes N 9 12, 13, M 6/2-12, 13 W 7-11

Soft, light and sophisticated shoes. Crafted in durable Nabuk leathers on micro soles for feather light comfort



LORENZO

Moc toe four cyclet blucher tie Padded tongue and arch support. Textured Nabuk leather Rubber sole Fully eather ned

36810 Black 36820 Brown 36826 Brandy 36840 Bale 36863 Winter White

36887 Olive

Szes 116.2 13



LYON

Plain toe four eyelet bal tie Padded tongue and arch support. Textured Nabuk eather Rubber so e. Fully leather lined.

36510 Black

36520 Brown

36526 Brandy

36540 Blue


36563 Winter White

36387 Olive

Sizes 11 6 x 12 13



The cushiony feel of rubber soles The unexpected richness of textured Nabuk appers. Rugged, casual yet distinctively set in the Bruno Mag i mold





PERRY

Ger ine handsewnik tic moccasin with tasse Joined Nabik Call

26310 Back

26320 Brown

26340 Buc

26350 Bone

26360 White

26396 Trupe

Szes N 9 12 13 M 6 12 13 W 7 II



WINDSOR

All over woven positive it's plan Unined Buffa o Call

03310 Back

03326 Brandy

03350 Bone

03360 White

Sizes 11 6 2 13



PENN

Gent ne handsewr in hed positive fit moccasin Kittle tasse with woven ramp Unlined Buffalo Cuf

16210 Back

16226 Brandy

16250 Bone

16260 Ante

16270 Burgundy

Sizes M 6 12 13



PATRIC

Ger line handsewn kit cinoccasin with tasse. Unired Buffato Call

26110 Back

26126 Brandy


26140 Bic

26150 Bonc

26160 Ante

26170 Burg ndy

Szes N 9 12 13 W 6 12 13 W 7 II



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02225 Te

02240 B &

02250 Bo

02260 77 -

02270 B , ny

02271 Rc

02290 Crey

02296 Trips

Szcs N 9 2 13 M 6 12 13 W 6 11 " W & dth on y



ABNER

Genune handsewn aced moccasin Kitic and tassel Unined Buffalo Car

02010 Black

02025 Tan

020 to Blue'

02050 Bone

02060 White'

02070 Bergundy

02074 Red"


02090 Grey

02096 Taupe

5 zes > 9 12 3 M 6 12 13 W 6.

"Ne width only

FBI(24-cv-1564)-2624 ²⁷



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOI, PA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET FOI, PA# 24 cv 1564

Total Deleted Page(s) 2 Page 31 ~ Duplicate, Page 32 ~ Duplicate,

 October 13, 1994 FEDERAL EXPRESS

Robert L. Shapiro, Esq. 2121 Avenue of the Stars Nineteenth Floor Los Angeles, California 90067

> RE: PEOPLE V. ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

> > CASE NUMBER: BA097211

Dear Mr. Shapiro:

Pursuant to a telephonic request I received yesterday I am enclosing another copy of the computer diskette relating to the population data that was previously forwarded to you in a letter dated October 5, 1994, from Mr. Howard Shapiro, General Counsel of the FBT. [advised that your office was unable to locate the diskette and requested a second copy.

Sincerely yours,

<u>Associate General Counsel</u>

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Enclosure

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
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1 - Mr. H. M. Shapiro Ahlerich l M. 3 Mr Ж. ₩. Nimmich 3 5444 58 43 54 on parties Sometime of the 7064 1 64 G ABOVE SEX DIE E



FBI(24-cv-1564)-2647

Office of the Los Angeles County District Attorney Hall of Records b6 -11 320 West Temple b7C -11 Los Angeles, California Office of the Alameda County District Attorney 661 Washington Street Oakland, California 94607 Z *** Deputy District Attorney 101 W. Broadway, Suite 1440 San Diego, California 94607 b6 -12 Note: This letter responds to a telephonic request made by who claimed that the 10/5/94 letter 67C -12 defense attorney did not contain the referenced diskette. However, he did concede that it could have been misplaced at his office. <u>04</u> d£550 1633 Cipa me Com an info of Punic & Cong. Affi Sport. Persunne . b6 -1 ath the b7C -1 harpeceion,


2 - Marcia Clark. Esq.

Below, Debton,

SEP LES LIVES b6 -11 b7C -11 Office of the Alameda County District Attorney 661 Washington Street Oakland, California 94607 REI DETULE 4, LINEAH Desire remark to take request, and only closed 15th a page to b6 -3 of materials pertaining to which may be of LETO LOUI application to your The Dive Lunci Sugarromus Eupunic (Dallet, currently wes no information concerning defense experts We multi apprior the any Anthernation you have obtain currently Love superis Gurana their pertiripation in the abovecaptioned matter. It you have in that weststamme of information, pience consuct the Dithits of salapprone number (187) 124-4919, Paracrile number (202) 324-1043. Sincerely yours, Bewager Spangaro General Proposit 25 76 可好人 W/C /2 DNA Legal Assistance Subunit Shallendens. Dellegie Tintained in room 7879.

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
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Office of the Los Angeles
County District Attorney
Hall of Records
320 West Temple
Los Angeles, California 90012

re: people v. orenthal james simpson


LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT CASE NUMBER: BA097211 DEFENSE DISCOVERY REQUEST


Dear

b6 -11,12 b7С -11,12


I am writing in response to your letter dated January 9, 1995, which attached a defense DNA discovery request letter dated January 5, 1995, from of the defense team in the captioned case.

As you know, the FBI has conducted no DNA testing in the captioned case and is under no legal obligation to provide any of the materials requested by the defense. However, as we noted in our October 5, 1994, letter to Mr. Shapiro in response to a September 26, 1994, subpoena, we have no objection to providing copies of articles and the underlying population data if the information has already been disseminated to other scientists or presented in public forums, and does not present Code of Federal Regulations or Privacy Act problems.





FBI(24 cv 1564) 2655



I have carefully reviewed the defense letter and have identified only three requests (B, D and F) that apply to the FBI. Each is under the Articles section of ______letter and appears to request the underlying data for several peer-reviewed papers written by the FBI and other scientists. I will address each request separately.

The request states:

5. Articles.

The defense requests the underlying data from the following validation articles produced by Roche and the FBI Laboratories. There have been previous representations from Roche, the FBI, and the prosecutors that there is no objection to the production of this data from articles that are published or in press:

- B. Comey, Budowle, et. al, <u>PCR Amplification and</u>
 <u>Typing of the HLA DQ Alpha Gene in Forensic Samples</u>, 38
 J. Forensic Sci. 239 (1993);
- D. Jung, Comey, Baer, and Budowle, Extraction Strategy for Obtaining DNA from Bloodstains for PCR Amplification and Typing of HLA DO Alpha Gene, Int. Journal of Legal Medicine (?) [sic] 145 (1991); and
- F. Budowle, et al, <u>Validation and Population Studies</u> of the Loci LDLR, GYPA, HBGG, D788, and Gc (PM Loci), and HLA-DO Alpha Using Multiplex Amplification and <u>Typing Procedure</u>, J. Forensic Sci. (In Press).

FBI Response to Request B and D: It appears the defense is seeking copies of the underlying data used to generate these two papers which have already been peer reviewed, published and widely disseminated in the scientific community. The material being sought by the defense is voluminous and includes notes, papers, typing strips, photographs, other laboratory records which would be extremely expensive and time-consuming to duplicate. Furthermore, the Forensic Research and Training Center is currently understaffed and does not have the personnel resources to duplicate the large amount of material associated with these two papers in a timely fashion. Consequently, the FBI is not able to provide the materials pursuant to the defense request.



b6 -1 b7C -1

FBI Response to Request F: We provided this material to the defense on a computer diskette on October 5, 1994, and again on October 13, 1994, after telephonically contacted me and advised that he had been unable to locate the first diskette we had sent.

Please do not hesitate to contact me at (202) 324-8550 if you have any questions or need to discuss this matter further.

Sincerely yours,

Associate General Counsel



LOS ANGES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTOMNEY'S OFFICE

BUREAU OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS • ORGANIZED CRIME AND ANTI-TERRORIST DIVISION

GIL GARCETTI • District Attorney
SANDRA L. BUTTITTA • Chief Deputy District Attorney
R. DAN MURPHY • Assistant District Attorney

ROGER J. GUNSON • Director

October	12.	1994


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Federal Bureau of Investigations	
Headquarters 9th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW,	
Room 7159	
Washington, D.C. 20535	
Re: <u>People v. Orenthal James Simpson</u> BA097211	
Dear	ъ6 -1,11
	₽40 -1,11
Pursuant to your conversation with enclosed please fi a copy of the defense Motion to Exclude DNA Evidence.	nd
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.	
Very truly yours,	
GIL GARCETTI	_
District Attorney	
Ву	
Law Clerk	
	1.C 1.11
Enclosure	b6 -1,11 b7C -1,11

ENCL BEHIND PALE

19714-1081150

18-702A Criminal Courts Bldg. 210 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 (213) 974-3785 FBI(24 cv 1564) 2658



October 12, 1994

Howard M. Shapiro General Counsel FBI Headquarters Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Mr. Shapiro:

I have been authorized by Los Abgeles County Deputy District
Attorney to formally request the assistance of FBIb6 -1,11
research scientist for the admissibility hearingb7c -1.11
in the case of People v. Orenthal James Simpson now pending in Los
Angeles County. The admissibility hearing is tentatively scheduled
to begin on November 1, 1994. I am aware thatwill be
out of the country from November 6- 26 and will find a way to work
around his prior commitments.
We have defined the scope oftestimony within the
parameters which you have described in letter to
dated October 7, 1994. In order to avoid any confusion
on this issue, I will articulate the parameters of
testimony again. There are two forms of DNA typing which have been
utilized in the Cimpson gage DELD and DCD will be
asked to explain the evolution of the statistics debate concerning DNA-RFLP testing. In the PCR part of the admissibility hearing b7c -1,3,11
DNA-RFLP testing. In the PCR part of the admissibility hearing 18 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
will be examined about the large sets of population -1,3,11
data which he has in his possession, which also forms the basis for
the testimony of other prosecution witnesses. Under no
circumstances will be asked to examine the actual
casework performed by the testing labs in this case. These matters
are clearly irrelevant to any admissibility consideration under the
legal authority of People v. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771.
legal authority of People v. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771.
Thank you, for your consideration in this important matter. (
contributions to the development and implementation of
all aspects of forensic DNA typing constitute some of the most
significant achievements in this area. Should he be permitted to
testify in this case, it will reflect quite favorably upon the
FBI's continuing commitment to improvements in our system of instice
justice. Q7-HQ- Cb7c -1,11
•
Sincerely.
Senior Deputy District Attorney

October 5, 1994 FEDERAL EXPRESS

Robert L. Shapiro, Esq. 2121 Avenue of the Stars Nineteenth Floor Los Angeles, California 90067


> RE: PEOPLE V. ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT CASE NUMBER: BA097211

Dear Mr. Shapiro:

We are in receipt of your subpoena dated September 26, 1994, which was received at FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C., on September 27, 1994.

For your information, disclosure of any information or data in the possession of the FBI is controlled by 28 C.F.R., sections 16.21 - 16.29, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C., Section 552(a). In order for the FBI to consider whether disclosure of the information or data you are seeking is appropriate, it will be necessary for you to serve an <u>enforceable</u> subpoena at FBI Headquarters and provide the information required by the C.F.R. Furthermore, even if you comply with the C.F.R. provisions, it appears that some of the information you have requested may fall under the provisions of the Privacy Act which prohibit the FBI from disclosing information concerning an individual without that individual's notarized written consent, or a valid court order specifically authorizing the FBI to disclose the requested information.

Despite your failure to serve a jurisdictionally valid subpoena, obtain a court order, or comply with the C.F.R. and Privacy Act regulations, the FBI is providing you with a copy of five in-press scientific papers and the accompanying population



Dep. Dir. _ ADD Adm.

ADD lov





Robert L. Shapiro, Esq.

- 1. Hochmeister, M.N., Budowle, B., Borer, U.V., and Dirnhofer, R., <u>Swiss Population Data on the Loci HLA-DQ Alpha, LDLR, GYPA, HBGG, D7S8, Gc, and D1S80;</u> Forens. Sci. Int. (in press).
- 2. Budowle, B., Baechtel, F.S., Smerick, J.B., Presley, K.W., Giusti, A.M., Parsons, G., Alevy, M., and Chakraborty, R., D1S80 Population Data in African Americans, Caucasians, Southeastern Hispanics, Southwestern Hispanics, and Orientals; J. Forens. Sci. (in press).
- 3. Huang, N.E. and Budowle, B., <u>Chinese Population</u>
 <u>Data on the PCR-based Loci HLA-DO Alpha, LDLR, GYPA,</u>
 HBGG, D7S8, and Gc; **Human Heredity** (in press).
- 4. Budowle, B., Lindsey, J.A., Decou, J.A., Koons, B.W., Giusti, A.M., and Comey, C.T., <u>Validation and Population Studies of the Loci LDLR, GYPA, HBGG, D7S8, and Gc (PM loci), and HLA-DQ Alpha Using a Multiplex Amplification and Typing Procedure; J. Forens. Sci. (in press).</u>
- 5. Huang, N.E., Chakraborty, R., and Budowle, B., D1S80 Allele Frequencies in a Chinese Population; Int. J. Leg. Med. (in press).
- 6. One diskette containing the raw population data for the papers listed in enclosures 1-6.

The information contained in these papers and the accompanying data have already been disseminated to other scientists or presented in public forums, and do not present C.F.R. or Privacy Act problems. The papers are all in-press and will be published soon in the referenced journals.

The FBI objects to the production of any additional information regarding PCR-based population data at this time since our research is continuing, and premature release of any

Robert L. Shapiro, Esq.

data may harm ongoing research efforts at the FBI Laboratory. However, as explained earlier, we cannot even consider your request until you have complied with all of the applicable provisions of the C.F.R. and Privacy Act. Once you have satisfied all of the requirements, we will provide you with a detailed response stating our position to each of your requests.

Any questions regarding to Associate General Counsel	40 (202) 021 0000	5 -1 'C -:
	Sincerely yours,	C
	Howard M. Shapiro General Counsel	
Enclosures (6)		
2 - Marcia Clark, Esq. Office of the Los Angeles County District Attorney Hall of Records 320 West Temple Los Angeles, California 90012		
Office of the Alameda County District Attorney 661 Washington Street Oakland, California 94607	b6 -11 b7C -11	
Deputy District Attorney 101 W. Broadway, Suite 1440 San Diego, California 94607		
Note: This letter responds to a substitute of the second states and the Investigation of the second states and the Investigation of the second states are second states.		
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- ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT A' ROBERT L. SHAPIRO, I 2121 Avenue of the Stars Los Angeles, CA 90067		тель	FOR CO	URT USE ONLY
_ ·	it, ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON			
	anch court, if any, and post office and street address.			
Title of case. PEOPLE V ORENTHAL JA	AMES SIMPSON	*		
SUBPENA (CRIMINAL, OR DUCES TECUM	JUVENILE)		CASE NUMBER: BA097211	
	STATE OF CALIFORNIA (NAME): C	ustodian of Reco	ords, Federal I	l Bureau of
Investigation, Laboratory, C	•			
a. Date: October 3, 199	94 Time: 9:00 a.m. □Dept.: 103	□Div.: □ Room) :	
b. Address: Los Angele 210 West T	s Superior Court emple Street Los Angeles, California 900	012		
2. AND YOU ARE				
a. ordered to appear	•			
b. In not required to apper of records in complete	ar in person if you produce the records described in the rance with Evidence Code sections 1560, 1561, 1562, a	accompanying affidated and 1271. (1) Place a	vit and a completed copy of the records	declaration of custodian in an envelope (or other
wrapper). Enclose envelope the case n outer envelope, se	your original declaration with the records. Seal them ame and number, your name and date, time and place of it, and mail it to the clerk of the court at the address ty shown at the top of this form.	(2) Attach a copy of from item 1 (the box	this subpena to the above). (3) Place	envelope or write on the this first envelope in an
or other qualified w (b) of section 1560	n person and to produce the records described in the actimess and the production of the original records is red, and 1562, of the Evidence Code will not be deemed	quired by this subpend sufficient compliance	a. The procedure a with this subpena	nuthorized by subdivision
d. ordered to make the attorney's repr	ne original business records described in the accompar esentative and to permit copying at your business add	nying affidavit availabl ress under reasonable	le for inspection at conditions during n	your business address by ormal business hours.
3. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUEST YOUR PRESENCE IS REQU	TIONS ABOUT THE TIME OR DATE FOR YOU TURED, CONTACT THE FOLLOWING PERSON	TO APPEAR, OR IF BEFORE THE DAT	YOU WANT TO E ON WHICH YO	
a Name:	b. Telephone	number: (310-556-7	886)	Ь6 −12 Ь7С −1
4. WITNESS FEES: You r item 3 AFTER your appear	may be entitled to witness fees, muleage, or both rance.	in the discretion of	the court. Conta	
DISOBEDIENCE OF THIS SU ISSUE FOR YOUR ARREST I	BPENA MAY BE PUNISHED BY A FINE, IM F YOU FAIL TO APPEAR.	IPRISONMENT &	DBOTH. A W	WRANT MAY
FOR COURT USE ONLY	Date: September 26, 1994	(SIGNATURE	of Person iss	SUING SUBPENA)
		` _		-
		Robert L. Sh	apiro	·····
		(TYPE OR PRINT N	(AME)
	(See reverse for proof of service)	-		IAMES SIMPSON
	SUBPENA (CRIMINAL OR JUVEN	SENJOE A	(TITLE)	b6 -1 b7C -1
Form Adopted by Rule 982	SUBPENA	9-17-94	- 2:1584	Penal Code § 1326 et seq.
Judicial Council of California	(CRIMINAL OR JUVEN	1L9		ons Code,§§ 341, 664, 1727
982(a) (16) [Rev. January 1, 1991]	11 of 1/1/2			
	q //_ ·			FBI(24-cv-1564)-2661

PEOPLE V. O. J. SIMPSON

982(a)(16) [Rev. January 1, 1991]

CASE NUMBER BA097211

PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUBPENA

1. I served this \square Subpena \square Subpena Duces Tecum and suppreserved as follows:	orting affidavit by personally delivering a copy to the person
a. Person served (name):	
b. Address where served:	•
c. Date of delivery: d. Tirue of delivery:	
2. I received tius subpena for service on (date):	
3. NON-SERVICE RETURN OF SUBPENA a. After due search, careful inquiry, and diligent attempts business, I have been unable to make personal delivery county on the following persons (specify):	at the dwelling house or usual place of abode or usual place of of this Subpena Subpena Duces Tecum in this
 b. Reason: (1) Unknown at address. (2) Moved, forwarding address unknown. (3) No such address. 	(4) ☐ Out-of-county address. (5) ☐ Unable to serve hearing date. (6) ☐ Other reasons (explanation required):
 4. Person serving: a. Not a registered California process server. b. California sheriff, marshal, or constable. c. Registered California process server. d. Employee or independent contractor of a registered California process server. 	 e. Exempt from registration under Bus. & Prof. Code section 22350(b). f. Name, address, and telephone number and, if applicable, county of registration and number:
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Date:	(For California sheriff, marshal, or constable use only) I certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Date:
(SIGNATURE)	(SIGNATURE)



AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

Declarant is the attorney for the defendant, ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON, in the matter of <u>People v. Orenthal James Simpson</u>, Los Angeles Superior Court Case Number BA097211. Said cause is pending in Department 103 of the Los Angeles Superior Court.

The Custodian of Records, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Laboratory, Quantico, Virginia has in its possession or under his/her control the following documents or materials:


- 1. Hard copies of databases for D1580 and polymarker systems: Please provide printed copies of all databases in the possession of the laboratory provided in a format such that the multi-probe genotype is given for each sample tested (that is, all alleles for all probes).
- 2. Database disc for D1580 and polymarker systems: Please provide a computer version of all databases (on DOS formatted 3-1/2" disc or equivalent) provided in a format such that the multi-probe genotype is given for each sample tested.
- 3. Construction of databases for D1580 and polymarker systems: Please provide copies of all documents related to the source or origin of samples in laboratory's databases, including but not limited to: documents concerning the method by which samples were collected, the background or characteristics of individuals who were the source of the samples, the choice of populations and sub-populations to be sampled and the nature of the sample procedure used to collect the samples. In the event that samples were obtained from an outside agency, please identify outside agency by institution name, contact-person, address, phone number, and provide copies of all correspondence with that

111 - 11 m

agency.

ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON

b7C -3





October 12, 1994

Howard M. Shapiro General Counsel FBI Headquarters Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Mr. Shapiro:

b6 -1,11 b7C -1,11

•
I have been authorized by Los Angeles County Deputy District
Attorney to formally request the assistance of FBI
in the case of People v. Orenthal James Simpson now pending in Los
Angeles County. The admissibility hearing is tentatively scheduled
to begin on November 1, 1994. I am aware that will be
out of the country from November 6- 26 and will find a way to work
around his prior commitments.
We have defined the scope of testimony within the
<u> </u>
parameters which you have described in letter to
dated October 7, 1994. In order to avoid any confusion
on this issue, I will articulate the parameters of
testimony again. There are two forms of DNA typing which have been
utilized in the Simpson case, RFLP and PCR.
asked to explain the evolution of the statistics debate concerning
DNA-DTID togtion . In the DOD next of the educationists because
DNA-RFLP testing. In the PCR part of the admissibility hearing,
will be examined about the large sets of population
data which he has in his possession, which also forms the basis for
the testimony of other prosecution witnesses. Under no
circumstances will be asked to examine the actual
casework performed by the testing labs in this case. These matters
are clearly irrelevant to any admissibility consideration under the
legal authority of People v. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771. b6 -1,3.11
b7C -1,3,1
Thank you for your consideration in this important matter.
contributions to the development and implementation of
all aspects of forensic DNA typing constitute some of the most
significant achievements in this area. Should he be permitted to
testify in this case, it will reflect quite favorably upon the
FBI's continuing commitment to improvements in our system of
diametric di man
BO 1,11
b7C -1,11
Sincerely,
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\

1: 21/15-1

FBI(24-cv-1564)-2667

Senior Deputy District Attorney

October 7, 1994

Office of the Los Angeles County District Attorney Hall of Records 320 West Temple Los Angeles, California 90012 b6 -1,11 b7C -1,11 TESTIMONY OF RE: ON FORENSIC DNA MATTERS AN PEOPLE V. ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT CASE NUMBER: BA097211 Dear Several weeks ago I was contacted by Senior Deputy District Attorney of Alameda County b6 -1,11 regarding the testimony of in the Simpson b7C -1,11 is the FBI's chief DNA As you know, prosecution. researcher and developed the forensic RFLP and PCR procedures used by the FBI Laboratory Division and many other forensic _explained laboratories in the <u>United States and abr</u>oad. that he, along with of the San Diego District Attorney's office, would be assisting you in the DNA portions of the Simpson prosecution. He indicated that the prosecution wished to obtain FBI approval for testify at the DNA admissibility hearing scheduled for later this 111/1/2 1/4 50-8 year. Initially, FBI management was extremely hesitant to to testify since the FBI had not conducted b6 -1,11 authorize any DNA examinations in this case. However, based on the b7C -1,11 information I obtained in several conversations with you, ADD Adm. I was able to convince FBI management to give Aset, Dir.: Adm. Serve. Crim. Inv. _ 1 - Mr. H. M. Shapiro 1 1 М. <u>Ahlerich</u> 1 Legal Coun. 1 Rec. Mgnt. Tech. Servs.. 1 ILU (DNALAU) W. Nimmich Training b6 -1 1 Cong. Atts. Off. b7C -1 Off. of EEO Off, Lisison & int. Atts.

FBI(24 cv 1564) 2668

Dep. Dir.

ADD Inv.

ident.

Intell. tab.

Off. of Public Affa. Telephone Him.

b6 -1,11 b7c -1,11
tentative approval for
To date, we have still not received a written request for testimony. When I discussed the matter with you last week, you advised that was handling the request. However, told me that he was not handling the matter and had not been in contact with you for the past three weeks, and was unsure whether he or would be assisting in the case. b6 -1,11 b7c -1,11
This lack of communication has caused FBI management great concern and they are now reconsidering their tentative approval for to testify. I was only able to obtain tentative approval for testimony after I convinced FBI management that you, were three of the most experienced DNA attorneys in the country, and that I have complete confidence in your individual and collective judgement to call as a witness.
However, I am concerned over the confusion that has arisen over the role of I believe that it will be a grave mistake if you fail to take advantage of their considerable expertise in your hearing. Although I know you are entirely capable of conducting the admissibility hearing on your own, based on my exposure to Messrs over a four year period in <u>United States v.</u> I believe you will be overwhelmed and unable to adequately prepare for the defense challenge at the hearing. During our preparation and throughout the admissibility hearing in we were overwhelmed despite the fact that we had two FBI attorneys, two prosecutors,

b6 -3,11,12 b7C -3,11,12

and two paralegals working on the DNA issues on a full-time

basis.

. . . .

b6 -1,11 b7C -1,11

Esq.

The FBI remains committed to providing your office with whatever assistance possible in this case. I am hopeful that you can immediately resolve the communication and delegation problems that have arisen so that we can proceed to assist you as requested. As you know, the outcome of this case will have a major impact on other pending and future DNA cases throughout the country. I am sure you share my desire that we should all work together on this case to ensure your hearing takes advantage of the best prosecution and FBI resources available.

Please contact me at (202) 324-8550 at your earliest convenience to discuss this matter further.

Sincerely yours,

Associate General Counsel

Office of the Alameda County
District Attorney
661 Washington Street
Oakland, California 94607

b6 -1,11,12 b7C -1,11,12

Deputy District Attorney
101 W. Broadway, Suite 1440
San Diego, California 94607

ASPANOVED: Contract C



DATE:	February 14. 1995	PRECEDENCE:	ъ6 -1,11
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	PRIORITY
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FROM: VESTIGATIVE LAW UNIT NA LEGAL ASSISTANCE SUBUNIT FBI HEADQUARTERS, ROOM 7879 10TH ST. & PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 TELEPHONE (202) 324-4419 FACSIMILE (202) 324-1043	20 - 1-2 71 /O
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-DNA LEGAL ASSISTANCE UNIT-

> 197-40-1081150-10 ENCLOSURE

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March 20, 1995

FEDERAL EXPRESS

b6 -11 b7С -11

Office of the Los Angeles
County District Attorney
Hall of Records
320 West Temple
Los Angeles, California 90012

RE: PEOPLE V. ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

CASE NUMBER: BA097211

EDTA VALIDATION STUDIES AND

SHOE PRINT EXAMINATION CORRESPONDENCE

Dear

I am writing as a follow up to my letter to you dated March 3, 1995, to provide you additional discovery materials in the captioned case. Enclosed are the following:


1. Two (2) copies of the validation studies relating to EDTA tests performed by the FBI Laboratory; and

b6 -1,11 b7C -1,11

2. Two (2) copies of all notes and/or correspondence relating to contacts by with various shoe manufacturers.

The shoe print examination correspondence supplements the notes I provided to you in my March 3, 1995. I have now provided you with all of the notes and/or correspondence

1	-				Shapiro	
1	-	Mr.	Μ.	Α.	Ahlerich	
1	-					
1						-
1		Mr.	K.	W.	Nimmich	
1		Mr.	к.	W.	Nimmich	_
1 1 1	- -	Mr.	K.	W.	Nimmich	_



b6 −1 b7C −1 generated to date in connection with the FBI Laboratory's shoe print examination in the captioned case, except for photographs and accompanying transparent overlays, which cannot be sufficiently duplicated on a photo copy machine. These photographs and overlays cannot be released but are available for inspection at FBI Headquarters.

print examinations are not yet complete. They will be forwarded to you as soon as they are completed.

We have reviewed all of the discovery requests directed to the FBI Laboratory, and unless otherwise noted, have complied with each request even though many are clearly outside the normal scope of discovery. We leave it to your discretion to decide whether some of the materials we have provided in response to the discovery requests are outside scope and should not be turned over to the defense.

please do not hesitate to contact of my staff at (202) 324-8550 if you have any questions or need further assistance in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Howard M. Shapiro General Counsel

Enclosures (3)

3 - Marcia Clark, Esq.

b6 −11 b7C −11

·b6 -1

b7C -1



LAW OFFICES

JOHNNIE L. COCHRAN, JR. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

4929 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1010 LUS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 80010 (213) 931-6200

FAX (213) 931-952

OF COUNSEL DONALO K WILSON, JR

WASHINGTON D.C. OFFICE CAP TOL HILL WEST BUILDING 201 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE N E WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002 PHONE (202) 547-9225 FAX (202) 547-9228

JOHNNIE L COCHRAN, JR.* EDD'E J HARRIS ERIC G FERRER** CARL E. DOUGLAS CAMERON A STEWART CLARA HILL WILLIAMS SHAWN'S CHAPMAN WILMER J HARRIS VICTORIA E K NG

댝.

*ALSO MEMBER WASHINGTON D.C. BAR **ALSO MEMBER NEW YORK BAR

VIA FAX AND MAIL

January 29, 1995

Associate General Counsel U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, DC 20535

ъ6 -1 b7C -1

People v. Orenthal James Simpson LASC Case No. BA 097211 Case No. BA097211

Dear

This is in response to your letter dated January 10, 1995 regarding our request for the data underlying published studies involving the FBI. You have indicated an unwillingness to make the requested information available to us as it would be too time consuming to do so. In an effort to accommodate your concerns, we are providing you with a more specific request for information that will be less burdensome on you to produce.

197-144-1081150-11 We therefore request the following.

- COMEY, BUDOWLE, et al. PCR Amplification and Typing of HLA Α. Dga Gene in Forensic Samples, 38 J. Forensic Sci. 239 (1993)
 - Color copies of figure 1 as it appears in the original 1. publication as the xerox copies we received are unreadable.

For the following samples referred to in the study, please provide color photographs [or black and white photographs if color pictures do not exist] as close to first generation of all testing strips, yield gels, product gels or slot blots pertaining to those samples plus any associated work papers showing the source of the samples and any processing of those samples:

The 206 known and 26 questioned bloodstains used in the study.

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let to Johnnie R. Cochian, Tr., Eog. for Howard M. Shopute 2-13-95 FRI(24 N 156A)

FBI(24 cv 1564) 2679

b6 −1 b7С −1

January 30, 1995 Page 2


- 3. The samples showing 3 or more alleles [referred to on page 241]
- 4. The 60 questioned samples where there was no DQa result initially [including all data on the retests done with these samples].
- 5. Selected cases highlighted in the study numbered 25, 42, 48, 65, and 95.
- B. BUDOWLE. et al <u>Validation and Population Studies of the</u>
 <u>Loci LDLR, GYPA, HBGG, D7S8, and GC [PM loci], and the HLA-DQa using a Multiplex Amplification and Typing Procedure,</u>
 Journal of Forensic Sci. [The disks previously provided on this article contained only genotype tables. We are requesting other information]
 - 1. For samples 1119, 1127, 1123, 1181, 1341 and any other samples where dot intensity across loci or within loci was determined to be different, color photographs [or black and white photographs if color pictures do not exist] as close to first generation of all testing strips, yield gels, product gels, or slot blots pertaining to those samples plus any associated work papers showing the source of the samples and any processing of those samples.
 - 2. Please provide color copies of all figures from the article. As to figures 4 and figure 5, color photographs [or black and white photographs if color pictures do not exist] as close to first generation of all testing strips, yield gels, product gels or slot blots pertaining to those samples plus any associated work papers showing the source of the samples and any processing of those samples.

b6 -1 b7C -1

January 30, 1995 Page 3

3. For each of the 113 samples referred to in the environmental insult study [table 2], color photographs [or black and white photographs if color pictures do not exist] as close to first generation of all testing strips, yield gels, product gels or slot blots pertaining to those samples plus any associated work papers showing the source of the samples and any processing of those samples.

Your prompt response to the above requests will be greatly appreciated.



b6 -11,12 b7C -11,12

cc: Judge Lance Ito

c simpsnoj\sylvstr.ltr & a:f 51

FBI/DOJ

FBI(24 cv 1564) 2682

February 13, 1995

FEDERAL EXPRESS

€.

	Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr., Esq. 4929 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1010 Los Angeles, California 90010 Attention: Messrs.	b6 -12 b7c -12		
	RE: PEOPLE V. ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT CASE NUMBER: BA097211			
Dep. Dir ADD Adm. ADD Inv Asst Dir Adm. Servs. Crim Inv.	Dear Messrs.			
	I am writing in response to your letter dated January 29, 1995, which was received in our office on February 9, 1995, regarding your most recent DNA discovery request in the captioned case.			
	Although your recent letter attempts to narrow the scope of your early January (January 5, 1995, letter to discovery request, it fails to do so. In fact, we believe your latest request is broader in scope and seeks copies of additional material not sought in your early January request. This is despite the fact that you are no longer seeking the data associated with the extraction paper. Unfortunately, interpretation of your request is difficult because it is confusingly worded, and we are not able to ascertain whether you are requesting the actual samples used, or pictures of the samples and the accompanying data 17 - 1/2			
CJIS Info Mgmt. Insp. Instell Lab Legal Coun.	1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -	9		
Tech. Servs Training Off. of EEOA Off. Llaison & Int, Affs Off. of Public	1 - Mr. J. J. Kearney (20) Copies faced to) ; ·1,11		
& Cong. Affs	MAILROOM [] MAILROOM [] b6 - b7c	-1,11 -1,11		

Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr., Esq. All of the material that is responsive to your request is located at the FBI's Forensic Science Research and Training Facility (FSRTC) which is located at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. As we advised in our last letter, most of the materials you are seeking cannot be reproduced by merely running them through a photocopier. Special photographic duplication equipment is required which is expensive and extremely time consuming to operate. Furthermore, this equipment is already committed to other forensic research purposes and using it to duplicate material for discovery purposes would interfere with ongoing research projects. Even if the specialized equipment were available for discovery duplication purposes, the FSRTC is understaffed and does not have the personnel resources to duplicate the large amount of material associated with the two papers referred to in your letter. Consequently, we are unable to comply with your request. However, we are interested in assisting you to the greatest extent possible, and so we are offering to make the materials you have requested, to the extent they exist, available for review by your experts at the FSRTC. Furthermore, in response to your complaint that the quality of the copies of the two papers we provided in our last response were poor, we have enclosed first-generation copies of both papers: Comey, Budowle, et. al, <u>PCR Amplification and Typing of</u> the HLA DQ Alpha Gene in Forensic Samples, 38 J. Forensic Sci. 239 (1993); and 2. Budowle, et al, Validation and Population Studies of the Loci LDLR, GYPA, HBGG, D788, and Gc (PM Loci), and HLA-DQ Alpha Using Multiplex Amplification and Typing Procedure, 40 J. Forensic Sci. 45 (1995). Unfortunately, we do not have reprints of these public source documents that we can send you; however, reprints are available from the publisher. The publisher's address is: American Society for Testing Materials 1916 Race Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 If you decide to accept our offer to review the materials discussed above at the FSRTC, you will be required to comply with all the rules and regulations that apply to visiting - 2 -FBI(24-cv-1564)-2683 Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr., Esq.

scientists. For your convenience, we have enclosed a copy of those rules and regulations. If you have any questions, or want to make arrangements to visit the FSRTC, you may contact Associate General Counsel, at (202) 324-8550.

b6 -1 b7C -1

Sincerely yours,

151

Howard M. Shapiro General Counsel

Enclosures (3)

1 - Honorable Lance A. Ito
 Criminal Courts Building
210 West Temple Street
 Los Angeles, California 90012

3 - Marsha Clark, Esq.

b6 -11 b7C -11

Office of the Los Angeles County District Attorney Hall of Records 320 West Temple Street Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI/DOJ

FBI(24 cv 1564) 2685

March 3, 1995

FEDERAL EXPRESS

Office of the Los Angeles	
County District Attorney Hall of Records	
320 West Temple	
Los Angeles, California 90012	
C/O Los Angeles Police Department Crime Laboratory	b6 -6,11 b7C -6,11
Attention:	
555 Ramirez, Space 270	
Los Angeles, California 90012	
RE: PEOPLE V. ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON	
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT	
CASE NUMBER: BA097211	
DEFENSE DISCOVERY REQUEST	
Dear	
I am writing in response to a letter dated Febru	<u>lary</u> 27,
1995, addressed to the Honorable Lance A. Ito and	b6 -1,11,12
from of the defense team in the	1.00 a 44 a 0
captioned case. The letter was facsimiled to Special Ager on February 28, 1995.	ic
on February 28, 1995. /97- /2- /0	8/150-13
I will individually address each of the portion	ns of
the letter that are applicable to the FBI.	7 HQ- 1081150
• •	•
1 - Mr. H. M. Shapiro 1	
1 - Mr. M. A. Ahlerich 1 -	
Dep Dir 1 -	
Chief of 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1	」
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Request I(2):

All documents prepared by or relied upon by prosecution shoe print expert concerning the comparison of shoe prints in this case. This includes but is not limited to: notes, charts, exhibits, photographs, overlays, research data on sole and shoe types, and notes of communications directly and indirectly (e.g. through the LAPD) with SILGA rubber company, the Bruno Magli shoe company, and distributors and retailers of the sole and shoe products.

b6 -1,11 b7C -1,11

Although the shoes, soles, and documentation are presently with the FBI, will make efforts to have the items shipped here this week in time for the Saturday inspection.

FBI Response:

Enclosed are the following:

 Laboratory worksheets and written notes for Laboratory numbers:

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40912024

40920013

40923001

40927003

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41006016

41006017

41018001

41019001

41026003

41114001 41216001

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50118030

50120001

2. Photocopies of 85 known impressions of the U2887 outsoles.

Original shoe print evidence, shoes and shoe soles received at the FBI Laboratory and photographs of crime scene impressions, where submitted, have been returned. Photographs of

evidence taken by Special Agent have been previously returned in multiple copies. The set of photographs which contain notes on them relevant to the shoe print examination as well as the transparent overlays will not copy sufficiently on a photocopy machine and cannot be released, but are available for inspection at FBI Headquarters.

b6 -1,11 b7C -1,11

b6 -12

b7C -12

Trial charts and enlargements are being prepared but will not be ready for at least two weeks.

Request III(1):

The EDTA report and related documents from the FBI. Early last week when brought this matter to the attention of the Court, Your Honor commented that you expected the prosecution to produce a report from the FBI by last Thursday, February 23. Although there have been oral representations as to the results, there has been, as of yet, no report. To plan our defense, it is essential that we receive immediately:

- a. the FBI's report;
- all underlying and supporting laboratory notes;
- c. all documentation regarding validation studies performed either by the FBI and/or elsewhere regarding testing for the presence of EDTA including, but not limited to, studies validating the sensitivity and specificity of the test conducted.

FBI Response:

The FBI report was forwarded to the Court via Federal Express on March 2, 1995. All underlying and supporting laboratory notes are enclosed. Validation study information is being collected and duplicated and will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

Pursuant to your request I have addressed this letter and accompanying enclosures to you, but mailed them via Federal Express to the LAPD crime laboratory to ensure Saturday delivery.



Please do not hesitate to contact
of my staff at (202) 324-8550 if you have any questions or need
to discuss this matter further.

Sincerely yours,

Howard M. Shapiro General Counsel

Enclosures (3)

3 -	Marcia Cl	ark. Esg.			b6 -1,11 b7C -1,11
			<u> </u>		

May 4, 1995 VIA FACSIMILE Honorable Lance A. Ito Criminal Courts Building 210 West Temple Street Los Angeles, California b6 -1 b7C -1 RE: PEOPLE V. ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT CASE NUMBER: BA097211 DECLARATION OF SPECIAL AGENT Dear Judge Ito: b6 - 1, 3, 11Enclosed is a two page declaration of Special Agent b7C -1,3,11 concerning conversations he had with of National Medical Services, Inc., and regarding EDTA testing. ///- H - 10/11 I had promised to send this declaration to by late yesterday afternoon prior to the 4:00 p.m. hearing. <u>However, I</u> was unable to do so and was not able to contact to tell him of the delay before he left for court. b6 -11 apologize for any inconvenience this delay may have caused. b7C -11 sending copies of this letter and the declaration via facsimile to Messrs. Cochran, Shapiro, and 197 HQ-1081150 Sincerely, Associate General Counsel - Mr. H. M. Shapiro 1 1 Chief of Mr. M. E. Ahlerich Staff 1 I Off of Gen. 1 b6 -1 1 b7C -1 CJIS <u>Kearney</u> DNALAU Room 7879 Finance Info. Res Insp. SEE NOTE PAGE TWO National Sec. Personnel, Training Of of EEOA

(Suc cope; designations, page 2)

Off of Public

Director's Office _

MAIL ROOM [

Honorable Lance A. . to

J Marsha Crark, Esq.	
	b6 -11 b7C -11
Office of the Los Angeles	
County District Attorney	
Hall of Records	
320 West Temple Street	
Los Angeles, California 90012	
los Angeles, California 50012	
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nos migeres, carriornia 50010	
1 - Robert L. Shapiro, Esq.	
2121 Avenue of the Stars	
Nineteenth Floor	
Los Angeles, California 90067	
bob imigered, carriornia 5000;	
Note: This letter responds to a telephonic request made by	
for a declaration from regarding his	
conversations with	
has claimed that has improperly attempted	
to contact potential defense experts and is seeking sanctions be	4 2 4 4 4 4
from the court. We delayed sending the declaration because of b7C	1,3,11,12
concerns over some of the statements which we could not resolve	-1,3,11,1
until early on 5/4/95. contacted after	
the hearing on 5/3/95 and requested that we send the declaration	
directly to Judge Ito as early as possible on 5/4/95.	
directly to padde ito as early as hossinie on 2/4/32.	



July 10, 1995

FEDERAL EXPRESS	
Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr., Esq. 4929 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1010 Los Angeles, California 90010 Attention:	b6 -12
necentari.	b7C -12
RE: PEOPLE V. ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT CASE NUMBER: BA097211	
Dear Mr. Cochran:	
I am writing in response to your letter dated July 9, 1995, which was received in our office on July 10, 1995, regarding the EDTA testing conducted by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) in the captioned case.	b6 -1 b7C -:
I will respond to each of your requests separately:	270
1. SSA has no objection to meeting with you at FBI Headquarters. You should contact him directly to make the necessary arrangements. He can be reached at (202) 324-4318.	
2. Yes, we will accept a subpoena by mail for SSA in this case.	
Regarding your discovery requests:	6
1. No such data exists. It was not saved in the	
computer. 197HQ - 1031150	
ABB Adm	ъ6 −1 ъ7С −:
Leb1 - LegalCoun1 - LegalCoun Mr. K. W. Nimmich	
Cong. Affs. Off. Off. of EEO Off. Lialson &	

Int. Affe. Off. of Public Affs. ___ Telephone Rm.

Director's Sec'y

MAIL ROOM

FBI(24-cv-1564)-2691

- 2. No additional data exists.
- 3. SSA CV is enclosed.
- 4. Eight pages of additional research notes dated May 11, 1995, and a recent abstract titled "Analysis of Metal Chelates by Electrospray Ionization Mass Spectrometry" are enclosed.

If you have any additional questions you may contact Associate General Counsel, at (202) 324-8550.

Sincerely yours,

Howard M. Shapiro General Counsel

Enclosures (3)

1 - Honorable Lance A. Ito
 Criminal Courts Building
210 West Temple Street
 Los Angeles, California 90012

3 - Marsha Clark, Esq.

b6 -11 b7C -11

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,) Case No. BA097211
Plaintiff,	
v.	
ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON,)
aka O.J. SIMPSON	In Department 103, Los Angeles County Superior
Defendant.	Court

MOTION TO EXCLUDE DNA EVIDENCE

ROBERT L. SHAPIRO State Bar No. 043693 GERALD F. UELMEN State Bar No. 39909 SARA L. CAPLAN State Bar No. 147271 BARRY C. SCHECK, ESQ. State Bar No. 62646 PETER J. NEUFELD, ESQ. WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, Ph.D. State Bar #104967 Law Offices of Robert L. Shapiro 2121 Avenue of the Stars 19th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 310/282-6255; 310/553-3000

Attorneys for Defendant, ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF) CALIFORNIA,)	Case No. BA097211
against	MOTION TO EXCLUDE DNA EVIDENCE
ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON,) aka O.J. SIMPSON)	In Department 103, Los Angeles County Superior Court
Defendant.)	Court

TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT AND TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES:

Defendant, ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON, by and through counsel, hereby moves this Honorable Court for an order providing that:

I. Pursuant to the rule in <u>People v. Kelly</u> (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal.Rptr 144. governing the admissibility of scientific evidence, the results of forensic DNA testing the prosecution intends to introduce at trial be excluded on the following grounds:

- A. The statistical estimates being offered for Cellmark's RFLP, polymarker, and DQ Alpha tests, DOJ's D1S80 and DQ Alpha tests, and LAPD's DQ Alpha tests should not be admitted because the statistical methods used by the laboratories are not generally accepted as reliable, i.e., there is an ongoing controversy in the relevant scientific communities (statisticians and population geneticists) where experts significant in quality and quantity object to the reliability of the methods. The issues in controversy include:
 - 1. The general acceptance of the methods used to determine the probability of a coincidental match for each test (RFLP, polymarker, D1S80, and DQ Alpha);
 - 2. The general acceptance of the methods used to determine the false positive error rates of the laboratories for each test;
 - 3. The general acceptance of methods used to express the probability of that the defendant is the source of DNA evidence: whether it is appropriate to express the probabilities of a coincidental match and a false positive error as one statistical estimate, two statistical estimates, or in some other fashion;
- B. The reliability of the methods used by the LAPD, Cellmark, and DOJ for collecting, handling, processing,

and testing crime scene samples for forensic each PCR based test (DQ Alpha, D1S80, and polymarker testing). The issues in controversy include:

- 1. The general acceptance of the methods used by crime scene LAPD investigators and laboratory analysts to prevent the contamination of crime scene samples given the uniquely sensitive nature of PCR based DNA testing;
- 2. The general acceptance of subsequent testing of crime scene samples given the failure of the LAPD laboratory to document and control sources of PCR contamination in its laboratory;
- 3. The general acceptance of using each of the PCR tests (DQ Alpha, D1S80, and Polymarkers) to analyze forensic crime scene samples;
- II. Pursuant to California Evidence Rule Section 352, DNA statistical estimates should not be presented to the jury because, given the present state of the controversy over coincidental match probabilities and false positive error rates, to do so would be unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and misleading. The issues in controversy which would engender unfair prejudice and confusion include:
 - 1. Overstating the value of DNA evidence by
 - (a) Failing to present one statistical estimate to the jury which combines the probability of a coincidental match and the false positive error

rate of the laboratory; or,

- (b) Failing to provide just the comparatively high false positive error rate of a test when the coincidental match probability is much lower;
- 2. The controversy over the validity of methods for calculating the probability of coincidentally matching DNA profiles;
- 3. The controversy over the validity of methods to determine the false positive error rate of a laboratory for a particular technique;
- III. Pursuant to <u>People v. Griffin</u> (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011,
 DNA results from crime scene samples should not be admitted
 because in the collection, preservation, and processing of crime
 scene samples LAPD crime scene technicians and laboratory
 personnel failed to preserve them properly, thereby making
 subsequent testing by other laboratories unreliable.
- IV. That the court take judicial notice of two volumes of exhibits, Volume I, Transcripts and Affidavits of Scientists; and Volume II, Scientific and Legal Articles, upon which the attached memorandum of points and authorities is based. These volumes contain key scientific articles which are cited in the memorandum, although not every article cited in the memorandum is contained in the volume of exhibits.

V. And any other relief this court deems just and proper.

Dated: October 4, 1994

Respectfully submitted,

By:

Barry C. Sch

By

Peter J. Neufeld

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF) CALIFORNIA,	Case No. BA097211
Plaintiff,	
v.)	
ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON,)	
aka O.J. SIMPSON	In Department 103, Los
Defendant.)	Angeles County Superior Court

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE DNA EVIDENCE

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Attorneys for Defendant, ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF) CALIFORNIA,	Case No. BA097211
Plaintiff,)	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
v. ,	MOTION TO EXCLUDE DNA EVIDENCE
ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON,) aka O.J. SIMPSON)	In Department 103, Los Angeles County Superior
Defendant.)	Court

TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT AND TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES:

I. INTRODUCTION

The prosecution seeks to introduce DNA evidence derived from a variety of testing methods. 1 Many of these methods are novel:

For a comprehensible explanation of how DNA prints are created using the RFLP and PCR methods, see Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the 'DNA War,'", 84 J. of Crim.Law & Criminology 22, 22-26

some have never been reviewed for admissibility by an appellate court in California, some have never been reviewed by any appellate court anywhere. Even the best established methods (those based on RFLP analysis) are controversial and have recently been held inadmissible by appellate courts in California. People v. Barney 8 Cal.App.4th 798, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 (1992); People v. Wallace 14 Cal.App.4th 651 (1993).

A. The Admissibility of DNA Evidence Must Be Determined Under the Standard of People v. Kelly.

The admissibility of each item of DNA evidence depends on whether it was derived from a method that is generally accepted to be reliable. To make this determination, the court must apply the standard set forth in People v. Kelly 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal.Rptr 144 (1976). The Kelly standard has three "prongs":

- (1) it must be established, usually by expert testimony, that the scientific methods utilized are generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community,
- (2) the witness furnishing such testimony must be properly <u>qualified</u> as an expert to give an opinion on the subject, and

⁽Spring 1993) [contained in Volume II - Scientific and Legal Articles, No. 28 -- of Defendant's Attached Exhibits], and <u>DNA Technology in Forensic Science</u>, Report of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (National Academy Press, April 1992) at 27-48 [copy of NRC Report is also attached in Volume II of Defendant's Attached Exhibits].

¹ In Kelly, the California Supreme Court adopted a test for the admissibility of scientific evidence that was first articulated in Fryevolution-with-red (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013. Hence, the test has long been known as the Kelly-Fryevolution-Fryevolut

(3) the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case.

Kelly, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30 [emphasis in original].

The goal of the <u>Kelly</u> standard is to shield the jury from the prejudicial effects of hearing evidence derived from scientific methods whose reliability is in serious dispute among scientists. Such evidence is likely to be overvalued by the jury due to the "aura of infallibility" that surrounds scientific technology. <u>In re Amber B.</u> 191 Cal.App.3d 682, 690-91, 236 Cal.Rptr. 623, 629 (1987). There is also concern that efforts to challenge controversial scientific evidence through cross-examination and expert testimony will consume inordinant amounts of time and raise issues "beyond the scope of critical analysis by the average lay person." <u>Id.</u>; <u>Accord People v. McDonald</u> 37 Cal.3d 351, 372 (1984). The greatest danger arises when a technique carrying an "aura of infallibility" is, in fact, quite fallible, and when an analysis of the reliability of the technique involves technical issues that are difficult for lay individuals to

³ Accord, M. Udall & J. Livermore, Law of Evidence, sec.
102 (2nd Ed., 1982):

If there is a discernible thread distinguishing what is rigorously scrutinized as scientific evidence before admission from what is more generously received as relevant expert opinion, it is that any technique that in its application is likely to have an enormous effect in resolving completely a matter in controversy must be demonstrably reliable... Because "science" is often accepted in our society as synonymous with truth, there is a substantial risk of overweighting by the jury. The rules concerning scientific evidence are aimed at that risk.

understand.

A major advantage of the "general acceptance" test incorporated in <u>Kelly</u> is that it does not require courts to master arcane scientific subject matter in order to determine the admissibility of scientific techniques. The role of the Court, when applying the general acceptance test, is simply to determine whether or not the scientific community accepts the technique in its forensic application as reliable.

Kelly/Frye does not demand judicial absorption of all the relevant literature, nor does it require a decision once and for all whether a particular kind of scientific evidence is reliable. The court need only conduct a 'fair overview' of the subject, sufficient to disclose whether 'scientists significant either in number or expertise publicly oppose [a technique] as unreliable. People v. Reilly (1987) Cal.App.3d 1127, 1148, quoting from People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 533.

Accord, People v. Shirley, (1982) 31 Ca.3d 18, 55, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 ("Our duty is not to decide whether [the new technique] is reliable as a matter of 'scientific fact,' but simply whether it is generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community").

B. Kelly Requires That Each Major Step of a DNA Typing Procedure Be Generally Accepted As Reliable By the Scientific Community.

In reviewing the admissibility of DNA evidence under <u>Kelly</u>, this court does not write on a blank slate. Four California appellate rulings on DNA evidence have helped establish the

When evaluating whether a new scientific technique is generally accepted, the Court may take judicial notice of transcripts of scientific testimony in previous hearings. Cal. Evid. Code Section 452(d). The Court may also consider scientific and legal articles and judicial opinions from other jurisdictions. People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 512, 530, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516; People v. Smith (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 19, 25, 263 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682.

nature and scope of the issues reviewable under Kelly. People v. Axell 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411 (1991); People v. Barney 8 Cal.App.4th 798, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 (1992); People v. <u>Pizarro</u> 10 Cal.App.4th 57, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 (1992); <u>People v.</u> Wallace 14 Cal.App.4th 651 (1993). One key point established by these cases is that forensic DNA testing requires a series of distinct steps, and that the methods employed at each major step are independently reviewable under Kelly; each step must be generally accepted. For example, Axell and Barney identified three major steps in DNA tests that employ RFLP analysis and made it clear that failure to use a generally accepted method for any of these steps would preclude admissibility of the resulting evidence. For newer technologies, this court will need to identify the steps in the testing procedure and ascertain that a generally accepted method is being used at each step, particularly at critical steps (i.e., points where serious errors might occur).6

Statistical computation will obviously be a critical step for every DNA testing procedure that purports to find a "match" between samples with respect to their genetic characteristics.

The steps were: (1) processing of the DNA samples to produce DNA prints, (2) comparison of the prints to determine whether there is a "match", and (3) estimating the statistical significance of the match, i.e., probability of a match would be declared between samples from different people. Barney, 8 Cal.App.4th at 806.

For PCR-based forensic tests, for example, the scientific community considers sample collection and preservation to be a step that is critical to the overall reliability of the test results. See Point III, <u>infra</u>, particularly the comments of Nobel laureates Richard Roberts and Kary Mullis.

People v. Barney, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 742 ("The statistical calculation step is the pivotal element of DNA analysis, for the evidence means nothing without a determination of the statistical significance of a match of DNA patterns."); People v. Axell 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 866 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411, 430 (1991) ("We find that...a match between two DNA samples means little without data on probability...); People v. Wallace 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 721, n. 3 (1993) (without valid statistics DNA evidence is "meaningless"); accord, Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 526 N.E.2d 440 (1991) ("It is apparent from the basis on which we decide the DNA testing issue that we would not permit the admission of test results showing a DNA match (a positive result) without telling the jury anything about the likelihood of that match occurring"); Ex Parte Perry, 586 So.2d 242, 254 (Ala. 1991); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502 (Wash. 1993) ("[t]estimony of a match in DNA samples, without the statistical background or probability estimates, is neither based on a generally accepted scientific theory nor helpful to the trier of fact."); Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69 76 (Del. 1993) (trial court's exclusion of

To say that DNA evidence is "meaningless" without statistical data on match probabilities is not the same as saying that such evidence has no probative value. The problem is not that evidence of a match, by itself, is valueless; the problem is that its value is impossible for the trier of fact to assess in a meaningful manner. Thus, in <u>Wallace</u>, the Court of Appeals suggested that it might be more accurate to state that DNA evidence "'is <u>incomplete</u> without an interpretation of its significance.'" 17 Cal.Rptr. at 726 (n. 3) (quoting <u>Barney</u>). Regardless of the semantics, it is clear that without appropriate statistics the trier of fact will find it difficult if not impossible to weigh the DNA evidence.

match frequency "inherently inconsistent" with its admission of testimony of a match, because "without the necessary statistical calculations, the evidence of the match was 'meaningless' to the jury."); State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1991) ("Without statistical evidence, the ultimate results of DNA testing would become a matter of speculation."); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H. 1992) ("A match is virtually meaningless without a statistical probability expressing the frequency with which a match would occur.").

Recent scientific commentary has clarified the necessary elements of the statistical estimation procedure. In particular, it is now clear that no statistical procedure is acceptable unless it addresses the probability of two events that could cause a "match" to be reported between samples from different people: (1) a coincidental match between different individuals who happen to have the same genetic characteristics, and (2) a false positive (false match) due to laboratory error. The probability of a coincidental match is typically estimated by determining the frequency of matching genetic characteristics (genotypes) in a suitable reference population (or populations). The probability of a false positive is estimated by determining the laboratory's rate of errors in proficiency tests.8

C. The Court Must Look Beyond Forensic Science for Evidence of General Acceptance.

⁸ For example, Cellmark Diagnostics estimates its rate of laboratory error to be approximately 1 in 200 based on having made errors while processing samples in proficiency tests. DNA Discovery at 1664.

The general acceptance test of <u>Kelly</u> cannot be met by showing that promoters and practitioners of the method accept it to be reliable. The test is not whether a method is accepted by those who have a personal or professional stake in its acceptance, but rather, whether it is "accepted as reliable by the larger scientific community in which it originated." <u>People v. John W.</u> 185 Cal.App. 3d 801, 805 (1986); <u>People v. Shirley</u> 31 Cal.3d 18, 54 (1982).

Courts have also recognized that promoters and practitioners of a particular method "may be too closely identified with the endorsement of [the technique] to assess fairly and impartially the nature and extent of any opposing scientific views." Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at 38. Thus, when applying the Kelly standard, the court must look to experts who are "'impartial,' that is, not so personally invested in establishing the technique's acceptance that he might not be objective about disagreements within the relevant scientific community." People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 530; accord People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 483, 391 N.W.2d 2270, 275-76 (reliance on testimony of practitioner/promoter to establish general acceptance of forensic test was error). In this regard, the court should bear in mind that employees of forensic labs "have a clear pecuniary interest in the acceptance of DNA evidence by the courts. The success of their employers and the stability of their own employment depends upon continued use of DNA testing." Dan L. Burk, DNA Identification: Possibilities and Pitfalls Revisited, 31 Jurimetrics J. 53, 79-80. Obviously, employees of laboratories that hold patent rights to a new forensic technique have a similar pecuniary interest in the acceptance of the technique in court.

The history of litigation on forensic DNA tests shows the wisdom of looking beyond forensic science to the "larger scientific community" to determine what is and is not accepted. When RFLP-based DNA evidence was first introduced in U.S. courts in 1987, it faced almost no opposition. Few scientists, other than those who were employees or consultants of the forensic laboratories, knew the details of forensic testing procedures, and few had occasion to think about the difficulties posed by the transfer of DNA technology to the forensic arena.

Forensic DNA tests were ... developed by commercial laboratories whose procedures were proprietary, whose work product is generally not available for examination by outsiders (except when used in a court hearing), and whose laboratory protocols were initially available only by court order. The forensic scientists who developed and validated the techniques in both commercial and government laboratories were well aware that they would be called upon to defend the new tests when their admissibility was challenged in litigation, and they had a professional stake in the outcome of that litigation. In that atmosphere, they had little incentive to air and discuss problems, and strong incentive to suppress doubt and uncertainty for fear that candid statements would be used against them in court.

Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons From the 'DNA War', 84 J. of Crim. Law & Criminology 22, at 95.

During the first few years that these tests were used, there was little hint of the "raging controversy" that would later arise, leading to their exclusion in Barney and Wallace. Indeed,

nearly two years passed before the first scholarly critique of forensic DNA test procedures appeared in the scientific literature. Eric Lander, <u>DNA Fingerprinting on Trial</u>, 339 Nature 501 (1989).

The absence of scholarly criticism did not mean that the methods used by forensic DNA laboratories were "generally accepted." Many laboratories were, in fact, using methods that have since been rejected by the scientific community. 10

Without the benefit of open scientific scrutiny, some testing laboratories initially used methods (for such fundamental steps as identifying patterns, declaring matches, making comparison with a databank, and correcting for band shifting) that they later agreed were not experimentally supported.

<u>DNA Technology in Forensic Science</u>, Report of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy Press (1992), at 56 [hereinafter "NRC Report"].

Before the methods could become controversial, they had to become known and understood. The absence of criticism when the tests were first introduced was not proof that the tests would be generally accepted in the scientific community; silence does not imply assent. Thus, to conclude that a technique is "generally

The author, Eric Lander, is a distinguished academic scientist who became familiar with forensic DNA testing only after being retained as a consultant by the defendant in a criminal case. Lander offered a number of criticisms of RFLP tests, some of which have led to important changes in forensic procedures.

10 For example Landerly critique induced formatic

¹⁰ For example, Lander's critique induced forensic laboratories to adopt quantitative rules for declaring matches (rather than just eyeballing DNA prints). Lander's criticisms also led some laboratories to modify their "binning" procedures in order to avoid underestimating allele frequencies. For more detailed explanations of these issues, see Thompson, "Lessons", supra, at p. 52-56; 65-68.

accepted" when only a few scientists (other than its promoters) have evaluated it, is perilous indeed.

Should the court embark upon such a perilous cause, there are nevertheless excellent guideposts to be found in the NRC Report. 11 The NRC Report takes no position on the validity or

The Committee that authored the Report consisted of preeminent scientists in the fields of population and molecular genetics, forensic science, legal academics, ethicists, and a federal judge (Hon. Jack B. Weinstein). The NRC Report was peer reviewed by a group other than the authors on a confidential basis and the final report was written and approved by the Committee members themselves.

One cannot predict with safety how the NRC, which speaks authoritatively as the voice of the scientific community, will come out. Six of the scientists had previously testified for prosecutors in favor of the admission of DNA evidence and only one had testified for the defense against the admission of the evidence. Yet the Report gave great support to the views of critics of the forensic laboratories.

As will be mentioned many times during the course of this brief and the <u>Kelly</u> hearing, the NRC, in an unusual step, has formed a new committee that is meeting this fall to take up once again the controversy over DNA statistical issues -- both the continuing controversy over the probability of a coincidental match and the issue of laboratory error rates. See, NAS Takes Fresh Look at DNA Fingerprinting, "<u>Science</u>, Vol. 265, August 26, 1994, at 1163. Certainly, for purposes of a <u>Kelly</u> analysis, it would make little sense to admit DNA statistical estimates before the new Committee has issued its report, which is expected by the summer.

¹¹ The National Academy of Sciences was established by President Lincoln as a body that would assist the government in undertaking research on important and controversial scientific issues. The National Research Council is the Research arm of the Academy and commissions in-depth studies on scientific issues of national importance. The NRC Report, <u>DNA Technology in Forensic Science</u> was commissioned in response to a "crescendo of questions concerning DNA typing [that] had been raised in connection with some well-publicized criminal cases," and "calls for an examination of the issues" from the "scientific and legal communities. NRC Report, at ix.

scientific acceptability of any particular forensic DNA test, 12 but sets forth a set of requirements that it regards as "essential" for assuring the reliability of any forensic DNA test. Hence, one way to judge whether or not a new technique would be generally accepted in the scientific community (if better known) is to determine whether it meets the NRC's "essential" requirements. 13

One requirement is that forensic DNA tests be validated through empirical studies. Research is necessary to establish the reliability and appropriateness of standards for declaring a match, to identify possible artifacts that could interfere with interpretation of the test results, 14 to establish the statistical frequency of the genetic markers and the error rate

[&]quot;[T]oo many methods exist or are planned, and too many issues must be addressed in detail for each method. Instead, our main goal is to provide a general framework for the evaluation of any DNA typing method." NRC Report, at 52.

Cf. Thompson, "Lessons," supra, at 94:

The NRC's validation standards take into account not only the range of problems that have arisen in connection with DNA profiling, but also issues likely to arise in connection with newer technology. When evaluating the admissibility of current and future DNA technology, courts should be very attentive to whether the validation research recommended by the NRC Report has been done. If it has not, then a strong case can be made for excluding the laboratory's results either on grounds that they fail to meet the general acceptance standard of Frye or that they are insufficiently validated to constitute "scientific knowledge" under Daubert.

[&]quot;Each DNA typing method must be rigorously characterized with respect to the type of possible artifacts, the conditions under which they are likely to occur, the scientific controls for detecting their occurrence, and the steps to be taken when they occur..." NRC Report, at 54.

of the procedure. The NRC Report emphasizes that the key validating studies must not only be done but published before a laboratory can claim that its methods are generally accepted.

If a new DNA typing method (or a substantial variation on an existing one) is to be used in court, publication and scientific scrutiny are very important. Extensive empirical characterization must be undertaken. Results must be published in appropriate scientific journals. Publication is the mechanism that <u>initiates</u> the process of scientific confirmation and eventual acceptance or rejection of a method.

NRC Report, p. 56 [emphasis added]

A second requirement is that the laboratory gain "a solid base of experience in forensic application" before it uses a new DNA typing method. Although the NRC Report lists a series of steps a laboratory should take <u>before</u> using a new forensic DNA test, one requirement is emphasized above all others:

Most important, there is no substitute for rigorous proficiency testing via blind trials. Such proficiency testing constitutes scientific confirmation that a laboratory's implementation of a method is valid not only in theory, but also in practice. No laboratory should let its results with a new DNA typing method be used in court, unless it has undergone such proficiency testing via blind trials.

NRC Report, at 55.

These emphatic pronouncements, from a distinguished scientific panel, following a two year study of the issue, hold an important lesson. The court should not take seriously the claim that a new DNA typing method is "generally accepted" within the meaning of <u>Kelly</u> if the method has not been validated by published research and "rigorous" blind proficiency testing.

D. Acceptance of RFLP Analysis and PCR for Other Scientific Purposes Does Not Imply That Forensic Tests Employing RFLP

Analysis or PCR Are Reliable or Generally Accepted for Forensic Identification.

Prosecutors sometimes make the misleading argument that forensic DNA tests must necessarily be accepted in the scientific community because they employ procedures (e.g., RFLP analysis, PCR) that are used and accepted elsewhere in science for other purposes. Their argument is syllogistic, viz.: RFLP analysis is accepted; Cellmark's DNA test uses RFLP analysis; therefore Cellmark's test is accepted (alternatively: PCR is accepted; the DOJ's DNA tests use PCR; therefore the DOJ's tests are accepted).

The problem with this argument is that it fails to recognize the difficulties that may arise from the transfer of technology from one application to another. 15 It is widely recognized that forensic DNA testing is more technically demanding than other applications of RFLP and PCR technology, 16 and that it

and not for others. Indeed, many techniques that have proven reliable for certain purposes in non-forensic settings have been found unacceptable when used for forensic purposes. Polygraphs are one example. The techniques used in polygraphs (monitoring heart rate, blood pressure, galvanic skin response) have a number of accepted applications in physiological research and medicine. It does not follow, however, that lie detection procedures which use these "accepted" procedures are necessarily reliable. See Neufeld and Coleman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, 262 Scientific American 46, 49 (1990). Hypnosis is another example. The use of hypnosis is well accepted for a number of purposes in psychological research and in psychotherapy. But the California Supreme Court held in People v. Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 18 that the use of hypnosis for refreshing witnesses' memories is not generally accepted.

According to a report by the U.S. Congress' Office of Technology Assessment:

[[]i]t is generally agreed that applying DNA tests to forensic samples, especially criminal evidence, potentially presents more difficulties than analyzing

involves additional critical steps that do not arise in other applications (such as the matching and statistical estimation steps¹⁷). What must be considered under <u>Kelly</u> is whether the method that produced the incriminating evidence is accepted to be reliable <u>as it was applied</u>, not whether a similar method is accepted for another purpose.

The simpleminded notion that any forensic DNA test employing RFLP or PCR is, of necessity, reliable and accepted was flatly rejected by the National Research Council:

Before a method can be accepted as valid for forensic use, it must be rigorously characterized in both research and forensic settings to determine the circumstances under which it will and will not yield reliable results. It is meaningless to speak of the reliability of DNA typing in general—i.e., without specifying a particular method.

National Research Council, <u>DNA Technology in Forensic Science</u>, 1992, at 51-52.

samples in basic research or clinical diagnosis. Samples from crime scenes are frequently small and might be of poor quality because of exposure to a spectrum of environmental onslaughts. And unlike paternity samples, where each sample is from an identified source, the contributor to evidence from a crime scene is often unknown.

OTA report, p. 59; see also Lander, <u>DNA Fingerprinting on Trial</u>, supra at 501 (use of RFLP analysis for medical diagnosis does not mean the technique is reliable for forensic identification); NRC Report, p. 51-53 (discussing differences between forensic and diagnostic applications of DNA technology).

[&]quot;Unlike many of the technical aspects of DNA typing that are validated by daily use in hundreds of laboratories, the extraordinary population-frequency estimates sometimes reported for DNA typing do not arise in research or medical applications that would provide useful validation of the frequency of any particular person's DNA profile." NRC Report, p. 77.

POINT II

LACK OF A GENERALLY ACCEPTED METHOD FOR STATISTICAL COMPUTATION PRECLUDES THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PROSECUTION'S DNA EVIDENCE.

A. DNA Evidence is Inadmissible Because There Are No Generally Accepted Statistical Methods That Address Both the Probability of a Coincidental Match Between Two People Who Share Common Genetic Characteristics and the Probability that A Match Would Mistakenly Be Reported Due to Laboratory Error.

Evidence of a DNA "match" between two samples is impossible to evaluate without reliable information on the likelihood that a match would be declared if the samples are from different individuals. Most commentators consider the ability to express this probability to be crucial to the admissibility of DNA-derived evidence: "without being informed of such background statistics, the jury is left to its own speculations." McCormick, Evidence, 655 (Cleary, Ed.).

The need for background statistics to show the meaning of a DNA match is firmly established in California law. People v.

Barney, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 742 ("The statistical calculation step is the pivotal element of DNA analysis, for the evidence means nothing without a determination of the statistical significance of a match of DNA patterns."); People v. Axell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 866 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411, 430 ("We find that...a match between two DNA samples means little without data on probability...); People v. Wallace (1993) 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 721, n. 3 (quoting conclusion of NRC Report that without valid statistics DNA evidence is "meaningless").

It is now broadly recognized that a false "match" between

samples can occur in two ways.

Interpretation of DNA typing results depends not only on population genetics, but also on laboratory error. Two samples might show the same DNA pattern for two reasons: two persons have the same genotype at the loci studied, or the laboratory has made an error in sample handling, procedure, or interpretation.

NRC Report, at 88.

Thus, to evaluate DNA evidence, the jury needs statistics that address the probability of <u>both</u> events that could cause a false match. To provide statistics that reflect the probability of one event that could cause an innocent person to match, and not the other, would leave the jury to speculate about the meaning of DNA evidence.

Especially for a technology with high discriminatory power, such as DNA typing, laboratory error rates must be continually estimated in blind proficiency testing and must be disclosed to juries. For example, suppose the chance of a match due to two persons' having the same pattern were 1 in 1,000,000, but the laboratory had made one error in 500 tests. The jury should be told both results; both facts are relevant to a jury's determination.

NRC Report, at 89.

The same point was made by Professor Daniel Hartl in an expert's report filed in <u>U.S. v. Yee</u>. Although his criticism was directed specifically at the FBI's DNA test, his point applies to any RFLP-based DNA test:

Once the FBI has declared a match, they treat this declaration as if there were no operator error and no measurement error. The technology simply is not up to this standard....In my judgment, experimental error will turn out to be a very significant term, and perhaps the dominant term, in any valid estimation of the true probability of a match, and any statistical calculation that fails to take this into account is simply meaningless.

Daniel L. Hartl, Expert's Report in the Case of <u>United States v.</u> Yee, at 4, <u>U.S. v. Bonds</u>, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993), aff'g <u>U.S. v. Yee</u>, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991) [emphasis added].

Other experts have recently echoed this conclusion:

Statisticians and geneticists involved in the controversy over DNA testing have understandably been fascinated by and mostly written on disputes regarding the statistical and genetic issues that DNA identification raise, but laboratory error places the most serious limits on the evidentiary import of reported DNA matches. If justice is the mutual goal of those involved in the debates over DNA identifications—and I believe it is everyone's concern—the—possibility of error must be honestly faced, and it must be incorporated into estimates of the incriminatory power of DNA matches.

Richard Lempert, <u>Comment: Theory and Practice in DNA</u>
<u>Fingerprinting</u>, 9 Statistical Science 255, 257 (1994).

When DNA evidence was first introduced in the courtroom, the primary concern was the likelihood of a coincidental match. Little attention was devoted to the likelihood of false positives, perhaps because there was a widespread misperception that false positives are impossible in RFLP-based DNA tests. 18 This misperception was generated and sustained by self-serving claims of DNA test promoters that DNA tests are infallible, fail-

The courts that decided <u>Axell</u>, <u>Barney</u>, and <u>Wallace</u> appear to have been unaware of the growing belief among scientists that laboratory error rates are crucial to the evaluation of DNA evidence. Consider, for example, the following statement from Barney:

To say that the frequency of Howard's DNA pattern is 1 in 200 million...is tantamount to saying his pattern is totally unique, and thus only he could have been the source of the crime scene blood stains. 8 Cal.App. at 817 [emphasis added]

This statement is coherent only if one assumes, as the court undoubtedly did, that laboratory error is not a factor in determining whether Howard was the source of the blood stains.

safe, and error-free. 19 Professor Jonathan Koehler has suggested that DNA test promoters "engaged in a sinister semantic game" in which they were able to issue misleading denials of the possibility that a DNA test could make an "error" by excluding consideration of human error in administering or interpreting the Koehler, Error and Exaggeration, supra, at 24. Needless to say, the effort to distinguish "human error" from "test error" is pointless and misleading when humans are necessarily involved in administration and interpretation of the test, when occasional human errors are inevitable, and when it is necessary to know the overall rate of error (from whatever cause) to evaluate the test results. "For juries it is of little significance what causes an innocent person to match, what matters is how often such matches might be expected." Laurence Mueller, The Use of DNA Typing in Forensic Science, 3 Accountability in Research 55, 56 (1993); see also Thompson, Lessons, supra, at 92.

See, People v. Shi Fu Huang, 546 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Co.Ct. 1989) ("Dr. Baird testified that it is impossible to get a false positive"); People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Co.Ct. 1988) ("it is impossible under the scientific principles, technology and procedures of DNA Fingerprinting (outside of an identical twin), to get a "false positive" -- i.e., to identify the wrong individual as the contributor of the DNA being tested ... Under the undisputed testimony received at the hearing, no "wrong" person, within the established powers of identity for the test, can be identified."); <u>Hicks v. State</u>, 860 S.W.2d 419, Tex.Crim. App. 1993) ("According to Caskey, a false positive finding was impossible..."); State v. Cobey, 559 A.2d 391, 392 (Md.App. 1989) ("An Incorrect match is an impossible result"); see also Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA Matches and Statistics: Important Questions, Surprising Answers, 76 Judicature 222 (1993); Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence at Trial, 34 Jurimetics 21 (1993) (quoting a number of similar statements from transcripts of expert testimony).

In any case, the potential for false positives due to laboratory error in DNA testing is now beyond dispute. "Laboratory errors happen, even in the best laboratories and even when the analyst is certain that every precaution against error was taken." NRC Report, at 88-89. <u>See also Koehler, DNA Matches</u> and Statistics, 76 Judicature 222, 229 ("[B]ased on the little evidence available to date, a reasonable estimate of the false positive error rate is 1-4 percent."); Koehler, "Error and Exaggeration, " supra, p. 26 (proficiency testing shows error rate of 1-4%); Donald Berry, Comment, 9 Stat. Sci. 252, 253 (1994) ("Only the frequency and type of errors are at issue."); R.C. Lewontin, Comment: The Use of DNA Profiles in Forensic Contexts, 9 Stat. Sci. 259 (1994) (discussing sources of error); William C. Thompson, Comment, 9 Stat. Sci. 263, 265 (1994) (discussing data on laboratory error); Cf. Dan L. Burk, DNA Identification: Possibilities and Pitfalls Revisited, 31 Jurimetics 53, 80 ("Bald statements or broad hints that DNA testing is infallible...are not only irresponsible, they border on scientific fraud").

Even experts who support current forensic methods for computing the frequency of matching DNA profiles acknowledge that the rate of false positive errors must also be considered when evaluating DNA evidence. For example, Professor Bruce Weir, a statistician at North Carolina State University, who has been a prominent prosecution witness, has noted the need to take into account laboratory error rates when evaluating DNA evidence.

Bruce Weir, <u>Population Genetics in the Forensic DNA Debate</u>, 89 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 11654, 11658 (1993).

Indeed, most experts now believe that having an accurate estimate of the false positive rate is more important than having an accurate estimate of the probability of a coincidental match because the rate of false positives is likely to be much greater than the rate of coincidental matches, at least for RFLP-based tests. 20 Paul J. Hagerman, DNA Typing in the Forensic Arena, 47 Am.J.Hum.Genet. 876 (high false positive rate makes probability of coincidental match irrelevant); Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA As Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 Cardozo L.Rev 303, 325 (the probability of a coincidental match between people who have the same DNA profile "is usually dwarfed by the probability of a false positive error"); Mueller, The Use of DNA Typing in Forensic Science, supra, at 58 (exact probability of a coincidental match "should hardly matter" to jury given much greater likelihood of false positive); Richard Ostrowski & Daniel Krane, Unresolved Issues in Forensic Use of DNA Profiling, 3 Accountability in Research 47 (1993).

A central premise of California appellate cases is that evidence of a DNA match is inadmissible unless accompanied by

By analogy, if one needed to estimate the amount of money a man was carrying, it would typically be more important to have accurate information on the number and denomination of bills in his wallet than on the number and denomination of coins in his pocket because the coins would represent only a small portion of his total money.

Axell, Barney, Pizarro and Wallace all recognize this principle.

Now that the scientific community has recognized that error rates must be taken into account in order to make a meaningful evaluation of DNA evidence, the logic of those cases requires that juries be given statistics on the probability of laboratory error; without such statistics, evidence of a DNA match is inadmissible because it is impossible to evaluate.

It would be absurd for courts to insist on valid quantitative estimates of the probability of a coincidental match, without also requiring valid estimates of the rate of false positives due to laboratory error, when the scientific community has determined that the latter is more important than the former to a rational evaluation of DNA evidence. If DNA evidence is "meaningless" without statistical estimates of the probability of a coincidental match, it is also "meaningless" without statistical estimates of the positive.²¹

Professor Eric Lander, one of the earliest and most influential scientific commentators on DNA evidence, and a member of the NRC panel, explained the matter succinctly:

...it is simply crazy and scientifically unacceptable to agonize over the exact population frequencies, which might be one in a million, or one in a hundred thousand, or one in ten thousand for the frequency of a

When DNA evidence is analyzed under <u>Daubert</u>, there is little question that valid estimates of positive error rates would be a precondition to admissibility. See, Scheck, <u>DNA and Daubert</u>, 15 Cardozo L.Rev. 1959 (1994).

genotype in a population, and yet not have actual data for the accuracy, the proficiency of a laboratory's handling of samples...[T]he scientific acceptability of DNA evidence depends on the proficiency of a laboratory being tested such that one can know what the error rate is likely to be, or at least have an upper bound on that error rate.

Prof. Eric Lander, Testimony as a Court's Witness in <u>U.S. v.</u>

<u>Porter</u>, District of Columbia Crim. Docket 3F-6277-89, p. 46, July 28, 1994.

At this point, there is broad agreement among scientists with the NRC's position on error rates: DNA evidence cannot be evaluated without knowing the rate of false positives due to laboratory error, error rates must therefore be estimated and these estimates must be disclosed to juries. There is some disagreement, however, about the best way to present error rate statistics.

The NRC Report recommends that jurors be given <u>two numbers</u>, one indicating the frequency of matching genotypes and the other indicating the rate of laboratory error. "The jury should be told both results; both facts are relevant to a jury's determination." NRC Report, at 89.

Other scientists believe that the error rate and frequency statistics should be <u>combined into a single number</u> that reflects the overall likelihood that the laboratory would declare a match between samples from different people. For example, Professor Hagerman suggested that "[r]esults of DNA typing should always be reported as the sum of the laboratory error rate and the estimated frequency of recurrent band patterns in the relevant population." Hagerman, <u>DNA Typing in the Forensic Arena</u>, 47 Am.

J. Hum. Genet. 876 (1990). Another proponent of this approach is Professor Bruce Weir, who has suggested that data on the probability of a coincidental match and the error rate be combined into a single statistic called a likelihood ratio.²²

Some experts have gone so far as to suggest that jurors be told only the false positive rate; they reason that the probability of a false positive is so much greater than the probability of a coincidental match (at least for multi-locus RFLP matches) that the latter probability has little bearing on the value of the evidence. For example, if the probability of a coincidental match were .000001 (one chance in one million), and the probability of a false positive were .01 (one chance in one hundred), then the overall probability of a match between samples from different people would be approximately .010001, a number

A likelihood ratio is a statistic that uses a ratio of conditional probabilities to describe the strength or probative value of evidence. <u>See</u>, Richard Lempert, <u>Modeling Relevance</u>, 755 Mich.L.Rev. 1021 (1977); Thompson, <u>Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the 'DNA War'</u>, 84 J.Crim.L.& Criminology 22, n.163 (1993).

For a hypothetical case in which the frequency of the matching DSA profiles is 1 in 1,000,000 and the laboratory false positive error rate is 1 in 1000, Weir used a formula that concluded that the possibility of a false positive error diminishes the value of the DNA evidence by a factor of 1000--in other words, the chances of a false match being reported are 1000 times higher if one takes into account the error rate than if one does not.

Weir, <u>Population Genetics in the Forensic DNA Debate</u>, 89 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 11654, 11658 (1993).

Interestingly, the results of Weir's formula can be closely approximated by simply adding together the probability of a coincidental match and the probability of a false positive. That is, of course, exactly what Hagerman proposed.

that conveniently rounds off to .01 (one in 100). So why not just tell jurors the false positive rate and avoid the risk that they will be confused or unduly swayed by an impressive number (one in one million) that has little meaning or value relative to the false positive rate?

The rate of false positives defines a practical lower bound on the probability of a match, and probability estimates based on population data that are smaller than the false-positive rate should be disregarded."

R.C. Lewontin & Daniel Hartl, <u>Population Genetics in Forensic DNA</u>
<u>Typing</u>, 254 Science 1745, 1749 (1991).

Professor Richard Lempert specifically cites the danger of confusion and prejudice as a reason for presenting only the error rate statistic in cases where the probability of a false positive greatly exceeds the probability of a coincidental match.

...jurors provided with a laboratory's false positive rate and with information about the likelihood, assuming no testing error, of a match if the DNA evidence was not the defendant's, are likely to be hopelessly confused about the weight to accord the testimony because ordinary people are not very good at working with conditional probabilities. Thus, jurors ordinarily should receive only the laboratory's false positive rate as an estimate of the likelihood that the evidence DNA did not come from the defendant.

Lempert, Caveats, supra, at 325. 23

Another issue that is being debated is what to tell jurors about the error rate of a laboratory that has performed

To support his conclusion that the multiple number approach will leave jurors "hopelessly confused," Lempert cites social science research regarding the ability of lay individuals to draw appropriate conclusions from statistical data. Research of this type is highly relevant to the important issue of when and whether DNA statistics are likely to prove misleading and prejudicial to a lay jury.

relatively few blind proficiency tests and therefore has limited data on which to base an error rate estimate. Suppose a laboratory had made no false positive errors, but had participated in only ten proficiency tests in which a false positive might have occurred. It would obviously be quite misleading to tell the jury that the laboratory's error rate is zero. If the true false positive rate were one in 100, or one in 50, or even one in 10, there is a very good chance an error would fail to occur in the first ten trials.

The best solution to this problem is to use a statistical device known as a confidence interval: the number presented to the jury is not the actual number of errors, but a number that can be said with a given degree of confidence (by convention 95% or 99%) to be less than or equal to the true rate of error. For example, if a laboratory had completed 1000 tests without error, one could say, with 95% confidence, that the laboratory's true rate of error is less than or equal to .003 (three in 1000), because there is a 95% chance that at least one error would have been made in 1000 trials if the error rate exceeded .003.

Mueller, The Use of DNA Typing in Forensic science, 3

Accountability in Research 55 (1993); 24 Saks and Koehler, What DNA 'Fingerprinting' Can Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic

Mueller concludes that, based on data from July 1991 showing the FBI had completed 417 internal proficiency tests, and assuming that all these tests could have produced false positives but did not, "the best we can say is that with 95% confidence the FBI rate of false positives is less than or equal to 1 in 140." Id. Mueller provides a simple formula for computing the confidence interval.

Science, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 361-372, 369-70; Koehler, <u>DNA Matches</u>
and Statistics: Important <u>Questions</u>, Surprising <u>Answers</u>, 76
Judicature 222, 228 (1993).

The advantage of the confidence interval approach is that it is conservative. It minimizes the risk that the number reported to the jury will understate the true error rate and thereby be detrimental to the interests of the defendant. There is only a five percent chance, for example, that a number reported with 95% confidence would understate the true error rate. By contrast, there is a very good chance that the actual frequency of errors in a limited number of tests will understate the true error rate, to the detriment of the defendant. Basic principles of fairness and due process therefore require the use of the confidence interval approach.

Continuing debate is to be expected over how best to determine the rate of laboratory error and how best to present error rate data to the jury. Indeed, the issue of error rates is slated to be examined by a new committee that was recently appointed by the National Academy of Sciences to examine and report on the continuing scientific controversy over the use of statistics in connection with forensic DNA tests. NAS Takes A Fresh Look at DNA Fingerprinting, 265 Science 1163 (August 1994). The appointment of this new committee is an acknowledgement, by the National Academy, that the scientific controversy over DNA statistics was not resolved by the 1992 NRC Report. Part of the continuing controversy concerns error rates. According to

population geneticist James Crow, the chair of the new committee, the "main emphasis will be statistical analysis...and certainly we have to get into the question of error rates [in forensic laboratories]." Id.

The continuing scientific debate about how to determine and express the error rate for forensic DNA laboratories reflects a broad consensus that laboratory error rates are a crucial factor affecting the value of DNA evidence. The fundamental point recognized by the first NRC Report — that the error rate must be known in order to evaluate DNA evidence — is not in dispute. The new NAS committee recognizes that to determine the statistical meaning and value of DNA evidence, one must "get into error rates." So must this court.

B. Failure of the Testing Laboratories to Use a Generally Accepted Method for Determining the Probability of a Coincidental Match Renders the Prosecution's DNA Evidence Inadmissible.

1. There Currently Is No Generally Accepted Method for Determining the Frequency of Multi-locus RFLP-based DNA Profiles.

After determining that two DNA samples match, forensic analysts estimate the statistical frequency of such matches in a reference population. The purpose of the statistical estimates is to provide meaning to the match by showing the likelihood that an unrelated person in the reference population would match by chance.

Frequency estimation has been the most controversial aspect of DNA testing. The great majority of courts that have held DNA evidence inadmissible have done so based on the existence of a

scientific dispute over the validity of the forensic laboratories' frequency estimation methods.

To estimate the frequency of a DNA profile in a reference population, forensic analysts first estimate the frequency of each allele (band) in the DNA profile by determining its frequency in a data base containing DNA profiles of a number of individuals. These data bases consist of convenience samples drawn primarily from blood banks, with separate data bases for major racial and ethnic groups (Hispanics, non-Hispanic Caucasians, African-Americans, Asians). Then analysts combine the estimated frequencies of the individual alleles to determine the overall frequency of the DNA profile, using the product rule which works only if the alleles are statistically independent. 26

These procedures have been challenged on several grounds.

One problem is the contention that forensic laboratories tend to underestimate the frequency of matching alleles in their databases, and thereby greatly underestimate the overall

See generally, NRC Report, at Chapt. 3; Thompson, Lessons, supra, at p. 61-89.

Statistical independence means that the likelihood of a person having a particular allele is not affected by what other alleles the person has. The probability of a series of independent events is the product of their frequencies, and hence will be quite low when all the frequencies are low. For example, the probability of rolling "one" eight times in a row with a fair die is (1/6)8 = .000000595, or approximately one in 1.6 million. The probability might be considerably higher if the probability of rolling "one" on each throw is not independent of the other throws, as would be the case, for example, it were not a fair die. Whether the alleles in DNA profiles are in fact statistically independent is a central issue.

frequency of DNA profiles. <u>See</u>, Thompson, <u>Lessons</u>, <u>supra</u>, at 65-68 (reviewing scientific literature and relevant court opinions).

A more fundamental concern is that the procedure fails to take into account the possibility that there is significant variability among population subgroups in the frequency of alleles. Critics suggest that within major groups, such as Caucasians, Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians, the frequency of alleles may differ among various ethnic, religious or geographic subgroups, a phenomenon known as population substructure. If such variability exists, there are two important implications.

See generally, NRC Report, at Chapt. 3. First, the convenience samples used by the forensic laboratories may be unrepresentative of the population in particular locales. Second, the assumption that the frequency of alleles is statistically independent would be invalid.

a. <u>History of Litigation</u>

Concerns about the accuracy of statistical estimates were raised early in litigation on the admissibility of forensic DNA evidence, 27 but at first were voiced by only a few experts in a handful of cases, and had little impact. Before 1991, statistical estimates of forensic laboratories were routinely ruled admissible in most cases; typically the defense failed to

²⁷ See People v. Wesley, 140 Misc.2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1988), aff'd 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1992) (Lifecodes test); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (1989) (Cellmark's test); also Christopher Joyce, High Profile: DNA in Court Again, New Scientist, July 21, 1990, at 24 (describing the population genetics issues raised in early 1990 in State v. Anderson regarding the FBI's test).

present a single expert to challenge them. In cases where the defense did muster experts, courts often found them less persuasive than the supporting experts presented by the prosecution, and concluded that the critics represented the viewpoint of only a small minority.

In <u>People v. Axell</u>, 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411 (1991) for example, the court chose to credit three experts who testified that Cellmark's statistical procedures are generally accepted over three experts who testified that they are not, suggesting that the prosecution experts had convincingly responded to the defense experts concerns.

It is ironic that the court, in reaching this conclusion, cited Dr. Kenneth Kidd's unpublished (and at that time unavailable) data on the "very small differences" in allele frequencies among various subgroups—the very data that, when later reanalyzed by Dr. Mueller, showed rather large differences among American Indian groups [discussed further below].

Defendant Axell was partly American Indian. The court also relied on testimony by Prof. Conneally who "opined that the probes used by Cellmark are in linkage equilibrium because they are on different chromosomes ... " (235 Cal.App.3d at 852) -- a position that is no longer widely accepted. See NRC Report, at 79-80.

In <u>United States v. Yee</u>, a federal magistrate took a similar tact:

... despite the prestige, standing, and expertise of the witnesses who share the view that the scientific community could not and would not find the FBI's database and resulting probability estimates acceptable, the view of the government's witnesses about the level of acceptance, when all factors are taken into account, is more likely to be the accurate view.

U.S. v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 206

Over time, however, the ranks of the scientific critics grew²⁸ and their concerns began to be taken more seriously by courts. In 1991 a number of trial courts, ²⁹ and one state supreme court, ³⁰ ruled DNA evidence inadmissible based on concerns about the statistical procedures.

The critics gained momentum when the world's leading population geneticist, Harvard professor Richard Lewontin, and his colleague, Daniel Hartl, published an article in Science, in

Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 565 N.E.2d 440 (1991).

In July 1991, Professor Charles Taylor, a population geneticist at UCLA, conducted a survey of others in his field to determine their positions on the acceptability of the statistical estimation methods used by forensic laboratories. Taylor identified 30 academic scientists with expertise in population genetics who had taken a position on the issue. By his count, 11 supported the forensic labs and 19 did not. Moreover, the ratio of critics to supporters was higher among those whom Taylor rated as better known in the field (based on their work having been cited in major textbooks). The results of the survey were introduced in evidence in People v. Halik, No. VA 00843 (Los Angeles Co. Superior Court, Sept. 26, 1991) (FBI's RFLP test inadmissible under Kelly) and later were made part of the record before the California Court of Appeal in People v. Barney, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 (1992).

State of Arizona v. Despain (Yuma County Superior Court No.15589, February 12, 1991); State of Illinois v. Michael Fleming and Vernon Watson (Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 90-CR-2716 and 90-CR-5546, March 12, 1991); State of Arizona v. Hummert & Hale (Superior Court of Maricopa County, Nos. CR 90-05559 and 90-03684, April 16, 1991; State of Vermont v. Arthur Passino (District Court of Vermont Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit, Docket No. 185-1-90, May 13, 1991); U.S. v. Porter, et al. (Superior Court of District Columbia, September 20, 1991).

December 1991. This article raised concerns about population structure and concluded that the statistical estimation methods used by forensic laboratories are "unjustified and generally unreliable." The article ignited a furious debate over how much population structure exists and the extent to which population structure undermines the validity of the statistical estimation methods used by forensic laboratories. 32

The debate came to a head with the publication of the NRC Report in April 1992. The NRC panel found existing empirical data insufficient to resolve the substructure question. The Report further concluded that the concerns raised by Lewontin, Hartl and others were sufficiently serious that the statistical estimation methods developed by the forensic laboratories should not continue to be used. These methods, the NRC felt, might greatly underestimate the frequency of DNA profiles. Instead, the NRC proposed an alternative method that it dubbed "the ceiling principle." 33

Since the publication of the NRC Report, appellate courts in six states, the District of Columbia, and Guam have held DNA evidence inadmissible under the <u>Frye</u> standard.³⁴ Indeed, the

Richard Lewontin & Daniel Hartl, <u>Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing</u>, 245 Science 1745 (1991).

See Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting: A Bitter Debate is Raging Over How the Results of This New Forensic Technique Are Interpreted In Court, 245 Science 1721 (1991).

NRC Report, <u>supra</u> note 12, at 82-85.

Commonwealth v. <u>Lanigan</u> (1992) 413 Mass. 154, 596 N.E.2d

311; <u>People v. Barney</u>, 8 Cal.App.4th 798, 10 Cal.Rptr 731 (1992);

<u>State v. Vandebogart</u>, 136 N.H. 365, 616 A.2d 843 (1992); <u>State v. Anderson</u>, 853 P.2d 135 (N.M. Ct.App. 1993), rev'd under a different standard (<u>Daubert</u>), N.M. Sup.Ct. No. 21,069, Aug. 25,

only appellate courts that have affirmed its admissibility under Frye "either failed or deliberately refused to consider the NRC Report before rendering a decision." Scheck, <u>DNA and Daubert</u>, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1959 (1994). Some of these courts expressed hope that a scientific consensus would soon emerge in favor of methods based on the NRC's ceiling principle. But those hopes now seem to be fading as it "appears that the level of debate has only increased as a result of [the NRC] report. "36

It is clear that the judgment of the court in <u>Axell</u> and the magistrate in <u>Yee</u> were premature.³⁷ As increasing numbers of critics emerged, and as their views gave rise to serious debate in the academic community, the conclusion that the prosecution experts speak for the scientific community, and that the defense experts do not, has become impossible to maintain.³⁸ Courts in

^{1994; &}lt;u>U.S. v. Porter</u>, 618 A.2d 629 (D.C. App. 1992); <u>People v. Atoique</u>, DCA No. CR 91-95A (Guam Dist. Ct. App. Div. 1992); <u>People v. Wallace</u>, 17 Cal.Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1993); <u>State v. Bible</u>, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993 (en banc); <u>People v. Pizarro</u>, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 (Ct.App.1992); <u>Vargas v. State</u> (Fla.Ct.App. June 1, 1994).

DNA analysis appears to point the way to ...common ground").

Mueller, supra, p. 2; see also, People v. Wallace, 17

Cal.Rptr.2d 721, 725 ("recent developments have shown that general acceptance may not be easily achieved").

These opinions are good examples of the perils, discussed earlier, of assuming a forensic technique is generally accepted at an early stage in its development when only a few scientists, other than its promoters, have had the opportunity to evaluate it.

The issues raised by the defense have been quite consistent over time; the change in judicial attitude would appear to stem solely from the growing number and prestige of the scientists voicing critical views. See e.g., People v. Barney, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 (noting that "the challenges asserted by Howard and Barney [based on the testimony of Laurence Mueller in

Frye jurisdictions are now hesitant about deciding which scientific views to credit in the face of this dispute. This perspective was adopted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals:

We specifically decline the government's invitation to hold that the position of one group of distinguished scientists (those favoring the government's position) is more persuasive, as a matter of molecular biology or population genetics, than the position of an apparently equally distinguished group of scholars who have reached an opposite conclusion; indeed, we view the government's position on this issue as contrary to Frye. 39

U.S. v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629 (D.C. App. 1992).

The following sections lay out the major scientific and legal issues surrounding the procedure by which laboratories calculate the frequency of matching RFLP-DNA profiles in a reference population. This procedure has three steps. First, the frequency of each single band in the DNA profile is determined. Then the joint frequency of the two bands associated with a given probe is calculated. Finally, an overall frequency across all matching bands is calculated.

b. Determining the Frequency of Individual Bands

^{1989]} are essentially the same as the points raised by Lewontin and Hartl.")

In <u>Porter</u> the government argued that the weight of scientific authority favored current statistical procedures: "at least 18 peer-reviewed articles and ten letters, written by 45 scientists support the methodology at issue, while only 6 articles and 7 letters, authored by only 12 scientists, questioned the method. <u>Id</u>. at 638. The Court properly responded that "the government asks this court to choose between scientists on the basis of rather unimpressive numbers, and thus to make precisely the kinds of determinations as to which <u>Frye</u> requires a consensus of experts." Id.

To determine the frequency of each band (allele) in the DNA print, forensic analysts estimate the percentage of bands in a data base that would "match" the band in question. the laboratory counts all bands in the data base that fall within a range of sizes; this range is designated a "bin." Some laboratories use "floating bins" keyed to the band in question. For example, to estimate the frequency of a band of 1000 base pairs, Lifecodes counts all bands-that fall within + 1.8% of its size -- that is, all bands in the data base which have an estimated size between 982 and 1018 base pairs. Because all of these bands fall within Lifecodes' match criteria, they all are bands that potentially could be "matched" with the band in question. laboratories use "fixed bins" which are established in advance and used in each case. For example, the FBI divides the full range of band sizes into 31 fixed bins. The frequency assigned to each band is determined by counting all the bands in its bin. Cellmark uses a floating bin based on what it calls "resolution limits.#

One concern is that forensic laboratories underestimate the frequency of matching bands. This would work to the detriment of the defendant by causing the frequency of the DNA print to be understated, making the DNA evidence appear more significant than it is. Some forensic laboratories have been criticized for using bins that are narrower than their match criteria, 40 a practice

Laurence D. Mueller, <u>The Use of DNA Typing in Forensic Science</u>, 3 Accountability in Research 1, 8 (1993) (hereinafter "Mueller, 1993") ("The size of the floating bins that have been

the NRC Report called "unacceptable."41 For example, Lander reported that in People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1989), Lifecodes used a bin for allele frequency estimates of only ±2/3 standard deviation, while using a matching criteria of \pm 3 standard deviations. 42 Similarly, the FBI has computed statistics in some cases based on floating bins of ±2.5%, while employing a matching criteria of $\pm 5\%$. Because the frequency of each allele is multiplied to obtain the frequency of the overall DNA print, systematic underestimates of the frequency of each allele can cause severe errors. With regard to Lifecodes' procedure in Castro, Professor Eric Lander states: "[f]or a three-locus genotype, the error may thus be about 8000 fold." Id. Lander analogized the practice to "catching a match with a 10foot-wide butterfly net, but then attempting to prove the difficulty of the feat by showing how hard it is to catch matches with a 6-inch-wide butterfly net." Id. Obviously, any binning procedure that fails to include the full range of bands that could potentially be considered to match would be unacceptable to the scientific community.

Another concern is that forensic laboratories may underestimate allele frequencies by failing to take into account

used by some labs are only about half the appropriate size, thereby producing allele frequency estimates that are too small").

NRC Report, at 78.

Lander, <u>DNA Fingerprinting on Trial</u>, n. 339, Nature 501, 504 (1989). Following the Castro case, Lifecodes abandoned this practice and adopted a floating bin the same size as its quantitative match standard.

sampling error--that is, the tendency for the allele frequency observed in a sample to differ from the true frequency due to the operation of chance in the selection of a sample. Lander's comments are particularly relevant:

Sampling error poses a particularly serious problem when estimating the frequency of a very rare event, such as an allele at a hypervariable RFLP locus. In a sample size of 500, an allele whose observed frequency was 1 in 500 might have a true frequency (taking a 99% confidence interval) of nearly 7 in 500. If this correction were neglected, the odds of finding the allele would be underestimated by a factor of nearly 7. If this were neglected for both alleles at [three loci] the total chance of finding the observed genotype would be underestimated by a factor of 76 = 118,000.43

Fortunately, statistical methods for incorporating sampling error are well developed. If conclusions must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it might be wise to use the 99% upper limit of the confidence interval for each allele.

Whether such adjustments for sampling error are necessary and appropriate has been controversial. Some forensic scientists have argued that upper confidence limit estimates are not necessary because the procedure for allele estimation is sufficiently "conservative" to overestimate the frequency of matching alleles even without such a correction. Furthermore, some statisticians disagree with Lander's suggestion that the upper confidence limit of the frequency of each allele be used in computing the frequency of the DNA profile, prefering to make the adjustment for sampling error after the allele frequency

Lander, <u>Population Genetic Considerations in the</u>
<u>Forensic Use of DNA Typing</u>, DNA Technology and Forensic Science,
Ballantyne, Sensabaugh & Witkowski (Eds.) (1989), at 146-47.

estimates are combined, rather than before, a procedure likely to produce smaller adjustments.

The scientific dispute over how to deal with sampling error is one facet of the continuing debate over forensic DNA statistics. It is one of the issues likely to be addressed by a new committee recently appointed by the National Academy of Sciences to make a second attempt to resolve the statistical controversy. The debate about sampling error, and how to deal with it, is therefore evidence that the National Academy's first effort to resolve the issue (the 1992 NRC Report) was unsuccessful—a conclusion confirmed by the Academy's current efforts to revisit the issue and try, once again, to find a resolution to the statistical controversy.

c. Determining the Frequency of Genotypes

After determining the frequency of each band, the next step is to determine the frequency of genotypes. A genotype is the pair of alleles (bands) produced by a given probe. One of these alleles is inherited from the mother and one from the father. To determine the frequency of heterozygous (two band) genotypes, forensic DNA laboratories use the formula 2pq, where p and q are the frequency of the two alleles (bands) in the genotype. 44

For example, if the frequency of band A is .03 and the frequency of band B is .05, the laboratory will multiply .03 x .05 x 2 and conclude that the frequency of the genotype AB is .003 (three in

⁴⁴ See generally, NRC Report, at 76-85.

1000). 45 This formula assumes the frequencies of band A and band B are statistically independent, and may significantly underestimate the frequency of genotypes if the allele frequencies are not independent.

When alleles at any genotype are statistically independent in a particular population, the population is said to be in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. 46 Whether U.S. populations are in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium has been a major-issue in the debate over DNA statistics. Critics suggest that Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium may not hold due to endogamous mating patterns -that is, a tendency for people to mate with others having the same subset of possible alleles, to mate with others of the same ethnic, religious, or cultural subgroup. For example, if people with allele A are more likely to mate with those having allele B, than with those having alleles C or D, then genotypes AA and AB would be more common (and genotypes AC and AD less common) than suggested by the formula 2pg. Endogamous mating might occur without people having any awareness of it. If alleles A and B were common in a particular population subgroup, and if people in that subgroup tended to mate with each other, genotype AB would be more common in the general population, and much more common

The product of the individual allele frequencies is multiplied by 2 because there are two ways a person can get a given genotype. A person may have genotype AB as a result of receiving A from his father and B from his mother, or vice versa. By analogy, there are two ways to roll number eleven with a pair of dice: a five on the first die and a six on the second, or vice-versa. Hence, the probability of rolling eleven is $2 \times 1/6 \times 1/6 = 1/18$.

NRC Report, at 78.

among members of that subgroup, than predicted by applying the formula 2pq to allele frequencies for the general population. 47

d. <u>Determining the Frequency of a Multi-Probe</u> <u>Match</u>

The final step in the statistical procedures is to determine the frequency of the entire DNA profile, which is sometimes called a multi-locus genotype. The forensic DNA testing laboratories do this by multiplying together the frequencies of the genotypes. If four probes were used, the laboratory would, during Step 2, have computed four genotype frequencies. The product of these frequencies would be presented as the frequency of the entire DNA print. The use of the product rule (i.e., multiplication) to compute the frequency of multi-locus genotypes assumes that the frequencies of the genotypes are statistically independent, and may significantly underestimate the frequency of the multi-locus genotype of the individual genotypes that are not independent.

When the genotypes at different loci are statistically independent in a given population, the population is said to be in linkage equilibrium. NRC Report, at 78-79. Whether the major racial groups in the U.S. population are in linkage equilibrium is another major issue. Linkage equilibrium and Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium are closely related issues because endogamous mating patterns among heterogeneous groups could undermine both. "Once

Genotypes AA, AB, and BB would also be more common in the general population than predicted by formula, although the effect might be difficult to detect if the subgroup was small relative to the general population.

a population is known to be heterogeneous, one also cannot assume linkage equilibrium even for loci on different chromosomes; if an individual possesses an allele common among Puerto Ricans at one locus, it is more likely that he will do so at a second locus as well." Lander, <u>DNA Fingerprinting on Trial</u>, at 504. Hence, the possibility of endogamous mating among heterogeneous groups, which is also called population structure, is a key underlying issue in the debate over the validity of the forensic laboratories' statistical estimation methods.⁴⁸

e. The Competing Views on Population Structure

The scientific community has split into three camps on the issue of population structure. One school of thought holds that concerns about population structure can be dismissed on theoretical grounds. Members of this "theoretical school" argue that deviations from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and linkage equilibrium in the general U.S. population are so implausible that empirical proof of the absence of such deviations is simply unnecessary. A second group, which has been labeled the statistical school, "feels that the issue [of population structure] can be resolved by studying population samples of broad racial groups and applying statistical tests of Hardy-

⁴⁸ If there is such structuring, the multiplication of band frequencies could produce severe errors. By analogy, if a population survey showed that ten percent of Europeans have blond hair, ten percent have blue eyes, and ten percent have fair skin, it would be a mistake to multiply these frequencies to conclude that the frequency of Europeans with all three traits is one in 1000. Because these traits tend to co-occur in Nordics, the actual frequency is much higher, particularly if one happens to be in Scandinavia. NRC Report, supra, at 76.

Weinberg equilibrium (HWE) and linkage equilibrium (LE) to detect substructure." Id. In other words, they believe the issue of population structure must be addressed through empirical (rather than theoretical) analysis, but that statistical analysis of existing data is sufficient to resolve the issue. 49 The third group, which has been labeled the empiricist school, "feels that the only way to resolve the issue is to sample particular ethnic groups to ascertain the actual extent of variation, i.e., how high or low allele frequencies might range." Lander, supra. The empiricists 50 believe that no amount of statistical analysis on existing data bases can resolve the issue because such analyses

See generally, Chakraborty & Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 Science 1735 (1991); Bernard Devlin, Neil Risch, & Kathryn Roeder, Estimation of Allele Frequencies for VNTR Loci, 48 Am.J.Hum.Genet. 662 (1991); Weir, supra, at 24.

The most prominent exponent of the empiricist school is Richard Lewontin of Harvard. See R.C. Lewontin and D.L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 Science 1745 (1991); other articles supporting this viewpoint include Mueller, Population Genetics of Hypervariable Human DNA, Forensic DNA Technology, Farley & Harrington (Eds.) (1991) (hereinafter, "Mueller, 1991"), at 51; Mueller, 1993, supra,; Dan Krane, Robert W. Allen, Stanley A. Sawyer, Dmitri A. Petrov, and Daniel L. Hartl, Genetic Differences at Four DNA Typing Loci in Finnish, Italian, and Mixed Caucasian Populations, 89 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 10583 (1992); Eric S. Lander, Reply (Letter), 49 Am.J. Hum. Genet. 899, 901 (1991); Lander, Invited Editorial: Research on DNA Typing Catching Up with Courtroom Application, 48 Am.J. Hum. Genet. 819 (1991); Green, Population Genetic Issues in DNA Fingerprinting (Letter), 50 Am.J. Hum. Genet. 440, 441 (1992); Jennifer R. Slimowitz & Joel E. Cohen, Violations of the Ceiling Principle: Exact Conditions and Statistical Independence, 53 Am.J. Hum. Genet. 314 (1993); William M. Shields, Forensic DNA Typing as Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Some Problems and Potential Solutions, Proceedings from the Third International Symposium on Human Identification, 1992; Seymour Geisser & Wesley Johnson, Testing Independence of Fragment Lengths within VNTR Loci, 53 Am.J.Hum.Genet. 1103 (1993).

"have insufficient statistical power to detect deviations, if present" and because existing data bases may not include members of some endogamous mating groups. Lander, <u>supra</u>. They favor collecting additional data on a number of distinctive subgroups. ⁵¹

Concerns about population structure were raised from the beginning of litigation on the admissibility of DNA evidence. At first, however, the discussion was dominated by theoretical arguments. The prosecution experts were generally members of the theoretical school, who found analysis of data unnecessary. The defense experts at first had difficulty gaining access to the data bases. 52

Affidavit of Prof. S.L. Zabell, submitted regarding statistical issues in the computation of match probabilities for DNA profiles, at 8. See also, R.C. Lewontin, Which Population? 52 Am.J.Hum. Genetics 205 (1993).

^{...} substructure raises concerns of two different types. First, the presence of substructure can result in linkage disequilibrium and thus invalidates the use of the product rule. But even if the population as a whole is in approximate linkage equilibrium, it may not constitute an appropriate reference population of suspects: the appropriate suspect population may consist of a subpopulation for which joint allele frequencies may be quite different.

In early cases, forensic laboratories provided tables of allele frequencies, but sometimes refused to provide the complete data bases in a form that would allow tests of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium or linkage equilibrium. See, State v. Schwartz, 427 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989)("[t]he defense request for more specific information regarding its methodology and population data base was denied by Cellmark."); also Geisser, Some Remarks on DNA Fingerprinting, 3 Chance: New Directions for Statistics and Computing 8 (1990)("Cellmark and Lifecodes use proprietary excuses for shielding their data."). Cellmark first made its data bases available in 1989 under a court order issued in

As the data bases became available, the range of issues being debated in the courtroom broadened. Defense experts began presenting statistical analyses of the data bases which, they claimed, supported the existence of population structure. Prosecution experts challenged these claims, and a debate erupted over the appropriate method for testing for substructure.

One test for substructure compares the total number of homozygotes observed in a sample (data base) with the number expected if the sample is in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. 53

Because substructure entails endogamous mating within subgroups, it increases the likelihood that mating pairs will share the same allele (band) and thereby produce homozygous offspring (who have only one band, rather than two at a given loci). Hence, if the number of homozygotes observed in a data base exceeds the number

pretrial proceedings in <u>State v. Cauthron</u>, 846 P.2d 502 (Wash. 1993), but only after extensive litigation during which Cellmark hired a private law firm to assist the district attorney in efforts to quash the discovery order.

The FBI also refused such requests at first, claiming that the data simply were not recorded in a manner allowing tests for independence across loci. Some defense experts found this claim suspicious, but it effectively thwarted their efforts to obtain the data. See Geisser supra, at 9.

If a population is in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, the expected number of homozygotes is the sum of the squared frequency of each allele. For example, if a population has four equally common alleles—A, B, C and D—the frequency of homozygotes (i.e., genotypes AA, BB, CC and DD), if mating is random, is expected to be .25²+.25²+.25²+.25² = .25, because a person with allele A, for example, is no more likely to mate with another A than to mate with a B, C or D. Population structure means that people are more likely to mate with others in their subgroup, hence people are more likely to mate with someone sharing their same allele and the overall frequency of homozygotes is higher.

expected to occur by random mating (by an amount unlikely to occur by chance), it is evidence of substructure. Tests for "excess homozygosity" were first performed on forensic data bases by experts retained by defendants in criminal cases. They reported spectacular deviations from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and argued that these findings raised serious concerns about the validity of the statistical procedures of the forensic laboratories.

Prosecution experts responded that the "excess" of homozygotes was more apparent than real. Technical problems in the assay of samples in the data bases may have caused some individuals who are in fact heterozygous to appear to have a single band. Hence, they argued, the true frequency of homozygotes is undoubtedly lower than indicated by the data. Some experts have argued that the "excess" homozygosity disappears entirely when adequate corrections are made for technical problems in the assays, 54 although this conclusion is controversial. 55

Debate about total homozygosity has faded over time as population geneticists on both sides of the dispute have come to realize that these analyses cannot adequately address the issue

⁵⁴ Bernard Devlin, Neil Risch & Katherine Roeder, No Excess of Homozygosity at Loci Used for DNA Fingerprinting, 149 Science 1416 (1990).

See Lander Reply, <u>supra</u>, at 901 (arguing that the conclusions of Devlin et al. have "been disproved"). <u>Also</u>, Phillip Green & Eric Lander, Technical Comment, 253 Science 1038 (1991) and Joel Cohen, Michael Lynch & Charles Taylor, Technical Comment, 253 Science 1037 (1991) (both commentaries challenge the conclusions of Devlin, Risch & Roeder)

of substructure. Measurement error and uncertainty about the quality of the data undermines confidence in any analysis suggesting substructure is present; ⁵⁶ the limited sensitivity of these procedures undermines confidence in any analysis suggesting it is absent. ⁵⁷

Another way to test for substructure is to compare the distribution of allele frequencies in various subgroups.

However, there has been controversy about which subgroups allow relevant comparisons. For example, FBI scientists argued against the possibility of substructure based on data showing that within major groups (Caucasians, Blacks, Hispanics) similar allele frequencies were found in samples drawn in Texas and Florida.

Lander responded: "One might analogously conclude that blond hair, blue eyes, and fair skin are not correlated because such traits show similar frequencies in Florida and Texas; examining average frequencies in mixed populations sheds no light on substructure." Lander, supra, 1991, at 821. According to Lander and others of the empiricist school, what is needed is direct comparison of distinct ethnic subgroups; differences among such

Devlin, Risch & Roeder, <u>supra</u>.

^{54 &}quot;Failure to reject the hypothesis that genotypes are well described by the Hardy-Weinberg law does not mean that large errors cannot be made the data set and statistical tests have limited power to uncover deviations if they do exist."

Mueller, supra, at 57, 62; also Lander, 1991, supra, at 821 (calling the failure to find excess homozygosity "virtually meaningless because the tests have such low statistical power to detect substructure even if it is present."); Lewontin & Hartl, supra, at 1747 ("Statistical tests for HWE are so lacking power that they are probably the worst way to look for genetic differentiation between subgroups in a population").

groups are difficult to detect in mixed populations. The NRC Report, at 80-82, adopted this position.

Recently, courtroom debate has shifted as new analyses of the existing data bases, using more sophisticated methods, have appeared. These new analyses purport to find reassuring evidence of the statistical independence of VNTR alleles, and thus to show that substructure is not a significant problem. 58

Critics from the empiricist school respond that analyses of existing data bases cannot rule out the possibility that there is substructure within broad American populations. There may be significant genetic variation among ethnic subgroups that goes undetected because members of discrepant subgroups are not included in the data bases, or because they appear in numbers too small for their differences to be noticed. Most data bases consist of blood bank or hospital data from a narrow region and therefore may fail to capture the genetic diversity of the total population. 60

Neil Risch & Bernard Devlin, On the Probability of Matching DNA Fingerprints, 255 Science 717 (1991) ("an innocent defendant has little to fear from DNA fingerprinting unless he has an evil twin").

⁵⁹ E.g., Nichols & Balding, Effects of Population Structure on DNA Fingerprint Analysis in Forensic Science, 66 Heredity 297, 299-300 (1991) ("[H]uman populations are known to be composed of large relatively outbred populations, typically in cities, and smaller inbred populations. In a random sample from both, the effects of inbreeding in the small populations will be swamped. We must examine studies of inbred populations for estimates [of how much they vary]").

Mueller, 1993, <u>supra</u>, at 5 ("the people in the data base have not been sampled at random and thus there is no expectation that the mixture of subgroups within these samples is representative of any real population.").

Professor Lewontin has argued that the large racial/ethnic groups for which laboratories maintain data bases are in fact "conglomerates" of ethnic subgroups which stem from genetically differentiated ancestral populations and have not yet fully blended in the American "melting pot." According to the empiricists, the way to resolve the issue of substructure is "to sample ethnically distinct subpopulations and to observe the actual degree of genetic differentiation." Some data suggesting significant variation among distinctive population subgroups already exist. 64

Some experts have repeatedly asserted that allele frequencies are similar across distinctive ethnic groups. Efforts to evaluate such claims have been impeded, however, by the failure of the prosecution experts to grant access to the data. For example, Prof. Kenneth Kidd, a frequent prosecution witness, who began testifying about the lack of variation among

Among Caucasians, for example, evidence from genetic markers other than VNTRs show "more genetic variation among Irish, Spanish, Italians, Slavs, Swedes, and other subpopulations, than there is on the average, between Europeans, Asians, Africans, Amerinds, and Oceanians." Lewontin and Hartl, supra, at 1747.

See Kenneth Lange, Match Probabilities in Racially Admixed Populations, 52 Am.J.Hum.Genet. 305, 306 (1993) ("What is lacking in [discussions of match probabilities] is an agreed-on method of computing match probabilities in admixed populations typical of the United States.")

Lander, 1991, <u>supra</u>, at 821; Green, <u>Population Genetic Issues in DNA Fingerprinting (Letter)</u>, 50 Am.J.Hum.Genet. 440, 441 (1992) ("For VNTR loci, there is no obvious alternative to gathering community/ethnic-specific subpopulation data bases").

⁶⁴ See Dan Krane, Robert W. Allen, Stanley A. Sawyer, DMitri A. Petrov, and Daniel L. Hartl, Genetic Differences at Four DNA Typing Loci in Finnish, Italian, and Mixed Caucasian Populations, 89 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 10583 (1992).

subgroups in 1988, refused to allow access to some of the data on which he based his testimony until 1991. At that point, critics challenged some of Kidd's assertions about the data. Lewontin and Hartl reported that there are striking differences in allele frequencies between some of the groups Kidd examined.

In one American Indian group, the Karitiana of Brazil, the entire sample of over 50 individuals had the same allele at one VNTR locus and had one of two alleles at another locus. and Hartl note that a comparison of the Karitiana with another Brazilian group, the Surai, show that "certain three-locus VNTR genotypes differ in frequency by a factor of more than 500 in these populations, even though they are separated by only 420 kilometers." Id. In response, Chakraborty and Kidd state that despite inbreeding among the Karitiana "there were no two individuals with identical VNTR profiles."65 However, this assertion has proven false. An analysis of Kidd's Karitiana data by Prof. Laurence Mueller found that over twenty percent of the individuals in the sample matched another individual over four or more probes. Two pairs of individuals matched over seven probes, although one of the seven-probe matches appears to have been a "false positive" caused by a laboratory sample handling error.66 Mueller also discovered a previously undetected sixprobe match between one of the Karitiana and a member of a different group, the Maya. Id., at 5.

Chakraborty & Kidd, supra, at 254.

Mueller, 1993, supra, at 4-5. A false pos

⁶⁶ Mueller, 1993, <u>supra</u>, at 4-5. A false positive is an event which is, itself, of considerable interest and importance.

f. The NRC Ceiling Approach

The NRC report acknowledged the existence of the scientific dispute over population structure and proposed a compromise. NRC Report, Chapter 3. The danger of population structure is sufficiently serious, the NRC concluded, that current approaches should not be used. Siding strongly with the empiricist camp, the NRC Report declared that additional empirical studies of ethnic subgroups are needed to determine the extent of population structure.

Pending the completion of the population studies, the NRC recommended an approach to statistical calculation that has been dubbed "the modified ceiling principle." First, the laboratory should check to determine whether the DNA print observed in casework matches any DNA prints in existing data bases. The frequency of such matches (and the size of the data bases) should be reported to the trier-of-fact. Second, the laboratory should estimate the frequency of the DNA print by applying the product rule to "modified ceiling frequencies" consisting of the 95% upper confidence limit of the highest frequency observed in an existing data base or 10%, whichever is higher. Id., at 91-93, 95.

The NRC's modified ceiling approach was intended to provide a reasonable, broadly acceptable basis for making statistical estimates in the face of the current scientific uncertainty over population structure. Lander, <u>DNA Fingerprinting: The NRC Report (letter)</u>, 260 Science 1221 (1993).

But the modified ceiling approach has not yet proven to be an acceptable compromise. Moreover, to further fuel the debate, disputes have arisen over how to interpret the NRC's modified ceiling approach, with different scientists offering different interpretations which can lead to radically different statistical interpretations in the same case.

The National Research Council has commenced a new study that will make a second attempt to resolve the statistical debate. A report is expected next spring or summer. The fact that the National Research Council would commission an entirely new study to revisit the statistical questions that were addressed only two years earlier, in the first NRC Report, is perhaps the most powerful evidence that could exist of the continuing nature of the scientific controversy over DNA statistics.

g. Determining the Relevant Reference Population

Another area of scientific dispute, closely linked to the debate over population structure, concerns the relevant reference population to use when estimating the frequency of a DNA profile. Forensic laboratories typically assume that the relevant reference population is the broad racial or ethnic group of which the defendant is a member. Thus, if the defendant is a Caucasian, the laboratory reports the frequency of the defendant's DNA profile among Caucasians (basing its estimate on the frequency of defendant's alleles in the laboratory's Caucasian data base).

Critics argue that focusing on the defendant's ethnic

background misses the issue. In a typical case, the defendant's DNA profile is known and has been found to match the DNA profile of an evidentiary sample. By denying that he is the source of the evidentiary sample, the defendant implicitly raises the possibility that the true perpetrator, whose identify is unknown, also has the "matching" profile. Hence, "it is not the ethnicity of the <u>defendant</u> that is the directly relevant question but rather the ethnic composition of the pool of possible alternative suspects."

This argument rests on the assumption that there is no correlation between the ethnic background of the defendant and that of the true perpetrator in cases where the defendant is falsely accused. In some cases, for example, police will have information about the appearance of the perpetrator which limits the pool of possible suspects to individuals of the defendant's ethnicity. Hence, the need to know whether the frequency of a particular DNA profile is higher among defendant's subgroup than among a larger aggregate group for which the forensic laboratories has a data base will be unavoidable in many cases.

h. <u>In Light of the Continuing Scientific Debate</u>, <u>Kelly, Barney and Wallace Dictate Exclusion of</u> <u>the DNA Evidence</u>.

In <u>Barney</u>, the product rule method (which was used by both Cellmark and the FBI) was found deficient under the first prong of <u>Kelly</u> because it is not generally accepted in the scientific

Lewontin, Which Population? (Letter), 52 Am.J.Hum.Genet. 205 (1993).

community. Citing a large number of prominent scientists who have publicly criticized the statistical methods of the forensic laboratories in published articles and testimony, and the NRC's conclusion that "substantial controversy" exists on the issue, the court declared that the necessary scientific consensus does not exist and therefore that the DNA evidence is inadmissible.

Our task under <u>Kelly-Frye</u> is not to choose sides in this dispute over the reliability of the statistical calculation process. Once we discern a lack of general scientific acceptance—which in this instance is palpable—we have no choice but to exclude the "bottom line" expression of statistical significance in its current form.

8 Cal. App.4th at 819.

This ruling differed from that of <u>Axell</u> only because the bulk of the scientific criticism had emerged after the <u>Axell</u> ruling.

It has become irrelevant how <u>Axell</u> addressed this issue at the time of the decision's filing in October 1991. The situation is somewhat analogous to a "change in the attitude of the scientific community" which undermines a previously correct judicial determination of general acceptance. (<u>People v. Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p.32, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240.) Simply put, Axell has been eclipsed on this point by subsequent scientific developments.</u>

8 Cal.App.4th at 820-21.

The First District Court of Appeal followed <u>Barney</u> in a decision issued in March, 1993. <u>People v. Wallace</u> (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 651. In <u>Wallace</u>, the court found that the results of an RFLP-based DNA test "should have been excluded for want of general acceptance of the method of statistical calculation employed to produce the frequency estimate of about 1 in 26

million." The prosecution's key witness in Wallace was Professor George Sensabaugh, who had been a member of the NRC committee on forensic DNA evidence. Sensabaugh also offered a "more conservative estimate of in excess of one in a million" but the court found that testimony should also have been excluded because "it too is unsupported by a showing of general acceptance of the underlying statistical basis for it." 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 721, 725.

RFLP-based DNA testing is currently inadmissible in California.

In <u>Kelly</u>, the California Supreme Court declared that appellate rulings on the admissibility of scientific evidence are controlling at subsequent trials "at least until new evidence is posited reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific community." 17 Cal.3d at 30. Hence, it is unnecessary even to hold a hearing on the admissibility of RFLP-based DNA evidence unless the district attorney meets the burden of proving that there has been a significant and meaningful change in scientific opinion since March of 1993, when the most recent appellate opinion rejecting RFLP evidence, <u>Wallace</u>, was issued.

In order to avoid extremely burdensome (and costly) relitigation of issues which have already been resolved after receiving intense scrutiny by appellate courts in this state, the hearing on RFLP-test admissibility should be narrowly focused.

If the district attorney seeks to introduce statistics computed using the product rule method that was rejected in Barney and Wallace, then there is only one type of evidence that this court should hear: evidence that Scientific critics of the

product rule method have changed their minds.

Given the current appellate precedent, a number of types of evidence the district attorney may seek to present, in an effort to resuscitate the product rule, are legally irrelevant and should not be heard. For example, evidence offered solely to prove that the scientific critics of the product rule are wrong, as a matter of scientific fact, is irrelevant because the duty of the court, under Kelly, "is not to decide whether [the method] is reliable as a matter of 'scientific fact,' but simply whether it is generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community." People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 55; People v. Reilly (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1127, 242 Cal.Rptr. 496, 500 (the requisite acceptance "is that of scientists, not courts"). evidence of empirical studies that purport to refute or respond to scientific critics is irrelevant absent a showing that such studies have, in fact, changed the minds of the scientific critics.

Evidence of the relative number of supporters and critics of the product rule is also irrelevant, so long as the critics continue to be "significant either in number or expertise."

... Frye does not demand judicial absorption of all the relevant literature, nor does it require a decision once and for all whether a particular kind of scientific evidence is reliable. The court need only conduct a 'fair overview' of the subject, sufficient to disclose whether 'scientists significant either in number of expertise publicly oppose [a method] as unreliable.

<u>People v. Reilly</u> (1987) Cal.App.3d 1127, 1148, quoting from <u>People v. Brown</u> (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 533.

Barney and Wallace establish conclusively that scientists "significant in number and expertise" opposed the product rule as unreliable as recently as March, 1993. The sole issue for the court is whether these critics have changed their minds in the past nineteen months. If the district attorney can offer no evidence of a change of scientific heart by the critics with respect to the product rule, then no hearing is necessary -- the product rule must be rejected.

i. In Light of the Heated Scientific Debate Over the NRC's Modified Ceiling Principle, It Must Be Excluded Under Kelly As Well.

Is there an alternative to the product rule method that can pass muster under <u>Kelly</u>? The only plausible candidate is the NRC's "modified ceiling principle." But it too is subject to raging controversy -- the necessary scientific consensus on its reliability is not even close to being achieved.

In Barney, the court had expressed hope that a scientific consensus would soon emerge in favor of methods based on the NRC's ceiling principle. Barney, 10 cal.Rptr.2d 731, 745 ("The NRC report on DNA analysis appears to point the way to...common ground"). But in Wallace, the court noted that those hopes seem to be fading.

Only eight months have passed since our decision in Barney, not enough time to confirm our speculation that the new methods of statistical calculation proposed by

The program of research recommended by the NRC as a basis for the ceiling principle (sampling 15-20 distinct ethnic populations) has not yet been undertaken. Therefore, the only calculations possible that are consistent with the NRC's recommendations are "modified ceiling" calculations.

the NRC report will likely receive general acceptance resulting in future admissibility of DNA analysis evidence. However, recent developments have shown that general acceptance may not be easily achieved. It appears that some proponents of DNA analysis, rather than attempting to come to terms with the NRC report, or some other compromise on statistical calculation, have taken the offensive and attacked the report's proposed new methods of statistical calculation as unsound...While we are in no position to choose sides in this ongoing dispute, we note that its persistence threatens the admissibility of [DNA evidence].

17 Cal.Rptr.2d at 725-26.

Since the Wallace opinion was issued, the attacks on the ceiling principle have only increased. Although it was initially attacked as "too conservative" by scientists who continue to believe in the product rule, recent scientific articles have shown that in theory, and perhaps in practice, it may not be conservative enough -- in other words, it may still understate the frequency of matching DNA characteristics, making DNA evidence appear more powerful than it really is. Joel Cohen. "The ceiling principle is not always conservative in assigning genotype frequencies for forensic DNA testing," 51 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 1165 (1992); Jennifer R. Slimowitz & Joel E. Cohen, Violations of the Ceiling Principle: Exact Conditions and Statistical Evidence, 53 Am.J. Hum. Genet. 314 (1993) ("Before the ceiling principle is implemented, more research should be done to determine whether it may be violated in practice."); Seymour Geisser & Wesley Johnson, Testing Independence of Fragment Lengths within VNTR Loci, 53 Am.J.Hum.Genet. 1103 (1993) (even with conservative correction, product rule impermissible). showing has given impetus to a more general condemnation of the

modified ceiling principle as scientifically indefensible and inadequate.

Slimowitz and Cohen have shown that the "ceiling principle" is not a ceiling, as others have shown that it is not a principle. Reflective courts find the choice of samples arbitrary, the calculations capricious, and the "expert" testimony indefensible. Like the flat-earth theory, the "ceiling principle" should be buried, not bounded.

Newton E. Morton, <u>Genetic Structure of Forensic Populations</u>, 55 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 587 (1994).

...the interim-ceiling principle is an example of datadriven, interest-ridden, pseudo-statistical, ad hoc methodology to which no statistician (or scientist) should be a party.

Expert Report of Dr. Elizabeth Thompson⁶⁹, in <u>State v. Hollis</u> (Sup.Ct.King.Co., Wash, No. 92-2-04603-9), Feb. 28, 1994.

In my view, the "modified ceiling principle" has no rational basis and has been chosen by entirely arbitrary means...It is clear to me that the "modified ceiling principle" was invented in the hope of maintaining the use of DNA pattern matching for forensic purposes, despite the lack of the necessary statistical information to allow a valid estimate of matching probabilities.

R.C. Lewontin, Affidavit in Thompson, DNA Wars, supra.

Can anyone seriously argue that the ceiling principle is generally accepted in the scientific community when prominent geneticists and statisticians are comparing it to the "flat-earth theory," calling it "pseudo-statistical," saying it "has no rational basis" and calling for it to be "buried." Surely, this is a case where "scientists significant in number and expertise publicly oppose [a technique] as unreliable" and it must

⁶⁹ Professor Thompson, an internationally recognized biostatistician, is Chair of the Department of Statistics at the University of Washington.

therefore be excluded under <u>Kelly</u>. <u>People v. Brown</u> (19845) 40 Cal.3d 512, 533.

Courts that have recently reviewed the admissibility of the "modified ceiling principle" to determine whether it passes the "general acceptance" test have concluded that it does not. In People v. Fountain (Superior Court of Contra Costa Co., Calif. No. 91-02674, April 5, 1994), a California Superior Court judge excluded DNA evidence under Kelly, after finding that "a major controversy...exists right now over the proper method to be used for...estimating the statistical probability of a match" (at 3631). Noting that "witnesses for both sides in this case have presented documented instances in which the ceiling principle has failed to be conservative" and that "[t]he FBI, citing serious controversy regarding the NRC report, asked the NRC to reconvene and obtained its agreement that it would do so," the court concluded as follows:

I think that all of this has demonstrated that there is substantial debate regarding the interim ceiling principle, regarding any of the methods...for the statistical calculation of a match and really [it] cannot be said that there is general acceptance in the scientific community as to any one of those (p.3632).

Similarly, in <u>Commonwealth v. Fowler</u> (Sup.Ct. Bristol Co., Mass., No.32440, 32464, March 31, 1994), a Massachusetts trial court excluded DNA evidence after finding, based on an extensive review of scientific opinion, that there is "no statistical calculation for interpreting the significance of a laboratory DNA 'match' which is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community." (p.17)

The 1992 NRC Report's recommendation of the use of ceiling and interim ceiling methods further fuelled the controversy concerning the appropriate statistical calculation to be used when interpreting DNA evidence. (p.16)

The court specifically found that there is "disagreement within the relevant scientific community over whether the ceiling principles provide for a more conservative statistical calculation of DNA profile frequencies than the product rule."

Id. Moreover, "some scientists in the relevant scientific community believe that the ceiling approach may produce less conservative estimates of DNA profile frequencies" [thereby disadvantaging the defendant]. Id.

Perhaps the most thorough discussion of the current status of the ceiling principle, vis-a-vis the "general acceptance" test, occurred in a Frye ruling in State v. Stenson (Sup.Ct.King Co., Wash., No. 93-1-00039-1, June 8, 1994). The court noted the concerns of numerous critics of the ceiling method, noting that the thrust of their position is that "setting any figure as a conservative figure is not within the realm of real science."

The setting of a conservative ceiling will some day resolve debate. Scientific debate here is whether or not [the NRC] ceiling is, in fact, conservative. From all of [the evidence], it is clear that the product rule as modified by the ceiling principle is not yet generally accepted by the relevant scientific communities.

The <u>Stenson</u> court specifically rejected an argument that concerns about population structure have been resolved by recent research, such as the FBI's so-called "Worldwide Study." The court noted that the conclusions of the Worldwide study are

inconsistent with other published findings (citing Geisser and Johnson, supra, and Slimowitz and Cohen, supra) and that the conclusions of the Worldwide Study have not been accepted by the scientific community. Even if the Worldwide Study turns out to be correct, "we are clearly in the lag time between controversy and hopeful consensus and Frye precludes the use of the Worldwide study [to resolve] the product rule issue until that consensus is reached."

These three recent trial rulings provide a model for this court, showing the proper resolution of the admissibility issue under <u>Kelly</u>.

2. There Is No Generally Accepted Method for Computing the Frequency of Multi-locus Polymarker Profiles.

The prosecution may seek to introduce statistics in connection with the polymarker test. At this juncture, the polymarker test is entirely novel. It has never been reviewed for admissibility by any appellate court anywhere. It has previously been introduced in only a handful of criminal cases. It has yet to survive any serious challenges, either inside or outside the courts. Few scientists, other than the employees or consultants of the laboratories promoting the test, know much about it. There are no published articles which purport to validate the test or its associated statistics. It fails in a number of respects to meet the "essential" validation requirements set forth in the NRC Report (p. 52-56).

The Polymarker test allows DNA from five different loci (areas of the genome) to be "amplified" via PCR and then "typed."

The polymarker loci have varying numbers of alleles (types). A "match" on the polymarker test means that two samples have the same allele (type) at each loci.

Evidence of such a match is meaningless, of course, unless one knows the probability of finding a match between samples from different people. This probability depends in part on the likelihood of a <u>false positive</u> in the polymarker test, which is completely unknown and impossible to estimate in the absence of rigorous blind proficiency testing (which has not yet been done). The probability of a match between different people also depends on the likelihood of a <u>coincidental</u> match, which depends, in turn, on the rarity of the set of matching alleles. A set of alleles, from different loci, is called a multi-locus genotype. It is the method for estimating the frequency of multi-locus polymarker genotypes that is discussed here.

The major problem with the method is that it makes use of the product rule (multiplication of allele frequencies) without the necessary demonstration that the alleles are statistically independent. The use of the product rule assumes that the various alleles are inherited independently, that there is no reason for persons with a given allele at one loci to have a preferential probability of having a particular allele at another loci, and that there is no population substructure. See NRC Report, Chapter 3. Defense counsel are aware of no studies, either published or unpublished, that have examined these questions.

As the NRC report has noted, "[t]he key question underlying the use of the multiplication rule is whether actual populations have significant substructure for the loci used for forensic testing." NRC Report, at 79 [emphasis added]. Without proof of the absence of substructure for the polymarker loci, the assumption of statistical independence that underlies the use of the product rule is based entirely on speculation. In light of the NRC Report, and the scientific furor that has arisen over the use of the product rule for RFLP-based tests, it seems clear that the scientific community would not accept its use for polymarkers without proof of the independence of the alleles.

The lack of information about population substructure also raises severe doubts about the representativeness of the small convenience samples that serve as data bases for polymarker statistics. There appears to be little information upon which to judge whether the frequency of particular polymarker alleles in one ethnic group, or one geographic area, is likely to be the same as in another. Thus, the relevance of small unrepresentative data bases appears questionable even for

⁷⁰ A "convenience sample" is a sample that is drawn for the convenience of the researcher and does not purport to be a random or representative sample of any particular population. The forensic laboratories have almost uniformly built their databases from "convenience samples" -- from blood banks, paternity testing laboratories, and police personnel. One can understand the nature and inadequacy of convenience samples by comparing it to political polling where the pollster takes opinions from the first ten people encountered instead of making an effort to selectively gather information, or "stratify" the sample, by interviewing in a targeted fashion people in representative categories -- such as gender, income, age, or ethnicity.

estimating the frequency of individual alleles, let alone estimating the frequency of multi-locus genotypes.

3. There Is No Generally Accepted Method for Determining the Joint Probability of a Coincidental Match Across Different DNA Tests, or Across DNA and Serology Tests.

The defendant will oppose any effort to present statistics that purport to show the joint probability of a match on two or more DNA tests, or the joint probability of a match on DNA and conventional serology protein and enzyme marker tests. Examples of the type of joint probability estimates defendant will oppose include efforts to estimate the probability of a match on both DQ-alpha and D1880 markers, on both DQ-alpha and serology markers, or on both RFLP and polymarkers.

The scientific community clearly would not accept any such omnibus statistical extrapolations in the absence of published research documenting the statistical independence (or lack thereof) of the frequencies that are being combined. No such research has been published. Joint statistical estimates cannot pass muster under <u>Kelly</u>.

- C. Failure of the Testing Laboratories to Use a Generally Accepted Method for Determining False Positive Error Rates Renders the Prosecution's DNA Evidence Inadmissible.
 - 1. Essential Elements of an Acceptable Method for Error Rate Determination.

As noted earlier, the scientific community now recognizes that evidence of a DNA match cannot meaningfully be evaluated without knowing the rate of laboratory error. Consequently, under the logic of Axell, Barney, Pizarro and Wallace, evidence of a DNA match cannot be admitted without statistics on the error

rate. To comply with the requirements of <u>Kelly</u>, the <u>method</u> used to determine the error rate must be generally accepted as reliable within the relevant scientific community.

Scientific commentary makes it clear that, in order to be accepted as reliable by the scientific community, the method for determining error rate must involve externally administered blind proficiency testing on samples that replicate casework. A blind proficiency test is one in which the analyst is not aware he or she is being tested. The NRC Report declares that "...laboratory error rates must be continually estimated in blind proficiency testing." NRC Report, p. 89. The proficiency tests must be "truly representative of case materials (with respect to sample quality, accompanying description, etc.)." Id. The NRC notes that "[t]ests based on pure blood samples would probably underestimate an error rate." Thus, it appears that such tests are not accepted as a reliable way to determine the error rate of a forensic test.

Other commentators agree. For example, Professor Bruce Weir, a frequent prosecution witness, has noted that the NRC Report "makes a strong case" for determining actual error rates through proficiency testing, although he warns that "[e]stablishing rates of false positives and false negatives may not be easy." Weir, supra, p. 11658. Professor Jonathan Koehler declares that, "[t]he best way to measure the rate of false positive error associated with a laboratory or an individual technician is through an ongoing series of blind, external

proficiency tests conducted under realistic conditions."

Koehler, Error and Exaggeration, supra, at 28. Others who endorse this position are R.C. Lewontin, supra, at 260 ("there must be frequent independent and unannounced inspections and tests"); Mueller, supra, at 57 (noting with approval the NRC's call for blind proficiency tests); Hagerman, supra (noting importance of proficiency testing to error rate determination). 71

The NRC Committee emphasized the importance of proficiency testing in a prefatory statement to its report:

We regard the accreditation and proficiency testing of DNA typing laboratories as essential to the scientific accuracy, reliability, and acceptability of DNA typing evidence in the future. Laboratories involved in forensic DNA typing should move quickly to establish quality assurance programs. After a sufficient time for implementation of quality assurance programs has passed, courts should view quality control as necessary for general acceptance.

The NRC's position is not universally endorsed. Professor Lempert has expressed doubt about whether proficiency testing "will ever be extensive enough to generate reliable false positive probabilities", but nevertheless favors proficiency testing as an incentive to laboratories to do good work and because "proficiency testing may allow the setting of bounds on likely false positive error rates", p. 257. The strongest dissenter from the NRC position appears to be statistician Kathryn Roeder, who has been a consistent supporter of existing forensic statistical methods. Kathryn Roeder, "DNA Fingerprinting: A Review of the Controversy, " 9 Stat.Sci. 222, 274-75 (1994). Although she agrees with Lempert that "realistic blind proficiency testing...could have unforeseen benefits," she regards it as "inefficient and inaccurate" for estimating extremely rare events. Her assumption that laboratory error will be an extremely rare event is not shared by other scientists, however, and her suggested alternative to proficiency testing . (she favors the method used by NASA for "estimating the probability of a space shuttle disaster") appears to have few adherents.

NRC Report, at x.

In recent testimony, Professor Eric Lander, a member of the NRC Committee, explained that the Committee did not wish to call a moratorium on all forensic DNA testing but wanted to see proficiency testing programs set up as soon as possible because the Committee members unanimously believed "that proficiency testing is an essential component of the scientific reliability and acceptability of [DNA] evidence," p. 43. In saying that laboratories should move "quickly" to establish such programs, the Committee chose the term with care "to be faster than with all deliberate speed, for example," p. 80, and to clearly signal courts that failure to do proficiency testing would not be acceptable for long.

Lander also explained the reason the Committee demanded blind proficiency testing: only blind testing gives an adequate measure of the likelihood of error.

An adequate [method of proficiency testing] must surely be blind. If you know that you are working on test samples rather than case samples, you will, even if you don't intend to, be more careful. Thus, open proficiency testing where the examiner knows that they are being examined, does not provide an adequate measure of proficiency. Blind proficiency testing, where samples are worked in normal case flow, provides a good measure of that.

Id., at 50.

In light of these very powerful pronouncements demanding realistic blind proficiency testing, it is clear that there are scientists significant in number and expertise who would accept no less. It would therefore appear impossible for any method of

error rate estimation to meet the requirements of <u>Kelly</u> unless it incorporated blind proficiency testing on samples simulating casework.

2. None of the Laboratories That Performed DNA Testing In This Case Have Employed a Generally Accepted Method to Estimate Error Rate.

The evidence to be introduced in the hearing will show that none of the laboratories whose work is offered in this case have done any adequate external blind proficiency testing on realistic samples to provide a meaningful estimate of its error rate. The true error rate of all the laboratories is unknown and unknowable based on currently available data. Consequently, the value of the DNA evidence they offer is impossible to evaluate and therefore inadmissible.

POINT III

THE METHODS USED IN THIS CASE FOR THE COLLECTION, PRESERVATION, HANDLING, AND PROCESSING OF CRIME SCENE SAMPLES FOR FORENSIC PCR BASED DNA TESTING -- THE DQ ALPHA, D1880, AND POLYMARKER TECHNIQUES -- ARE NOT GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS RELIABLE AMONG MOLECULAR BIOLOGISTS.

Forensic DNA testing based on the PCR technique is very different than RFLP testing. There is universal recognition in the scientific community that special and peculiarly difficult problems must be resolved if a reliable transfer of the extremely sensitive PCR technology from its present use in research laboratories and clinical (medical) diagnostic laboratories to the forensic arena is to be accomplished.

One point that emerges immediately in considering the general acceptance of PCR based forensic testing is that the scientific community has unequivocally warned about special dangers of sample contamination. These dangers embrace both the methods used for the initial collection, preservation, and handling of samples by crime scene technicians as well as the methods used for processing the samples in the laboratory. The NRC Report expressed its most "serious concern" about the problem of "contamination of evidence samples with other human DNA," NRC Report, at 65, and went on to underscore that reliable methods must be developed to prevent and control contamination problems unique to forensic PCR based testing in both the sample gathering and laboratory testing processes. NRC Report, at 66.

Therefore, it must be emphasized that a <u>Kelly</u> inquiry concerning PCR based testing must embrace the methods used by the

laboratories for identifying, correcting, and preventing contamination in the collection, preservation, and handling of crime scene samples. Of necessity, the principal focus of this inquiry will center on the methods used by LAPD crime scene and laboratory personnel since that agency collected, preserved, handled, and initially processed all the critical crime scene samples in this case. In addition, a Kelly inquiry must separately review the general acceptance of each PCR-based technique, and its application by each different laboratory in this case, whether one chooses to characterize the inquiry as a Prong 1 or Prong 3 question. See, People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 811, 810; People v. Pizarro, 10 Cal. App. 4th 57, 78 (Application by FBI and Cellmark of RFLP testing procedures must be separately examined).

The prosecution's burden at this hearing is a very heavy one indeed. There are no California appellate cases approving the methods of even the most experienced and validated laboratories which utilize the DQ-alpha technique. Each of the laboratories in this case have just begun validating their use of the DQ-alpha method based on a "kit" they received from Roche laboratories. The use of a commercially distributed standardized PCR DQ-alpha "kit," however, does not mean a laboratory employs adequate methods and controls to do reliable PCR DQ-alpha testing. Individual laboratory validation is required, and many scientists, and the NRC itself, believe that additional scientific controls are necessary to make PCR based forensic

testing reliable. The NRC makes this point clear in its comments on Roche's DQ-alpha "kit":

One commercial kit for forensic PCR analysis has been marketed. Other such kits will probably be ready for commercial distribution soon. The committee sees a potential for introduction of unreliable kits and the misuse of kits. The existence of a kit suggests ease of use and low chance of technical error. The committee believes that nonexpert laboratories will run a significant chance of error using kits. We therefore recommend that a standing committee (discussed later in this chapter) consider the issue of regulatory approval of kits for commercial use in forensic DNA analysis. Even though no precedent exists for the regulation of tests in forensic DNA applications, we believe that it might be necessary for a government agency to test and approve kits for DNA analysis before their actual forensic use.

NRC Report, at 69.

Moreover, the use of PCR based polymarker tests by Cellmark, and D1S80 tests by DOJ, are clearly, for these laboratories, at the earliest experimental stages. The forensic use of these techniques by the laboratories are barely known to the scientific community, much less generally accepted.

Furthermore, the prosecution will be unable to demonstrate at the <u>Kelly</u> hearing that the LAPD has, nor did it employ, a generally accepted method for the collection, preservation, and handling of crime scene samples for purposes of PCR-based testing. As a consequence, the DNA found in key crime scene samples were severely degraded. Such severe degradation substantially increases the risk of getting unreliable PCR typing results from those samples due to the slightest subsequent contamination by LAPD technicians and laboratory personnel, or by any of the laboratories that subsequently did PCR testing on the

samples. Moreover, the risk of sample contamination created by unreliable preservation and handling practices was seriously compounded by the fact that the LAPD DNA laboratory does not employ generally accepted methods for identifying, preventing, and controlling contamination in its processing of samples for PCR testing. Put simply, the methods employed by LAPD are not generally accepted as reliable and they have created scientifically unacceptable risks of sample contamination for purposes of PCR testing on the crime samples in this case.

A. The Transfer of PCR Technology To Forensic Testing.

The PCR technique was first developed by Dr. Kary Mullis while working for the Cetus Corporation in 1985. Last year, Dr. Mullis won a Nobel prize for this work.

Cetus owned a patent on the PCR technique which survived a lawsuit by DuPont, which claimed the technique was not patentable. Recently, Cetus, and the PCR patent, were purchased by Hoffman-LaRoche (Roche).

The PCR technique is used widely in research laboratories and many clinical laboratories, most notably immunological laboratories doing clinical work on organ transplants.

Nonetheless, the scientific community has consistently expressed caution about the transfer of PCR technology to forensic applications. For example, the Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress reported in July, 1990:

 $^{^{72}}$ The NRC Report offers an explanation of how the PCR technique works. NRC Report, at 40-44.

At present, however, the enthusiasm of some for PCR applied to forensic casework is tempered. Cautionary voices warn that, compared to RFLP analysis, all the possible artifacts and steps necessary to avoid them have not been fully identified. Some believe that additional studies of PCR on simulated or real samples is necessary to ensure that problems often encountered with real samples, including DNA and non-DNA contaminants, do not interfere with accurate PCR use in forensic applications. 73

More recently, the NRC began its discussion of forensic PCR testing with this observation:

PCR is a relatively new technique in molecular biology, having come into common use in research laboratories only in the last four years. Although the basic exponential amplification procedure is well understood, many technical details are not, including why some primer pairs amplify much better than others, why some loci cause systematically unfaithful amplification, and why some assays are much more sensitive to variations in conditions. Nonetheless, it is an extremely powerful technique that holds great promise for forensic applications because of its great sensitivity and the potential of its use on degraded DNA.⁷⁴

And the NRC ended its discussion of PCR by concluding:

PCR analysis is extremely powerful in medical technology, but it has not yet achieved full acceptance in the forensic setting. The theory of PCR analysis, even though it is the analysis of synthetic DNA as opposed to the natural sample, is scientifically accepted and has been accepted by a number of courts. However, most forensic laboratories have invested their energy in the development of RFLP technology and have left the development of forensic PCR technology to a few other laboratories. Thus, there is no broad base of experience in the use of the technique in identity

⁷³ Chapter 3, "Validity, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, Genetic Witness: Forensic Uses of DNA Tests," Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, BA-438, Washington D.C. (July 1990), at page 69.

Washington D.C. (July 1990), at page 69.

74 DNA Technology in Forensic Science, Committee on DNA
Technology in Forensic Science, National Research Council,
National Academy of Science (National Academy Press, 1992), page
63.

testing. [emphasis added] 75

The reason that the PCR testing has not achieved full acceptance in the forensic setting is because serious problems have been encountered. There are four basic difficulties with the application of current forensic PCR testing methods: contamination, misincorporation, differences in qualitative and quantitative fidelity, and differential amplification.

Contamination.

Contamination is the single greatest problem in the transfer of PCR technology to forensic testing. This is because the extraordinary ability of PCR to reproduce a single copy of DNA is also its greatest disadvantage. "PCR is not discriminating as to the source of the DNA it amplifies, and it can be exceedingly sensitive."

Contamination can arise in a myriad of ways. The general categories of contamination outlined by the NRC are:

a) Contamination from handling in the field during collection, either by cross-contaminating samples with each other directly, cross-contaminating samples through DNA carry-over on evidence gathering instruments or the gatherer's clothing, mixing up samples, or inadvertent contribution from the biological

^{75 &}lt;u>DNA Technology in Forensic Science</u>, Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science, National Research Council, National Academy of Science (National Academy Press, 1992), page 70.

⁷⁶DNA Technology in Forensic Science, Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science, National Research Council, National Academy of Science (National Academy Press, 1992), p. 65.

products from the evidence gatherer him or herself (sweat, sneezing, dandruff, etc.) 77;

- b) In the laboratory, cross-contamination of samples to each other, or contamination emanating from the evidence handlers and their instruments, while samples are being manipulated, sorted, labeled, dried, cut, before, during, and after the DNA extraction process;
- c) Contamination from contaminants in solution, reagents, or aerosols ("Even the simple act of flipping the top of a plastic tube might aerosolize enough DNA to pose a problem.");
- d) PCR product carryover contamination the contamination of evidence samples or reaction solutions with PCR products from prior amplifications; and
- e) Mixed samples -- contamination from the fact that a crime scene sample, such as blood stain, could be a mixture of bloods or other biological fluids or substances. NRC Report, 65-67.

Recognized leaders in the scientific community, unaffiliated with laboratories who have a vested interest in the immediate implementation of current forensic PCR methods, have urged against the use of such testing until more stringent controls be employed to guard against sample contamination, including

⁷⁷ Cross-contaminating samples directly is a more serious problem when handling bloodstains than with the mixed body fluids unique to a sexual assault case. In sexual assault cases, a differential extraction procedure bursts open the non-sperm cells from the female while leaving the sperm cells intact. Thus, one would have to contaminate the rape kit swabs or victim's underpants with other sperm rather than with sweat, saliva, or other bodily fluids to achieve a spurious result.

independent blind proficiency testing of laboratories. The views of these scientists alone preclude a finding of general acceptance.

DR. LEWONTIN

First, consider the recent observations of Dr. Richard
Lewontin, a pre-eminent geneticist who has been profoundly
influential in the scientific debate over forensic DNA testing:

The usual scenario in a criminal trial is that a small amount of dried blood, semen or tissue scraping is recovered from the scene of a crime. A suspect is then identified. and a sample of his or her blood is taken on cubiccentimeter amounts. DNA from the crime scene scraping and from the suspect's blood sample are then compared side by side in the same laboratory. (Sometimes the tissue or dried blood is found on property of the suspect and it is the victim's DNA that is to be matched with it.) While there is more than enough DNA recoverable from the suspect's large blood sample to carry out the needed procedures, the very small, and often degraded, sample from the crime scene does not contain sufficient DNA for the comparison. To obtain sufficient material, the DNA from the crime scene is "amplified," that is, copied thousands or millions of times in a procedure known as polymerase chain reaction (PCR). As the name of the procedure suggests, the original small number of DNA molecules are copies once, then these copies plus the original are copied a second time and so on for a number of cycles, increasing the total population of molecules exponentially until a sufficient amount has been produced for the matching procedure. The problem with the PCR technique is that because of its chain nature, contaminant molecules in the original sample may also be amplified and, since the original crime scene sample contained so few molecules, contaminants may overwhelm the original in the amplification. In addition, small differences in DNA sequence can have very large effects on the relative amplification of the components in an original mixture.

Now consider the actual practice in a forensic DNA laboratory. A technician is handling two samples. One is the very large DNA sample from the suspect's blood, the other is the minuscule DNA sample from the crime scene, which is then amplified by PCR. The situation is ideal for PCR contamination, with the result that the suspect's DNA will not really be compared with that from the crime scene,

but with his or her own DNA that has just been replicated in the PCR reaction. The result will be a perfect match.

All of us who use the PCR technique regularly are acutely conscious of the contamination problem, and the best laboratories have suffered occasionally from it. perspiration and "oils" on fingertips have provided enough DNA contamination in PCR experiments to give completely artifactual results. Only careful replication catches these errors, and some errors have not been caught until much later when another laboratory found conflicting results. the forensic context, where the liberty and even life of the suspect is in question, it is essential that courts be assured that laboratories are taking careful precautions against these contamination errors, not to speak of grosser errors of recording, etc. Representatives of commercial laboratories that have previously been found to provide erroneous results have told interviewers that they have "cleaned up their act." Perhaps they have, but we cannot know without independent checks, and anyway what about the people convicted before they "cleaned up their act"? The FBI has consistently refused to allow independent quality control checks, relying on their own internal procedures.

In a forensic context, where the liberty and even life of a suspect is at stake, there must be frequent, independent and unannounced inspections and tests of DNA laboratories, on the model of the inspections carried out by radiation safety officers and the Department of Energy of laboratories using radioactive materials. The issue is certainly too important to be dismissed by the unsubstantiated opinion of someone familiar with the technical procedures at first hand. If the data themselves are unreliable, questions of probabilities of alternative suspects are irrelevant.

R. C. Lewontin, "Comment: The Use of DNA Profiles in Forensic Contexts, in "DNA Fingerprinting: A Review of the Controversy," Statistical Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1994), at 259-260.

DR. RICHARD ROBERTS -- NOBEL PRIZE LAUREATE

Dr. Richard J. Roberts recently won the Nobel prize in genetics for his work in the area of restriction enzymes. He has testified numerous times as a prosecution expert in cases involving RFLP analysis and traditional Southern blotting methods. Dr. Roberts has submitted a number of affidavits opposing the use of forensic PCR analysis. In an affidavit

submitted for consideration at a <u>Frye</u> hearing in <u>Washington v.</u> <u>Gentry</u>, he had this to say:

First, I will make some general comments about PCR technology. The technique is an extremely powerful In principle, and occasionally in practice, a small region of a single DNA molecule can be amplified sufficiently to allow its detection. This means that DNA from a single cell in principle can be detected by the method. It is this exquisite sensitivity that makes it desirable for use in a forensic setting where often only limited amounts of material may be available. Unfortunately, it is this very sensitivity that makes it also prone to the possibility of contamination. This can result in the amplification, not of the small amount of sample that was intended. but rather of a small amount of an unintentional contaminant. Indeed, problems of contamination are a major source of error in the laboratory and extraordinary precautions need to be taken when performing multiple PCR experiments to avoid amplifying samples that have become contaminated through aerosols or sloppy laboratory procedures. Of course, knowing that such contamination can take place means that when working in a laboratory one takes the necessary precautions to avoid it. Unfortunately, the samples that are collected from crime scenes are, by their very nature, usually contaminated to begin with! becomes extremely important that proper checks and controls are carried out to be certain that the product amplified from a particular sample is from the sample and not from the contaminant. How can this be done? Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge there is no generally accepted method by which this can be quaranteed at the present time. The reasons are described below.

PCR is a technique that is still relatively new. It has only been in <u>routine</u> use in academic laboratories during the last two years and so our experience with the method is itself fairly limited. This experience for the most part has involved the pristine academic laboratory setting. Ruch less experience is available for forensic samples. In a laboratory setting it is usually possible to take the great precautions that are necessary to avoid dealing with mixed samples. Nevertheless, it occurs and occasionally

⁷⁸ The term "pristine academic laboratory setting" refers to the fact that research scientists generally work with known samples taken from known sources under ideal conditions.

amplification results in bands⁷⁹ other than the ones expected. In the laboratory one can usually go back and repeat the experiment, perhaps changing reagents or merely being more careful about sample handling. That such artifactual amplification will happen from time to time is to be expected.

Roberts Aff., February 22, 1991, <u>Washington v. Gentry</u>, at 2-3 [emphasis added]. 80

DR. KARY MULLIS -- NOBEL PRIZE LAUREATE

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there is the position of Dr. Kary Mullis himself, the man who developed the PCR technique and won a Nobel prize last year for doing so.

Dr. Mullis believes that the PCR DQ-alpha test should be used for exclusions but not inclusions. He has publicly taken this position, and criticized the inadequacy of controls being used to protect against contamination, in two Kelly hearings in the past two years. See, Mullis testimony, People v. McIntosh & Schlaepfer and People v. Moffet.

In the course of his testimony in <u>People v. McIntosh & Schlaepfer</u>, Case No. 33026, Tulare County Superior Court, on

⁷⁹ In using the term "bands," Dr. Roberts is referring to running amplified product on a test gel in order to determine the genotype of the test sample.

BOD. Roberts goes on to note that he would want "knowledge by some independent means of the quality of the sample being analyzed," and could "envision PCR results being useful as an adjunct to more conventional RFLP tests, when [the RFLP tests] have already produced results." Roberts Aff., at 4. The prosecution can find little solace in this qualification of Dr. Roberts' strong statement for at least two reasons. First, LAPD's PCR testing preceded Cellmark's RFLP test on sample 52 and, given the contamination problems at LAPD, does not provide prior, independent knowledge about the quality of the sample. Secondly, the prosecution is offering three different forms of forensic PCR testing on all other samples not as an "adjunct," but as the sole basis for analysis.

August 23, 1994, Dr. Mullis touched upon the major issues the defense is raising here.

First, Dr. Mullis specifically addresses why special care must be taken in the collection, handling, and preservation of crime scene samples when PCR testing is going to be done, and why such procedures must be considered a part of the forensic PCR testing method:

Q. Okay. What I'm pointing at, for the record, is the DNA technology in Forensic Science by the National Research Council that was published in '92. I forgot what exhibit it is.

But, in any event, you are familiar with some of the findings and the information that's contained in that report they submitted in '92?

A. Yes.

- Q. Looking at page 52 where they distinguish between the DNA diagnostics and DNA forensic where they give descriptions, I'm just curious whether this accurately represents what you're describing here when you're talking about diagnostics. You're usually involving clean tissue samples, known sources, repeated usually can be repeated comparison of discrete alternatives. Is this the kind of stuff that you're acquainted with?
- A. Right. You have control over everything. Not over everything, but over many more things when you're in a diagnostic situation than if you're just selecting samples that have been laying around.
- Q. So where they describe the forensic differences that are involved in forensic typing, they're speaking of degraded and contaminated possibilities, multiple unknown sources, inability to repeat always, matching of samples that can be from a wide range of alternatives. These are the kinds of things that you're aware of?
- A. Yes, it's much more difficult to know that your results are really what they seem to be in that situation. I think -- criminalists, I think, are the people that go around and collect that stuff. They

probably will get better at it. They'll eventually know what you can and can't do. But it's a vast problem compared to what you have in a clinic or in a hospital.

McIntosh, Mullis at 2340, line 17 to 2342 line 3.

Q. I didn't ask the question very well, I'm sure. But I think you answered it. Just to make sure though, what I'm talking about is that let's say you have samples that are picked up at a crime scene and not handled carefully and contamination could occur, a cross-mixing of various samples of DNA. Because of PCR's inherent sensitivity, if you ran PCR procedure on that DNA and then attempted to type it using the dot blot method, for example, would it be-- tend to be more sensitive to that error because of the evidence that was handled in PCR versus some other type of typing?

A. Yeah, I think I answered saying in certain cases when you wouldn't always know when that was, it certainly would be. In other cases, it introduces an uncertainty there that you don't have it you don't amplify. Because if you don't amplify and you get a thousandth part contamination, you know it will still be a thousandth part when you get to the analysis. It will be a wispy little thing somewhere and you'll say that's probably an artifact.

If you're going to amplify it and you pick up a contaminant that happens to be a lot easier to amplify than the sample that you really want to amplify, then that could become a real problem, because ten cycles gives you a thousand fold amplification, 20 cycles gives you a million, 30 cycles, which these people are doing, 30 or 32, gives you a billion.

Q. Thank you. Now, you said something this morning when you were talking about the application of PCR to the research and diagnostics area and then you were asked about the application in the forensics area. I think you mentioned that forensics is not the same as research and diagnostics. And then you said the certainty level is a lot lower, and I'm not sure what you meant by that.

In other words, when you're using PCR in the forensic area, is the certainty level lower than you would expect it to be?

A. I don't think the certainty level of the PCR reaction inherently would be any lower. It doesn't matter what it's being used for. The certainty level of the whole analysis involves the collection, the maintaining, the processing of the samples.

McIntosh, Mullis at 2387 line 2 - 2388 line 24.

Similarly, Dr. Mullis decisively rebuts the prosecution's contention that a PCR DQ-alpha, polymarker, or D1S80 test must be free of contamination if the negative amplification control (the "blank control") that comes with the Roche kit does not light up. Echoing the NRC's warning that a blank control will not necessarily reveal contamination ("[E]ven in a laboratory contaminated with PCR carryover, blank controls do not necessarily become contaminated on every occasion." NRC Report, at 67), Dr. Mullis describes the dimensions of the problem:

- Q. Now, you said earlier something, I won't go into the details, but it is listed here on page 67, that blank controls do not necessarily become contaminated on every occasion. This is a problem?
- A. That's a tough problem, too. It is. How many blank controls are you going—like I said, you cannot ever show that there wasn't one contaminating molecule in a bottle without taking the whole bottle and putting it into the PCR reaction. Once you've done that, you got to make another bottle. Just like you can't ever know if in fact there's just one, you know, virus in your blood stream if you're looking for a dangerous virus. You can't sample the whole thing. You don't sample the whole bottle of a particular reagent when you take a sample of it.

If it's highly contaminated, the statistics say you stick your pipette in there and take it out and you would get at least one of the contaminants. If there's only ten or fifteen in there, it will only be ten or fifteen times when you're using that bottle that you end up pulling one of them out. You never know when that would be. So you have to have five controls and they come out blank and then the unlucky time you might stick it down in there and put it into one of your

experimental tubes and it will show up there, but not in any of your controls.

McIntosh, Mullis at 2375 line 21 to 2376 line 23.

On cross examination Dr. Mullis remained firm in his contention that forensic PCR tests were not as reliable as other diagnostic clinical applications, particularly when analysis was being performed on degraded samples.

- Q. As far as the actual basic science of the diagnostic laboratories using PCR, that is no different than a forensic lab using PCR, correct?
- A. The basic science is basic science. I suppose the problems in the forensic lab, we have tried to list some of the ones that are in a forensic lab where it's very difficult or impossible to even make a good shot at solving them. Where in a clinical setting it is possible to take precautions that make your results much more reliable. That's what I was talking about just before the break which had to do with being able to know exactly how much DNA you're adding, how many copies of what it is you're looking for to expect and to set up the conditions of the amplification in accord with that.

If you have a sample that's degraded, you don't know how much DNA's in it, you just have to take a shot at it. And you might go too many cycles and, therefore, bring a contaminant up to a level that it will look like if it wasn't a contaminant.

McIntosh, Mullis at 2420 line 1 to line 24.

Finally, Dr. Mullis rejected the idea that combining, as the prosecution has done in this case, several different DNA and conventional serology systems would make the PCR testing any more reliable:

Q. In a case where we use several different systems, one including DQ-alpha as a site, we use RFLP markers as other sites, conventional serological evidence as other sites, would the combination of all those sites be useful?

A. If there weren't so much trouble with reliability on the DQ-alpha thing, that would certainly be data that you could add up together and say well, the probability based on DQ-alpha is that he's in a 17 percent group. The probability based on blood typing is that he's on a 30 percent group. The probability that you do with some RFLP or a couple of those puts him in an even smaller group. But you still would come up with maybe a number of, say, two out of a hundred people might or two out of a thousand or one out of a million maybe, if you're lucky. Depends on the data that you collect, whether it's rare data or whether he's got common things at those places.

But the reliability of the RFLP data, it says why add that to this whole mishmash of stuff that you've got? Why take some piece of evidence that you can find plenty of scientists will come in and say I wouldn't trust it on myself? I would repeat it over and over. I've got this problem with contamination. I've got this one with differential amplification.

This method relies on too many things that are easy to get wrong to make it really worth pursuing. That's all I'm saying. I'm saying why pick a method, why use a method that is so subject to human error and to just things that are way beyond our control? Why pick a method like that to use in a Court of Law? You wouldn't use that on your taxes.

McIntosh, Mullis at 2450 line 12 to 2451 line 21.81

B1 Dr. Mullis reiterated in the next question and answer his position that the appropriate application of PCR technology will be in sequencing tests, such as with mitochondrial DNA, which would avoid many of the statistical and contamination problems bedeviling the DQ Alpha, polymarker, and D1880 approaches.

Q. Opposed to that, the system you propose with mitochondrial DNA sequencing, that would be far superior?

A. It's easier to do. It's cheaper than having people arguing for days. It is much more informative. And it is presently doable. It's being done all the time. It's like silly to keep using this thing. With all the problems that have been pointed out about it, it should be evidence that there's enough doubt about it in the scientific community without somebody having written a definitive paper showing that it's worthless. There's

TESTIMONY FROM OTHER EXPERTS

Other molecular biologists from the academic community and the clinical community have expressed similar objections to the concerns voiced by Drs. Lewontin, Roberts, and Mullis. For instance, Dr. Ashok Bhagwat, a professor in the Chemistry Department at Wayne State University, had extensive experience studying molecular biology at Cold Spring Harbor where he received his post doctoral training working under Dr. Richard Roberts. In Washington v. Gentry, Dr. Bhagwat offered these succinct views:

Q: Dr. Bhagwat, is PCR technology generally accepted in the scientific community for use on crime scene evidence?

A: No, it's not.

Q: And could you describe to the Court some of the general reasons why you have that opinion?

A: There are several problems with the material that you are likely to obtain at a crime scene. It is most likely to be contaminated. And let me just slightly digress and say, PCR is so powerful that a single cell contamination could be devastating to the result, and hence, contamination is a big potential problem and it is unlikely that it is easily solvable for evidence arising from crime scenes.

Gentry, 28 RP 2238-2239.

Dr. John Gerdes is clinical director at Immunological

McIntosh, 2451 line 22 - 2452 line 13.

enough doubt about it in the scientific community that the legal community should take notice that the scientific community is not even using that much any more. They're starting to sequence. We're doing it easily.

Associates of Denver, a reference laboratory that uses the same PCR technology involved in this case in conjunction with transplants (matching organ donors and recipients) and screening for AIDS and other infectious diseases. He has testified over twelve times expressing, from the hands-on perspective of one who runs a clinical laboratory, the same objections raised by Drs. Lewontin, Roberts and Mullis. Dr. Gerdes testified most recently in the McIntosh case, in tandem With Dr. Mullis, and the defense submits this transcript for the Court's edification.

(a) Contamination from PCR carryover.

Most of the discussion so far has focused on crosscontamination of forensic samples in their collection,
preservation, handling, and processing. Before leaving the
subject of contamination, however, special mention must be made
of the phenomenon of PCR product contamination: contamination of
samples by PCR product from previously run reactions in a
laboratory. This is sometimes called "carryover contamination."

One of the developers of the Cetus/Roche kit, Dr. Russell Higuchi, describes the phenomenon:

More unique to PCR is the possibility of carryover contamination from a completed PCR to another sample yet to be amplified. Because by the nature of PCR, PCR product will seed production of more PCR product, the sheer number of copies of PCR product after amplification can make the consequences of such contamination more dramatic. A typical PCR could have 10^{12} copies of an amplified gene. If a preparer inadvertently transfers, as before, 0.1 $\mu 1^{82}$ of PCR sample A into sample B, even though sample B has a relatively high concentration of human DNA, the number

 $^{^{82}}$ A μ l is a microliter (one millionth of a liter).

of copies of the target, single-locus gene that derive from sample A far outnumber the copies that actually stem from sample B. Thus, the DNA type obtained will be that of A and not B, and the relative amount of the B type is so small that it would not even show up in the test, eliminating the possibility that the presence of more than two alleles would flag the occurrence of the contamination.⁸³

The NRC highlighted the problem of PCR carryover contamination as a key area of vulnerability, declaring "it has become clear that carryover products from one PCR reaction to another must also be eliminated." NRC Report, at 67. Accordingly, the NRC commented that "[m]ethods of detecting and preventing contamination from one PCR reaction to another in forensic laboratories are generally still in their early stages, and additional development should be encouraged."

It is plain, however, that forensic PCR laboratories, including those involved in the instant case, have not responded appropriately. For example, the NRC pointedly suggested that it would be a good idea to treat all evidence samples with uracil N-glycose (UNG) before amplification to destroy any PCR carryover from previous PCR reactions. Id. Clinical laboratories have followed up on this idea. Dr. Gerdes reports that his and other clinical laboratories "don't do anything without UNG anymore," McIntosh, Gerdes, 1915 line 6, and that the UNG control was featured in a PCR chlamydia kit which won recent FDA approval. Id., 1914 line 19. Forensic PCR laboratories, including the ones

⁸³ R. Higuchi and E.T. Blake, "PCR in Forensic Science, DNA Technology and Forensic Science," 32 Banbury Report, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press (1989), at page 275.

which did testing in this case, do not use UNG to protect against carryover contamination.

Most importantly, since PCR carryover contamination can be a systemic, cumulative problem in a laboratory, the NRC demanded that controls must be in place to monitor "general contamination" in forensic PCR laboratories:

In view of the problem of contamination due to handling and carryover, laboratories must incorporate contamination control into their standard operating procedures. And outbreaks of contamination and the steps taken to correct the problem should be documented.

NRC Report, at 67 [emphasis added].

Yet, at every turn, the prosecution and the laboratories have attempted to thwart discovery of laboratory contamination problems. Other than some systematic review of hybridization strips, there is no way to ascertain the extent of contamination in a forensic PCR laboratory, especially when the laboratory does not make a comprehensive effort to monitor or document the occurrence of contamination. Cellmark and the prosecution has opposed, along with Cellmark, the defense's request to view hybridization records from ten cases before and after the analysis performed in the instant matter. The prosecution has opposed the same request with respect to DOJ. Despite evidence that the LAPD laboratory has experienced "outbreaks" of contamination, and has not taken adequate steps to document or correct the problem, the prosecution and the laboratory continue to resist defense efforts to review hybridization strips. Indeed, despite specific reference in the NRC to "outbreaks of

contamination," the prosecution and the laboratories claim they don't understand what is meant by that phrase in defense discovery requests. See Letter of Dr. Robin Cotton, September 27, 1994, at 2 ("Note: Please ask for a clarification on what is meant by 'an outbreak of contamination'"...), attached to People's Response to Discovery Sanction Motion of September 28, 1994.

Given the crucial importance of demonstrating the absence of contamination in PCR laboratories to general acceptance in the scientific community, a strong inference should be drawn against the proponents of forensic PCR evidence for their refusal to permit adequate discovery of their contamination controls and their abject failure to monitor contamination.

2. Misincorporation, Differences in Qualitative and Quantitative Fidelity, and Differential Amplification.

PCR amplification products do not always faithfully represent the starting material in the sample, either qualitatively or quantitatively.

During PCR amplification nucleotides are known to be "misincorporated" at the rate of one per 10,000 nucleotides per cycle. If amplification is performed on a sample that has a large number of molecules, and if the misincorporation is random ("stochastic fluctuation"), then the low frequency of random errors will not skew typing results. The NRC warns, however, that "for systems in which misincorporation is not random," difficulties will arise. NRC Report, at 64. In particular, in DNA systems that contain tandem repeat sequences, "the DNA

polymerase can slip during amplification, introduce or delete copies of the repeat, and produce a heterogeneous collection of fragments, often making interpretation difficult." Id. D1S80 is a VNTR with tandem repeat sequences, thereby requiring, in the NRC's view, that its properties be "thoroughly characterized" before it goes on line.

Differential amplification is also a potential problem:

In some cases, PCR can be qualitatively faithful but quantitatively unfaithful, because some alleles amplify more efficiently than others. A sample might contain a 50:50 mixture of two alleles and yield an amplified product with a 90:10 ratio. Differential amplification can arise through several mechanisms. It has been observed in the amplification of allelic products of different sizes (larger products tend to amplify less efficiently than shorter products) and in the amplification of sequences that differ significantly in GC content (because of differing denaturation efficiencies). In some cases, faithful amplification occurs at some temperatures and differential amplification at other temperatures. The possibility of differential amplification needs to be addressed in the design and development of amplification protocols for each genetic marker system. The safeguards to ensure that differential amplification does not occur should be defined and documented.

NRC Report, at 64-65.

When dealing with mixed forensic samples, especially small degraded samples, quantitative analysis with current forensic PCR methods can be, in the NRC's words, "problematic." Id.

It should be noted that Dr. Mullis believes that PCR based sequencing methods, such as those being developed now on mitochondrial DNA, can avoid the problems of quantitative and qualitative amplification:

But the sequencing -- the reason I was so strong on sequencing is that it doesn't rely -- sequencing

doesn't rely on the quantitative accuracy in the amplification of different bands. The quantitative aspect is not as important. Just as long as you've got enough to sequence, it won't matter if you were sort of inefficient in your amplification if you have enough to sequence. If you don't, you can just amplify some more until you do...

If you're sequencing -- if you're sequencing with PCR amplification, [inefficient amplifications] won't change the results. It will say well, you didn't get enough to even get a sequence, so go back and amplify some more. It won't change the sequence. The data that you come out with will be the same, regardless of whether any of those things are wrong.

McIntosh, Mullis, 2377 line 13 to 2378 line 13.

3. The Absence of External Blind Trials Precludes Validation, and General Acceptance, of the PCR Methods Used In This Case.

The importance of external blind proficiency testing on samples that replicate case work has already been discussed in the context of developing a reliable method to determine the error rate of a laboratory. External blind trials, however, also serve a critical role in establishing the reliability of a new method, or validating that a laboratory can reliably apply a generally accepted method. The NRC was unequivocal on this point:

Most important, there is no substitute for rigorous external proficiency testing via blind trials. Such proficiency testing constitutes scientific confirmation that a laboratory's implementation of a method is valid not only in theory, but in practice. No laboratory should let its results with a new DNA typing method be used in court, unless it has undergone such proficiency testing via blind trials.

NRC Report, at 55 (emphasis added).

None of the laboratories in this case have undergone external proficiency testing via blind trials with any of the PCR

based methods. Given the controversy about the reliability of forensic PCR methods among the leading scientists in the field, the NRC's bright line injunction has particular force: None of the PCR testing should be used in this case because the testing laboratories have not demonstrated its reliability through external blind proficiency testing.

CONCLUSION

The NRC warned that forensic PCR testing "poses even more serious issues of proficiency, control, and technology transfer than RFLP typing." NRC Report, at 70. It decried reliance upon the commercially distributed PCR "kits" that are being used in this case and observed that "[i]nformation on the extent of the contamination problem in PCR analysis and the differential amplification of mixed samples needs to be further developed and published." Id.

Basic methodological issues in the forensic PCR testing remain unexplored or in controversy. 84 Despite the admonitions of the NRC and leading scientists, forensic laboratories have not responded to the fact that techniques for the collection, preservation, and handling of crime scene samples is an essential part of forensic PCR testing methodology because of the special problem of sample contamination. Unlike the American Society for

⁸⁴ For example, a recent paper by molecular biologists and mathematicians at USC who are independent of the forensic laboratories, demonstrates that a multiple control tube method (they recommend 10) "is superior to the standard one-tube procedure, either when the sample is small or when laboratory contamination is a potential problem." Navidi, Arnheim, and Waterman, "A Multiple-Tubes Approach for Accurate Genotyping of Very Small DNA Samples by Using PCR: Statistical Considerations," 50 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 347-359, 347 (1992).

Similarly, scientists from the FBI have recommended the use of formamide to improve HLA DQ Alpha amplification based on research that shows eight mistypings of bloodstain evidence without using formamide. Comey, Jung, and Budowle, "Use of Formamide to Improve Amplification of HLA DQ Alpha Sequences," 10 Biotechniques No. 1 (1990).

Histocompatibility and Immunogenetics, which has, for PCR techniques, detailed "Standards for Histocompatibility Testing," there is no comparable set of guidelines for forensic PCR testing.

POINT IV

THE DNA EVIDENCE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED PURSUANT TO EVIDENCE CODE \$352 BECAUSE IT CREATES SUBSTANTIAL DANGERS OF UNDUE PREJUDICE, OF CONFUSING THE ISSUES, AND OF MISLEADING THE JURY THAT OUTWEIGH ITS PROBATIVE VALUE.

The substantial dangers of undue prejudice, misleading the jury, and confusion of issues that arise from the statistical estimates offered by the prosecution about the value of DNA evidence are self-evident, and emanate from the core of the statistical controversy that continues to rage within the scientific community.

A. Prejudice and Confusion From the Coincidental Match Controversy.

One danger of undue prejudice arises, of course, from the controversial methods used to determine the probability of a coincidental match. Many courts have recognized this danger and found it, in conjunction with the general acceptance issue, to be a compelling basis to exclude DNA statistical evidence. After reviewing many Frye hearing transcripts and taking testimony at his own, Judge Henry Kennedy of the District of Columbia put the problem bluntly:

[This] court intends no disrespect to the citizens from whom jury panels are drawn when it states, unequivocally, that jurors are not competent to evaluate and resolve these extraordinarily complex and subtle issues...It is almost certain that jurors would simply "jump" to the bottom line numbers without giving any meaningful consideration to any dispute over the principles which underlie the methodology used to generate those numbers. To permit the fancy of jurors to operate in this manner is the antithesis of "due process."

United States v. Porter, F06277-89, Sup. Ct. Dist. of Colum.,
Crim Div., Slp. Opn., at 88.

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<u>VIA FAX</u>	
Hon. Lance A. Ito Judge, Superior Court Los Angeles County Superior Court Department 103 Criminal Courts Building 210 W. Temple Street	
Los Angeles, CA 90012	
Marcia Clark, Deputy District Attorney Deputy District Attorney Office of the District Attorney 18000 Criminal Courts Building	;

b6 -11 b7С -11

Re: People v. Orenthal James Simpson
Case No. BA 097211

210 W. Temple Street

Dear Judge Ito, Ms. Clark and	
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Attached is a copy of the Table of Cases and Table of Authorities for the Opening Brief to Exclude DNA Evidence. The brief was produced so quickly that we were unable to include the Tables of Cases and Authorities when flew it out to Los Angeles on Wednesday morning.

Please note that asterisks have been placed next to all items that are contained in the two volumes of exhibits that accompanied the brief.

Respectfully

ROBERT L. SHAPIRO

RLS

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*All or part of indicated material has been attrched in two separate volumes to Court's and District Attornay's copies of submitted brief.

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2/19/94

Q205-Q207 Removed 1X2 cm sample of Q206 from below heel area to use as a control.

Removed 10 ul of approximately 5ml of K67 blood to place on Q206 cutting and allowed to dry. One-fifth of the sample was analyzed.

Cut 2X5 mm from Q207 and from Q206 in same area that Q207 was

removed.

Q204 was approximately 2X5 mm piece of cloth red in color. One-half of this sample was taken for analyses.

The A/S swab was 2X6 mm and one-half was taken as a control

10ul of K68 blood was taken from approximately 1ml of blood and dried on a tissue to be used as a control for Q204. One fifth of the sample was analyzed.

Cut one each of 2X5 mm sections of K65 with stain and the control K65 without stain. The K65 samples were approximately 2X2 cm before cutting.

Samples were analyzed as follows:

- The cut samples were placed in 50-400 ul Millipore Ultrafree-MC Filter.
- 2. 25ul of water were added to each sample and let stand for 45 min.
- 3. The samples were centrifuged at 4,000 rpm for 10 min.

INSTRUMENTATION CONDITIONS:

The following instrumental conditions were used on the TSQ 70/700 LC/MS/MS for the analysis of EDTA:

ure 1: Procedure 2:
PRP-1 2.1 mm PRP-1
AN:H ₂ O 5:95 AN:H ₂ O
) NH4OH (0.06%) NH4OH
/minute 0.3 mL/minute
4 DAU 293
2 m/z 128-296 m/z
conds 1.5 seconds

Mode: ESI - MS/MS, coll=20 50psi/4.5kv 5cc sheath cap 200C + MS/MS, coll=-20 90psi/4kv 5cc sheath cap 200C 1200

Multiplier:

Masses to

Monitor:

300

1200

132, 160 (base peak)

EDTA was screened for with procedure one. The only samples which gave a response above background were known EDTA at 100ppm, the K68 blood which was used as a positive control for Q204 and K67 blood which was used as a positive control for Q206/Q207. The positive samples were analyzed with procedure two.

The order of the samples as run is listed below, the injection volume for all samples was 5ul.

Tri-K EDTA at 100ppm H2O blank 2 K65 control from dress 3 K65 stain from dress 4 The control used for the Q204 gate 5 0204 gate 6 K68 used as a positive control for Q204 7 H2O blank 8 Q206 control from sock 9 Q206/Q207 stain from sock 10 K67 on Q204 for positive control 11 H20/10/20/50/80 ppm EDTA, each run twice 12 H20/c65/k65/c204/q204/k68/c206/q206/q206+k67 13 scan 0/32/61/90/122/160/195/233/265 EDTA dau of 293 14 Water blank 15 K68 control for Q204 dau of 293 16 Water blank 17 K67 with Q206/207 dau of 293 18

Sample 12 was run to determine the minimum detectable limit of EDTA.

2/20/95

Samples were prepared to determine minimum detectable amount of EDTA on K65.

Four samples from K65 were analyzed.

- 1 K65 control and 25 ul water
- 2 K65 with stain and 25 ul of water
- 3 K65 with 5ul of red top blood and 250ul water
- k65 with 5ul of purple top blood and 250ul water

These four samples along with a 10ppm EDTA and a blank were

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analyzed. The only samples to show the 300 m/z ion for EDTA were the 10ppm standard and the 5ul of blood with EDTA.

The blood with EDTA was 5ul in 250ul or 0.5ul in 25ul. From this analyses it was determined that the minimum detectable amount of blood containing EDTA is 0.5ul of blood.

5ul of blood on cotton has the diameter of approximately 5mm. Therefore the minimum blood EDTA stain would be one tenth the size of a 5mm stain or approximately 1mm square.

2/21/95

Phenolphthalein tests on 1ul of the extract of Q204, Q206, K67 and K68 were positive.

Performed procedure on 0.75ul, 1.25ul and 2.5ul of blood containing EDTA to verify results of previous day. Again, the minimum detectable amount of blood containing EDTA is 0.5ul of blood.

2/22/95

Repeated analyses to detect trace quantities of EDTA. The analyses were performed in the positive ion mode. Daughters of 293 with Q3 scanning 158-162. This analyses is approximately ten times more sensitive than the negative ion. The results were similar except EDTA was detected on the victims dress. The amount of EDTA is approximately 16 time less than that found in EDTA blood based on m/z 160 ion counts (8,000,000/500,000). Ions for m/z 160 were detected in Q204 and Q206, EDTA could not be confirmed with a daughter spectrum while scanning m/z 130-295. A positive ion graph was prepared from EDTA standards. The minimum detectable limit for EDTA ions at m/z 160 is 5ppm. The response in ions for the victims dress is approximately that of a 25ppm solution. Blood concentrations for EDTA in preserved blood are approximately 2,000ppm.

Ran lab coat and Rayon for EDTA. Several m/z 160 ions for lab coat but none for rayon.

2/23/95

Specimens: C204, Q204, C206, Q206, C65, K65, K67, and K68 were analyzed by HPLC for EDTA.

Method: A Water's HPLC system consisting of a 486 UV detector, a 590 pump, and a 710B WISP autosampler were used for this analysis. The following conditions were also utilized in this procedure:

Column: Hamilton PRP-X100

Mobile Phase: 3.0 mM H2SO4/MEOH Detector: Direct UV @ 243nm (95/5)

Flow: 2.0 ml/min.

The column was initially equilibrated with the mobile phase for 2 hours. Multiple injections of 0.05 M CuSO4 were then made to further condition the column. The extracted samples, which were received in a dried condition, were reconstituted with 20 ul of 0.025 M CuSO4 prior to ir jection. 10 ul injections were made of all of the samples. Blanks consisted of 0.025 M CuSO4. EDTA was found in K67 and K68 only.


2-28-95


Repeated extract with Q204 to determine if the K68 blood could be removed from a metal surface.

Placed 5ul of K68 on metal surface and allowed to dry. Swabbed approximately One tenth of the 5ul K68 stain with one by one milliliter of the control for Q204.


Same results as previous analyses of Q204.

EDTA ANALYSIS






Samp: BLANK DLALL : <u>-U.44.U4</u> ACN/10mM NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M Comm: Mode: ESI +DAU LMR GAS UP LR b6 -1 Oper: Inlet: b7C -1 Peak: Label wndw: Masses: 157 > 1621000.00 1 > 44mmu 0, 4.00 Baseline 0, 3 Label: 0, 40.00 Area: m/z:160 E+04 5.535 1007 50 RIC E+05 1.655 1007



Samp: CONTROL FOR Q204 WITH K68 FROM METAL Start: 10:26:55 64 Comm: ACN/10mM NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M Mode: ESI +DAU LMR GAS UP LR Inlet: b6 -1 Oper: b7C -1 157 > 1621000.00 Label wndw: Masses: Peak: mmu 1 > 62Label: 0, 40.00 Baseline : 0, 3 Area: 0, 4.00



Samp: BLANK Start: 10:29:55 . 49

Comm: ACN/10mM NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M

Mode: ESI +DAU LMR GAS UP LR

0, 4.00


Area:


Oper: Peak: 1000.00 mmu Label wndw: 1


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
Inlet: $^{b6-1}$ Masses: 157 > 162

Label: 0, 40.00












Samp: BLANK Start: T0:40:00 Comm: ACN/10mM NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M Mode: ESI +DAU LMR GAS UP LR Inlet: Oper: b6 -1 b7C -1 1000.00 Label wndw: Masses: 157 > 162Peak: mmu 0, 40.00 0, 4.00 Baseline 0, 3 Label: Area: m/z:160 E+04 100 η 4.632







Information Millennium Sample

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Nume:

5ppm edta

Vial: Injection: 6

Channel:

486

Date Acquired:

02/23/95 10:29 AM

Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Method:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00

Run Time:

7.9 min


Date Processed:

02/23/95 02:25 PM

Dilution:

1.00000

.) .



ø	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.583	20244	622		BB

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

Cu\$04

Vial:

2

injection:

1

Channel:

486 02/23/95 10:59 AM

Date Acquired: Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Method:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

19.00

Run Time:

5.0 min


Date Processed:

02/23/95 02:25 PM

Dilution:

1.00000

1.



ø	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.600				Missing

Project Hame:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

1 Vial: 1 Injection: 486

Channel: 02/23/95 11:28 AM

Date Acquired:

00.1 Scale Factor: CAT2_MTH_SET

Acq Meth Set: Processing Method:

blank

edta


Unknown Sample Type: Volume: Run Time:

10.08 5.0 min

02/23/95 02:24 PM Date Processed:

1.00000 Dilution:

ŧ



ø	Name .	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.600				Missing

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Hame:

C204 50217009

Vial:

1

Injection: Channel:

486

Date Acquired:

02/23/95 11:35 AM

Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Neth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Hethod:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00

Run Time:

5.0 min


Date Processed:

02/23/95 02:24 PM

Dilution:

1.00000

} ,



			2 0			1
#	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.600				Missing

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

blank

Vial:

1

Injection: Channel:

1

485

Date Acquired:

Scale Factor:

Acq Meth Set: Processing Method:

02/23/95 11:41 AM

1,00 CAT2_MTR_SET

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00


Run Time:

5.0 min 02/23/95 02:23 PM

Date Processed: Dilution:

1.00000

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			Peak Kesui	is .		
#	Name	Ret Time	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
	CuEDTA	3.600				Missing

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

Q204 50217009

Vial:

3 1

Injection: Channel:

486

Date Acquired:

02/23/95 11:47 AM

Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Method:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00

Run Time:


5.0 min

Date Processed:

02/23/95 02:23 PM

Bilution:

1.00000



					1"	<u> </u>
ē	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.600				Missing

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

blank

Vial: Injection: 1 1

Channel:

486

Date Acquired:

02/23/95 11:53 AM

Scale Factor:

Acq Meth Set:

1.00 CAT2_MTH_SET edta

Processing Method:

1 1

Sample Type:

Date Processed:

Volume:

Run Time:

Dilution:


Unknown

5.0 min

1.00000

02/23/95 02:22 PM

10.00



			2 00000			
#	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.600				Missing
_						

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

C206 50217009

Vial:

1

Injection: Channel:

1

Date Acquired:

02/23/95 11:59 AM

Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Meth Set: Processing Method:

LAIL

486

CAT2_MTH_SET

edta

Sample Type:

ปกหกอพภ 10.80

Volume:


10,00

Run Time: Date Processed: 5.0 min 02/23/95 02:22 PM

Dilution:

1.00000

} }



			2 CON 2000			
ø	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
},	CUEDTA	3.600				Missing

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

blank

Vial: Injection: 1

Channel:

486

Date Acquired:

02/23/95 12:06 PM 1.00

Scale Factor: Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Method:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00


Run Time:

5.0 min 02/23/95 02:21 PM

Date Processed: Dilution:

1.00000

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ø	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
1	CuEDTA	3.600				Missing

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

0206 50217009

Vial:

3

Injection: Channel: 1 486

Date Acquired:

02/23/95 12:12 PM

Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_HTH_SET

Processing Method:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00


Run Time:

5.0 min 02/23/95 02:21 PM

Date Processed: Dilution:

1.00000

7.



#	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.600				Missing

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

blank

Vial:

1

Injection:
Channel:

1 486

Date Acquired:

02/23/95 12:18 PM

Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Method: 6

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00

Run Time:

5.0 min


Date Processed:

02/23/95 02:20 PM


Dilution:

1.00000

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	ě	Name	4 ***		Amount	Int Type
11 CUEDTA 3.500	1	EDTA	3,600	 		Missing



Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

C65 50217009

Vial:

ı

Injection: Channel:

486

Date Acquired:

02/23/95 12:24 PM

1.00

Scale Factor: Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

edta Processing Method:

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00


Run Time: Date Processed:

5.0 min 02/23/95 02:20 PM

Dilution:

1.00000

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			1 (41) 1(00	~		
#	Name	Ret Time	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
		3.600				Missing
1	CUEDTA	3.000				

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

K65 50217009

Vial:

1

Injection: Channel:

485

Bate Acquired:

02/23/95 12:37 PM

Scale Factor:

1,00

Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Hethod:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown 10.00

Volume: Run Time:


5.0 min

Date Processed:

02/23/95 02:19 PM

Dilution:

1.00000



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#	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uY*sec)	Height (uY)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.600				Missing

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Nume:

blank

Vial:

1

Injection: Channel:

1

486

Date Acquired:

02/23/95 12:31 PM

Scale Factor: Acq Meth Set:

Processing Method:

1.00 CAT2_MTH_SET

edta

Sample Type:

Volume:

Unknown 10.00

Run Time:

5.0 min


Date Processed:

02/23/95 02:19 PM

Bilution:

1.00000

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	# Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
}	1 CUEDTA	3.600				Missing

Information **Billennium** Sample

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

blank

Vial: Injection: 1 ı

Channel:

486

02/23/95 12:43 PM Date Acquired:

Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Method:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00

Run Time:

5.0 min


Date Processed:

02/23/95 02:18 PM

Dilution:

1.00000

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•	Nome	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
ī	CuEDTA	3.600				Missing

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Rame:

K67 50217009

Vial:

Injection: Channel:

486

02/23/95 12:49 PM Date Acquired:

Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Method:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00

Run Time:

5.0 min


Date Processed:

02/23/95 02:18 PM

Bilution:

1.00000

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*	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (u∀)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.567	172242	5439		88

Information Sample

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

blank

: fstV Injection:

Channel:

486 02/23/95 12:55 PM

Date Acquired: Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Meth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Method:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00

Run Time:

5.0 min


Date Processed:

02/23/95 02:17 PM

Dilution:

1.00000

7.



*	Name	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.600				Missing

Information Millennium Sample

Project Name:

CATIONS_2

Sample Name:

K68 50217009

Injection:

Viel:

5 1

486

Channel: 02/23/95 01:02 PM Date Acquired:

Scale Factor:

1.00

Acq Neth Set:

CAT2_MTH_SET

Processing Method:

edta

Sample Type:

Unknown

Volume:

10.00

Run Time:


5.0 min

Date Processed:


02/23/95 02:17 PM


Dilution:


1.00000




ğ	None	Ret Time (min)	Area (uV*sec)	Height (uV)	Amount	Int Type
1	CUEDTA	3.550	243156	8434		BB














. 50 Start: 01:11:01 BLANK Samp: ACN/10mM NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M Comm: ESI +DAU LMR GAS UP LR Mode: Inlet: b6 -1 Oper: b7C -1 158 > 162Masses: Label wndw: 1 > 50Peak: $\overline{1000.00}$ mmu 0, 3 0, 40.00 Label: 0, 4.00 Baseline : Area: m/z:160 E+031007 9.444 50 E+04 3.027 RIC 1007 50 20 30 40 50 10 FBI(24-cv-1564)-2848



















FBI(24 cv 1564) 2853






































∍amp: . 57 REPEAT OF Q206 TU:31:36 start: Comm: ACN/10mM NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M Mode: ESI +DAU LMR GAS UP LR Study: 50217009 b6 -1 Oper: Inlet: b7C -1 Peak: 1000.00 Label wndw: 1 > 57Masses: 158 > 162mmu

Label:


0, 40.00


0, 3


Baseline


0, 4.00


Area:























FBI(24-cv-1564)-2875



EDTA IN BLOOD (2,000 ppm)






Samp: BLANK Start: 12:45:25 47 Comm: ACN/H20/NH40H 75/25/0.03 PRP1 2.1X150 0.2ML Mode: ESI -DAU LMR GAS UP LR b6 -1 Oper: Inlet: b7C -1 Label wndw: Peak: 1000.00 1 > 47Masses: 297 > 302mmu Area: 0, 4.00 Baseline 0, 3 Label: 0, 40.00 m/z:300 E+0237 100 4.340 293 M 3968 M 50 RIC E+03 100 1.261 50-20 30 10 40 FBI(24-cv-1564)-2879


Samp: BLANK Comm: ACN/H20/NH40H 75/25/0.03 PRP1 2.1X150 0.2ML

Mode: <u>ESI</u>-DAU LMR GAS UP LR

b6 -1 Inlet : Oper: ъ7C -1 1000.00 Label wndw: Masses: 297 > 302Peak: 1 > 47mmu Baseline 0, 3 Label: 0, 40.00 0, 4.00 Area:



Peak: 1000.00 mmu Label wndw: 1 > 35 Masses: 297 > 302
Area: 0, 4.00 Baseline: 0, 3 Label: 0, 40.00




44.0 1.25UL BLOOD STAIN Start: 12:50:28 Samp: . 39 ACN/H20/NH4OH 75/25/0.03 PRP1 2.1X150 0.2ML Comm: Mode: ESI -DAU LMR GAS UP LR Inlet: b6 -1 Oper: b7C -1 Masses: 1000.00 mmu Label wndw: 1 > 39297 > 302Peak: 0, 40.00 0, 3 Label: Area: 0, 4.00 Baseline : m/z:30023 2647 M 2078,6 M E+03100 2.885 50-RIC E + 03200 3.829 50-


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10

FBI(24 cv 1564) 2882


30






```
Instrument serial # - 🕻 📉
ICIS Version 7.0
ICL Version 7.2
ULTRIX V4.2A (Rev. 47) System #1: Wed Dec 14 15:15:11 EST 1994
File name: ojnil
Study:
Sample: TRI-K EDTA 100 PPM IN H20
        0.0
Amount:
          በበ
Volume:
                                                                            b6 -1
Operator
                                                                            b7C -1
Client:
Injected volume:
                   0.0
Comments: ACN/10mM NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M
Analysis will stop at user request
                               from 17 FEB 95
Tune file name : edtatune.ict
ICL procedure: plotic
Analysis started at :19-FEB-95 15:30:08.1
Vacuum status -> ok
Collision gas on
                      70.007 C
Manifold temperature
                      0.00003149
Manifold presure
Collision cell pressure 0
Skimmer pump pressure 589.374
Ion source type = Electrospray ionization - Finnigan
                     7.0 volts
Parent Offset
                     20.0 volts
Collision Offset:
Daughter Offset :
                     25.0 volts
                                          9
                                                30.0 volts at mass
                     30.0 volts at mass
Lens 1-1
                                         126
                                                30.0 volts at mass
                                                                     197
                     29.6 volts at mass
                     31.0 volts at mass 224
                                               36.2 volts at mass
                                                                    496
                     61.1 volts at mass 993
                                              122.2 volts at mass 1797
                     5.0 volts
Lens 1-2
                :
                   29.1 volts
Lens 1-3
                 :
                    6.7 volts at mass
                                               6.7 volts at mass 7.0 volts at mass
                                                                      49
                                          9
Lens 2-1
                      6.7 volts at mass
                                         197
                                               27.2 volts at mass
                                         496
                     10.8 volts at mass
                     77.6 volts at mass 1797
                    159.3 volts
Lens 2-2
                    14.2 volts
Lens 2-3
                     31.7 volts
Lens 3-1
                 :
Lens 3-2
                    195.9 volts
                 :
Lens 3-3
                     65.0 volts
                      5.0 volts
                                                6.1 volts at mass
                      5.7 volts at mass
                                           9
Parent Calib
                                                                     496
                                         197
                                                11.0 volts at mass
                      7.7 volts at mass
                                               61.6 volts at mass 1687
                                        993
                     16.4 volts at mass
                     80.4 volts at mass 1797
                      0.0 volts
Collision RFP
                                                                      48
                                           8
                                               -15.9 volts at mass
                    -16.6 volts at mass
Daughter Calib
                                           60
                                              -15.0 volts at mass
                                                                     100
                    -14.9 volts at mass
                                               -18.9 volts at mass
                    -16.3 volts at mass
                                         307
                     -2.3 volts at mass 1750
                      4.9 volts at mass
                                                9.3 volts at mass
                                                                     224
                                           59
Parent Reso
                                          370
                                               29.7 volts at mass
                     11.0 volts at mass
                     95.0 volts at mass 1797
                     22.7 volts at mass 20.7 volts at mass
                                            8
                                                22.2 volts at mass
Daughter Reso
                 :
                                                17.5 volts at mass
                                          193
                                                                     481
                     14.3 volts at mass 962
                                                24.5 volts at mass 1750
                      0.0 volts
Collector
User Output #1
                      0.0 volts
                 :
User Output #2
                      0.0 volts
                 :
                     -1.7 volts
OCTA OFFSET
                 :
                                                                      49
                                           9 -45.4 volts at mass
                    -45.4 volts at mass
 TUBE LENS
                 :
                                          197 -46.8 volts at mass
                                                                     224
                    -45.4 volts at mass
                    -52.7 volts at mass
                                          339
                                               -60.8 volts at mass
                                                                     496
                                                                  FBI(24-cv-1564)-2885
```


```
993 -145.8 p.cs at mass 1797
9 -8.9 volts at mass 49
197 -10.1 volts at mass 224
                     -93. volts at mass
CAPILLARY
                       -8.9 volts at mass
                                                  -34.6 volts at mass
                                                                           993
                      -17.0 volts at mass
                                             496
                     -62.6 volts at mass 1797
Scan mode = Daughter scan using mass
2000u mass range / Negative ions
Full scan ->
               297.496
First mass =
Last mass = 302.486 amu
Scan time = 1.499 seconds
Scan rate = 3.3 amu/seconds
ESI spray voltage = 4.05372 kV
ESI spray current = 16.947 uA
Capillary temperature = 210.608
Sheath gas on
Auxilary gas on
At retention time 0.04 Min. -> Filament is off
    Electron multiplier = 0 V Conversion dynode = 15 KV
    Electrometer gain = 8 Electrometer zero = -24
Analysis stopped at :19-FEB-95 15:31:58.9 (retention time 1.85)
Analysis stopped because user requested stop from analysis
```







...nv. بستترب Start: 59 K65 CONTROL FROM DRESS 15:35:28 Samp: Comm: ACN/10mM NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M Mode: ESI -DAU LMR GAS UP LR b6 -1 Inlet: Oper: b7C -1 1000.00 Label wndw: 297 > 302Peak: Masses: mmu 1 > 5910, 4.00 Baseline 4, 5.00 Area: 0, 10 Label: Disp: Area m/z:300E+02 3.550 100 50 RIC E+02 9.910 100 50 10 20 30 40 50 FBI(24 cv 1564) 2889


9 : 2000







وستنزو .mKU: Start: 15:42:28 . 49 Samp: Q204 GATE SAMPLE Comm: ACN/10mM NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M Mode: ESI -DAU LMR GAS UP LR Inlet: b6 -1 Oper: b7C -1 1000.00 Label wndw: Masses: 297 > 302Peak: mmu 1 > 494, 5.00 0, 10 Label: Area: 10, 4.00 Baseline Disp: Area m/z:300E+02 3.070 100 50













Start: • 51 15:49:23 Q206 CONTROL FROM SOCK Samp: ACN/10mm NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M Comm: ESI -DAU LMR GAS UP LR Mode: Inlet: b6 -1 Oper: b7C -1 297 > 302Masses: Label wndw: 1000.00 1 > 51Peak: mmu 4, 5.00 Label: 0, 10 10, 4.00 Baseline Area: Disp: Area m/z:300E+02 3.980 100 50 RIC E+03100 1.185 50-40 20 30 10 50 FBI(24 cv 1564) 2896


و تحدید Start: 59 15:51:45 Q206/Q207 STAIN FROM SOCK Samp: ACN/10mM NH3 5:95 PRP1 2.1X150MM 0.3ML/M Comm: ESI -DAU LMR GAS UP LR Mode: Inlet: b6 -1 Oper: ъ7С -1 297 > 302Masses: Label wndw: 1 > 591000.00 mmu Peak: 4, 5.00 Label: 0, 10 Baseline 10, 4.00 Area: Disp: Area m/z:300E+02 3.390 100 50 RIC E+03 1.099 100 50 • 1 50 40 20 10 30







































CHRO: 2202 **ムロード EB**ーソン Frapse: シエ 10:14:46 54 Samp: BLANK Start: Comm: ACN/H20/NH4OH 75/25/0.03 PRP1 2.1X150 0.2ML Mode: ESI -DAU LMR GAS UP LR b6 -1 Inlet: Oper: b7C -1 1000.00 Label wndw: Masses: 297 > 302Peak: 1 > 54mmu 10, 4.00 Baseline 0, 10 Label: 4, 5.00 Area: Disp: Area m/z:300E+02 6.760 100 50 RIC E+03 .00 1.521 50 30 50 20 40 10









RECORDED 8/8/94

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

8/8/94

b6 -1

b7C -1

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

To: Los Angeles Police Department 555 Ramirez Street, SP. 270 Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

Lab No. 40808026 S/D UJ/Q3

Reference: Communication dated August 8, 1994

Your No. 94-08-17431

Re: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT; NICOLE SIMPSON AND RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS; HOMICIDE

Specimens received: A

August 8, 1994

Specimens	on August 8, 1994:	
Q1	Debris from glove (Item number 19)	
Q2	Hair from GOLDMAN (Item number 74)	
Q3	Debris from glove (Item number 110)	b6 -1,6 b7C -1,6
Q4	Debris from cap (Item number 111)	
Q5-Q6	Glass microscope slides from cap (Item number 111)	
Q 7	Debris from glove (Item number 112)	
Q8	Debris from knit hat (Item number 113)	
Q9-Q19	Glass microscope slides from knit hat (Item number 113)	

Page 1	(over)
new Out - 77 Gr Melay	Photo: 40 5/10 for
the freque	return 048-77 to 10/19/94 - Como notame FBI(24 CV 1564) 2916

DEBRIS F	ROM GOLDMAN'S:
Q20	Shoes (Item number 160)
Q21	Pants (Item number 161)
Q22	Socks (Item number 162)
Q23	Shirt (Item number 163)
Q24	Debris from N. SIMPSON's dress (Item number 164)
Q25	Debris from bag containing GOLDMAN's shirt (165)
Q26	Debris from cap from O.J. SIMPSON residence (Item number 168)
Q27	Debris from socks from O.J. SIMPSON residence (Item number 221)
DEBRIS R	REMOVED FROM CHICAGO ITEMS:
Q28	Pillowcase (Item number 153)
Q29	Pillowcase (Item number 154)
Q30	Bedsheet (Item number 155)
Q31	Bedsheet (Item number 156)
Q32	Washcloth (Item number 157)
Q33	Socks (Item number 158)
Q34	Athletic bag (Item number 159)
Q35	Debris from towel - 0.J.'s car (Item number 166)
Q36	Debris from plastic sheet - O.J.'s car (Item number 167)
Q37	Debris from shovel - O.J.'s car (Item number 169)
Q38	Hairs (Item number 141)
Q39-Q46	Tape lits from COWLING's bronco

Page 2 40808026 S/D UJ (over)

Q47	Knit hat (Item number 38)
Q48-Q77	Thirty (30) photographs
K1	Head hair sample from GOLDMAN (Item number 73)
K2	Eye hair samples from GOLDMAN (Item number 73)
КЗ	Arm hair sample from GOLDMAN (Item number 73)
K4	Head hair sample from N. SIMPSON (Item number 83)
K 5	Arm hair sample from N. SIMPSON (Item number 83)
K6	Eye hair samples from N. SIMPSON (Item number 83)
K 7	Head hair sample from O. J. SIMPSON (Item number 122)

17 (photos 00 00 99 - 00 00 10)


067-68 (photos 00 00 99 - 00 00 10)


069-74 (photos 00 00 46 + 00 00 51)


075-77 (photos 00 00 54 -> 00 00 56)


Copie of Cy8-77 retaine. Origina 048-77 photos - r be retire & -


Page 3 40808026 S/D UJ 88/94 - 198 - 977 philips, seale there lob referen with a who losty she day or wanfacture. 19/94 - techn to health to for 1 | wome like.
8/10/91 fact (for 213-237-0040)
(for 213-237-0040) \$16-17-9/97 frank drawng & copy of upon to other Robertons of of contry + bound for companies carryer high at show. Africe on 8/17/97 on telegen care for ______ that days was his Bruin magh desin / france list of district 8/19/44 - for large Eyes. Freme on mal - saight she f 512128 9.5 photos ley is buy olow. FAI for NPA Ja "LOPD" Lobel -Reguest & they said photos due to pronfor. Regard Solo for martiner a Ital - Siegh Gouma

















SKETCH

July 14, 1994

per Kenpuey
aux michele Kesstler

LAPD

213-237-0044

213-237-0031

Welch Mulch 1/14/94
Ge whenh blook upon or compet rachicle -plus philos of

for ingromes or conate susurele.

for ingromes or conate susurele.

while sent philos's of attent to heterne brand/majortum/size

while sent philos's of attent records.

No blook shows of suggest residence
No shoe brokes of suggest residence
Scare has been cleaned by
Gue has been outsile.

RECORDED 9/16/94 xxx

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

9/20/94

Laboratory Work Sheet

Dide

To: Los Angeles Police Department 555 Ramirez Street, SP. 270 Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

Lab No. 40912024 D QJ

Reference:

Letter dated September 5, 1994

Your No.

94-08-17431

Re: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT;

NICOLE SIMPSON, RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS;

HOMOCIDE

b6 -1 b7C -1

b6 -1

b7C -1

Specimens received:

September 12, 1994

Specimens:

U 2887 outsoles received from S.I.L.G.A. GOMMA, Civitanova Marche (MC), Italy , further described as follows:

K20 Left U 2887, size 42

K21 Right U 2887, size 42

K22 Left U 2887, size 43

K23 Right U 2887, size 43

K24 Left U 2887, size 44

K25 Right U 2887, size 44

Page 1

(over)

orderlanearin 9/8/94 Wimone

FBI(24 cv 1564) 2924

returned of owhere 100 + K31 to LAPD / enfrom of pole met of k20 - K31 2 2 2

K26	Left U 2887, size 45
K27	Right U 2887, size 45
X28	Left U 2887, size 46
K29	Right U 2887, size 46
кэо	Left U 2887, size 47
K31	Right U 2887, size 47

Important melefran K20 -> K31 outels / conquer total ly8-> 677 ingramm - 9/8/44. Improm at are sur degets throught ly8-77 phato an: Europe Sin 46 - US Sin 12 W/ except of \$57,58,63

Page 2 40912024 D QJ - OHE legit such size 416

_ Oya nyu soe Sizu 46

- 050 right sole - partern pol totally electronstan - size (1847)

_ 051 lys Side Size 46 (1945)

- 052 loft had + part of see \$12246 (some colon, 72)

_ 1053 right head & Sile Size 46 (Sport or (273)

_ 054 lost such a head (milestrary Size46 (Sam & O74)

_ 055 less her/son 512146

- 056 ruger hard Suc Sec. 46 (5m 0.075)

_ 057 - wantivet (5ma 071) (156)

_ 038 indistinct

- 059 helpse (5:2246)

_ 060 ly see (s.e.46)

Our left hul (51446) (50-6077)

- OLS met Ser/face (Size46)

- 063 madelled

c they left her (sixe46)

- Bus left had (size 40)

- Obs right here the (South)

_ 067 under at ou ground (firs light had)

- 068 legited - Soc are - Size 46 (P36)

(50) 969 rughe site - proposition - province since 76

(5) 70 less sole -translind- Sin 46

(Q71 ley hed/Son - 51246

(52) 1 072 Lept hed 18d - 51446

(153) 073 ruger helps Single

154) 074 legisde / transfer (500.46)

(50) 075 ruges had site (500 46)

152/ 676 inchatured

164 (77 ly her (50446)

Size 46 European Conseron to U.S Casto = Size 12 per

Bruno Maga.

- Owley set of comp. 4/433! 0100-101 Some limit. I area of ingression as compet

my represent growns I of shos - howen

laid suffered chang to mole defende conform.

no other recognizable patter

- on right such - the limber of Copum.

(ou pho?)

ners ower servi for Sulgar 9/8/94 FBI(24-cv-1564)-2926



5 Pesa lorda 1

5.00

Peso netto 1

Sede Sociale & AMERICAN MARCHE (MC) X 11011 X Strade del Casone, 33/F - № 0733/811011 X Telex: 560116 SILGAC I g/811177 Stabili

82027 SAN SEVERING MARCHE (MC)

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WASHINGTON, D.C. USA


b6 -9 b7C -9

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LAB ANOVA MARCHE (MC)

Via S. Michele - 🕿 0733/839327 - Fax 0733/834744 Registro Società Tribunale Macerata, n. 2254 • C.C.I.A.A. Macerata; n. 33358 • C.C.P.• n. 13803622 MC 002388 • Partita IVA e Codice Fiscale, IT-00083630434 • Capitale Sociale L. 5,000,000,000 £v C E INVOI DATA DOCUMENTO N. DOCUMENTO FOGLIO COD CLIENTE PARTITA IVA CLIENTE 5/09/94 5723 BENESTARE BANCARIO N BANC PAGAMENTO 106 CAMPIONI GRATIS PREZZO UNIT IMPORTO RESIDUO ORD. QUANTITÀ DESCRIZIONE ARTICOLO NUMER U.M CODICE ARTICOLO #* Bolla n° 2210/E del 5/09/94 ** 2,10 2 1,05 43 Pa U2887 U 2887-NERO 2,10 1,05 45 Pa 2 Æ 00 * * **U2887** 2,10 2 1,05 46 Pa ,, Æ 00 ., **U2887** 2,10 2 1,05 42 Pa m 00 U 2887 TESTA DI HORO U288? 2,10 1,05 2 44 Pa ** ** TH 100 U2887 2,10 1,05 47 ₽a 00 TH. U2887 F.CO DESTINO b6 -9 PAIA 12 b7C -9 SAMPLES FREE OF CHARGES 30434 SPESE BOLLI - ART. 15 IMPORTO SCONTO SPESS INCASSO IMPONIBILE AL. SVA LVA IMPORTO MERCE ₩ SC. 12,60 12,60 TOTALE DOCUMENTO CAUSALE ESENZIONE 12,60 NON IMP.ART.8/A N USD NOTE

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RECORDED 9/16/94 xxx

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

	9/20/94	
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1		

b6 -1

b7C -1

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

Lab No.

To: Los Angeles Police Department

555 Ramirez Street

Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

40920013 D QJ

Reference:

Airbill dated 9/16/94

Your No.

94-08-17431

Re: (

ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT;

NICOLE SIMPSON,

RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS;

HOMOCIDE

9/20/94

Specimens received:

September 20, 1994

Specimens:

K32

8 X 10 photographs with subject and 8 X 10 photographs of enlargement of shoes of subject

Shis donto ~

V32 ghotopels are deflect than the Boneni Ragen show


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of the U2887 outsiles. Deflet she pefer + show style.

NO IDENT

FBI(24-cv-1564)-2930

55.





RECORDED 9/19/94 XXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

Los Angeles Police Department To: 555 Ramirez Street, SP. 270 Los Angeles, California 90012

> FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

Lab No. 40923001 D QJ b6 -1 b7C -1

Reference:

Air bill dated 9/17/94

Your No.

94-08-17431

ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT: NICOLE SIMPSON,

RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS;

. HOMOCIDE

nent 9/23/99

Specimens received:

September 23, 1994

Specimens:

One pair (1) U 2887 outsoles received from S.I.L.G.A. GOMMA. Civitanova Marche (MC), Italy, further described as follows:

K33

Left U 2887, size 46

K34

Right U 2887, size 46

ALSO SUBMITTED:

Five (5) page computer printout list of distributors

1115/18 1633/34 A/5 note 4

A/S arpeid h33/34 > san is other Sin 46 (12) Sils by black (su 4091:004)

b6 -1

b7C -1

RECORDED 9/27/94 xxx

To:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

9/27/94

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

Lab No.

Los Angeles Police Department 555 Ramirez Street, SP. 270 Los Angeles, California 90012

b6 -1 b7C -1

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

40927003 S/D UJ QJ

Reference:

Receipt dated 9/26/94

Your No.

94-08-17431

Re:

ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT; NICOLE SIMPSON - VICTIM; R BONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIM; HOMICIDE 9108194

Specimens received:

September 27, 1994

Specimens:

Q82 - Q83

Two (2) color photographs and negatives relating to the state of the s

O82 Nagation # 2 Photograph of Nucleasures (full short)

O83 Colon region #4 Autographitize of close view of 6 mel of

Nicle Super -

and to sole frontin on the - enhand any set by

a pattan unga on with Nicre Super is back (about the scale).

un vaniety enhance. The parter are contain contains what are mit will the

contain a gail so I the king / 29 heads / too limited to further charactery or compar

to to 9/27/94 from Kerney / Kest En to for 9/29/94 or Known

FBI(24-cv-1564)-2938

ъ6 -1 ъ7С -1



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535

September 28, 1994

Major Armed Ford	Tunkibuka (af Dakhalam)	b6 -5 b7C -5
CME		D.C 3
	laska Avenue, N.W. a, D.C. 20306-6000	
	RE: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT; NICOLE SIMPSON, RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS; HOMOCIDE	
Dear Major	-	b6 -5 b7С -5
negatives victim:	Enclosed are photographic prints made from the original which depict a patterned area on the back of the	
	Q83 Full frame print Q83 Natural size of questioned area Q82 Approximate natural size enlargement taken from a more distant photograph of victim's back	
outsole.	Also enclosed is a natural size photograph of a right	
patterned	Please attempt to improve the visualization of the area in question.	
	Sincerely,	
	FBI Laboratory	b6 -1 b7C -1

4.4.4

PEDERA	. 1-9-90) L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION GTON, D. C. 20635					
,	9/28/94	Re:	•			
	7/20/94	Simpson				
TO:	Major	Pothology				b6 −5 b7C −5
	Armed Forces Institute		,			
	14th and Alaska Avenue		•			
	Washington, D.C. 2030	0-6000			器	· .
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		Invoice of Contents	<u> </u>			
Description	on of Contents:			FBI File#	95A-HQ-10	75008
		*		Case# 40	927003 D Q	1
,	our (4) Photographs			<i>"</i>		
:						
						
	•			Your#		
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Shipping	# <u>`</u>			~		
SHIPP	ING METHODS			Room _ 33		 -
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2-Da	y Standard Service		_			
Satur	day Delivery			FMSS - Sup	ply Room, 1B353	
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Packaged	Signature				•	
Date						
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All items	listed above are contained in this pac	kage.				
A detaile	ed description items will be found in B	ureau communication dated	•			

(SHIPPING HOURS - 9:00 A.M. TO 4:00 P.M.)

FBI(24-cv-1564)-2940

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOG

WASHINGTON, DC 20306-8000

PATIENT IDENTIFICATION

PLEASE USE AFTP ACCESSIO NUMBER IN ALL CHECK DIGIT

SSAN

OGEOUENCE

b6 -1 b7C -1

Simpson, Nicole A-000-94

SURGICAL/AUTOPSY PATH ACCESSION #'S

PLEASE INFORM US OF ANY PATIENT IDENTIFICATION ERRORS

WRO/dl

Laboratory Division, Room 3372C Federal Bureau of Investigation 10th St. and Pennsylvania Ave. Washington, DC 20535

mari and

DATE: 11-21-94

CONSULTATION REPORT ON CONTRIBUTOR MATERIAL

AFIP DIAGNOSIS:

Initially received are four photographic prints

Q83 full frame print,

Q83 Natural size of questioned area,

Q82 Enlargement of portion of a more distant photograph, and

a greyscale print of the outsole of a shoe.

Later received are three other photographic prints, two in color of a rug, and one greyscale of a rug with the label "Luminol."

A number of enhancement methods were applied to the prints. However, none of the manipulations were particularly useful to me; the marks on the body and rug are insufficient for diagnosis.

I am enclosing one processed image for your interest. Per your request, I am returning the prints to you. If you are able to come to any further conclusions, I would be very interested in any feedback you might be able to give me. Thank you for this interesting consult.

b6 -5 b7C -5

MAJ(P),MC, USA -- --

Deputy Medical Examiner


95A 117-1075018-16

b6 -1 b7C -1

95 it HQ-1075008

AFIP F/L 61 15 May 87

FBI(24-cv-1564)-2941



HBI(24 cv 15MI) 294.





FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

Los Angeles Police Department 555 Ramirez Street Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

41006015 S/D UJ QJ Lab No.

Fax received 8/19/94

94-08-17431 Your No.

ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT; NICOLE SIMPSON, RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS; HOMOCIDE

Specimens received:

August 19, 1994

Specimens:

ALSO SUBMITTED:

Faxed list of shoe sales, received 8/19/94 from UMA Shoe Company

forest had recombly MA lot all Etns to where the design of our some were distributed - with e borango or how offer - SIX 12+13 ferment par

request.

LORENZO 36810 Black - 36820 BROWN 1111 1417 441 1411 1411 36826 BRANDY 36840 Blue 36863 Windowshile KK 19 36887 DLIVE (+the) [36] 四 197] 16 Lyon 16 36510 Black 8 //// 36520 BRN 36526 BRANDY 36540 Blue 36563 Winke White THL 1 36587 Olive 4 total [10] grane I the 46

grand total 299 Size 12 "UZ887" sur 56.
Lorenzo (hyd) - 190
Luon (Lon) - 109

· @B/19/9 <u>4 15:28</u>	•	NO. 522	P001/0C5	10.10
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21752 03, 14790 MARSHS HUN		36520 M 12 1 of		•
31752 03/14/90 MARSHS HAUK		36528 M 12 1 bf		
81752 83/14/98 WARSHS -HUN		36520 M 12 1 pf		. \
81752 03/14/98 MARSHS +HUH 88176 03/27/98 MADISON +NYO		36528 M 12 1 pf 36887 M 12 -1 pf		DKS.
88170 83/27/90 MODISON THYC	•	36887 H 13 1 of		6
82178 93/27/99 MADISON NYO		36887 N 12 1 of		
52178 83/27/48 MADISON ANYO		36887 M 13 1 of	13 380990	
52179 83/27/98 MADISON -NYO		.488/ N 12 1 of		
321 M32/21/90 MADISON -NYO		36887 M 13 1 of		
82220 03/18/90 BETTINA -WOR 82210 03 28/90 BETTINA -WOR		36829 M 12 1 of 36829 M 12 1 of		
82239 83/28/98 MADINON -NYU			13 680990	
82239 85/28/98 MADISON -NYO		36587 M 13 1 of		
82239 83/28/98 MADISON -NYD		36587 M 12 1 of		
82219 83/28/99 MADISON -NYO		36587 M 13 1 of		
82239 03/28/90 MADISON -NYO 82239 03/28/90 MADISON -NYO		36587 N 12 1 of		
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ases as/sa/ar modison and		36587 M 13 1 of		
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BZE47 83/38/98 MADISON -NYO		-36826 N 12 1 of		
62242 03/28/90 MADISON -17/0		36826 M 13 1 of		
32242 83728798 MWW.SONNYC		36826 M 12 1 of		
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63242 04720/90 GONZALEZ-NBE STR. 4 PLAZA LAS AMERICAS		35826 H 12 1 of	9 181290	-
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63142 04.20/98 GONZALEZ-NRE STR. 4 PLAZA LAS GMERICAS		36826 M 12 1 of	9 101298	
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84326 85723798 SAKS -Y6T STR. 42 FAIRLANE		36826 M 12 1 of		
84326 05/23/90 SAKS -YGT STR. 42 FAIRLANE		36826 H 12 1 of		
84327 05/23/90 SAKS -YGY STR. 28 TRCY	•	36826 M 12 1 of	12 080990	
84327 05/23/90 SAKS -YGT STR. 28 TROY		36826 M 13 1 of		FBI(24-cv-1564)-2950
84328 05/23/98 59KS -YGS STR.23 CHEVY CHASE		36826 M 12 1 of	15 686638	

64959 83753738 2HMP TIBS SIRLES LIKEVE COMOS 84325-85/23/98 SAKS +Y6S STR. 23 CHEVY CHASE * -84328 85/23/98 SAKS +Y66 STR. 23 DHEVY. 84326 85/23/98 SAKS YES STR. 23 CHEVY 84329 05/23/90 SAKS YON STR. 38 BERGEN COUNTY 4 84329 85/23/90 SAKS **LYON STR. 38 BERGEN COUNTY** 84325 95/23/98 SAKS YON STR. 38 BERGEN COUNTY 84329 P5/23/98 SAKS YUN STR. 38 BERGEN COUNTY 84329 05/23/98 SAKS YON STR. 38 BERGEN COUNTY 84329 05/23/90 SAKS YON STR. 38 BERGEN COUNTY 83959 07/26/90 59KS YON 85959 87/26/98 SAKS **-YON** 85959 @7/26/9@ SAKS -YON 85959 87/26/98 SAKS -YON 85959 87/26/98 SAKS -Yan 85959 07/26/90 SAKS -YDN 85959 87/26/98 SAKS -YON 85959 87/26/90 SAKS -YDN 85959 87/26/98 SAKS -YON 33959 87/26/90 SAKS -YDN 86769 88/23/99 PARANZIN-CHA 86769 88/23/98 PARONZIN-CHA 86769 88/23/90 PARANZIN-CHA 86769 88/23/98 PARRNZIN-CHA 86769 88/23/98 PARANZIN-CHA 86769 08/23/90 PRR9NZIN-CHA 86769 **08/23/90 PARANZIN-CHA** 86769 88/23/98 PARSNZIN-CHA 86769 88/23/90 PARANZIN-CHA 86769 88/23/98 PARANZIN-CHA 86769 88/23/98 PARANZIN-CHA 86769 08/23/98 PARANZIN-CHA 86769 88/23/98 PARANZIN-CHA 86769 @8/23/90 PARANTIN-CHA 86966 08/31/90 MADISON -NYO 86986 88/31/90 MADISON -NYD 86986 88/31/98 MADISON -NYO 86986 08/31/90 MADISON -NYO 36986 88/31/90 MADISON -NYO 36985 88/31/98 MADISON -NYO 86986 86/31/98 MADISON -NYO 86986 86/31/98 MADISON -NYD 86986 88/31/99 MADISON -NYO 36966 88/31/98 MADISON -NYO 87662 89/20/98 MRSID 87662 09/20/90 MRSID -NEW 87662 09/20/90 MRSID -NEW

-NEW

87663 09/20/90 MRSID

		ا خارد مسامحهم به <u>اجهامه ما مناه مناه ما داده ما مناه با مناه به به مستوین مور</u> مو <u>د مو سوور با پوش</u> اه و بل						
	08/19/94 15:3	3A		NO. 52	22		P003/005	
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	1304! 13,10/0: 6045	-VOD CTR & 29 CG DEDT 31	7	36819 M	12	1 of	2 101191	
	4363: 13 13/81 PRUP	UPA EYO SA TONU AFRT 34		M ACGAS	12	4 AF	1 101191	
	12474 10/10/41 5HRS	THE BIR CO INUT DEST ST	•	NODED M	10	£ U1	1 191171	
	13239 10/17/91 BLOOMIN	G-NAK STR # 1 N.Y. DEPT 546	# 3	8682W M	15	1 01	4 101891-	
	13239 18/17/91 BUDONIN	G-NAK STR & 1 N.Y. DEPT 548		36820 M	13	i of	4 16 1891	
_	12718 18/31/91 SHIFMAR	T-MOR	3	36820 M	12	1 of	1 111591	
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	93835 83/29/91		36826 M		
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	93851 83/28/91	CHERNIN -CHI	36587 N 1	2 2 of	21 932191
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		BLOOMING-NAK STR # NEW YORK DEFT 540	-36887 M 1	3 1 of	17 983091
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	16570 06/05/91		36563 N 1		
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		MARTY -SEC LYON-BLACK-BRANDY-RLUE-HINTER WHITE	36526 N 1		
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N		MARTY -SEC LYON-BLACK-BRANDY-BLUE-WINTER WHITE	36549 N 1		
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	98103 07/15/91	DITCEONS PIS	36818 N 1	E T BI	5 871691

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

To: Los Angeles Police Department 555 Ramirez Street Los Angeles, California 90012

FRI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

Lab No. 41006016 S/D UJ QJ

Reference: COl

Communication received August 30, 1994

Your No. 94

94-08-17431

Re: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT; NICOLE SIMPSON, RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS; HOMOCIDE

Specimens received:


August 30, 1994

Specimens:

ALSO SUBMITTED:

Fax received 8/30/94 from UMA Shoe Company with list of stores and addresses

reno 8/3/94- Se 41006015



MARSHS HUN MARSH'S MENS AND BOYS 268-274 MAIN STREET HUNTINGTON, NY 11743

MADISON NYO BRUNO MAGLI- NEW YORK 535 MADISON AVE. NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022

BETTINA WOR BETTINA ORIGINALS ESSEX GREEN PLAZA W. ORANGE, NJ 07052

OXFORD RID OXFORD STREET ELLAS DABIT HIGHLAND VILLAGE, STE. #145 4500-155N JACKSON, MS 39211

SAKS YGT STR.20 CHICAGO SAKS FIFTH AVE. 669 N. MICHIGAN AVE. CHICAGO, IL 60611

SAKS YGT STR.42 FAIRLANE SAKS FIFTH AVE. FAIRLANE TOWN CENTER DEARBORN, MI 48126

SAKS YGT STR.28 TROY SAKS FIFTH AVE. 2901 W BIG BEAVER RD. TROY, MI 48084

SAKS YGS STR.23 CHEVY CHASE SAKS FIFTH AVE. 5555 WISCONSIN AVE. CHEVY CHASE, MD 20815

SAKS YON STR.38 BERGEN COUNTY SAKS FIFTH AVE. 380 HACKENSACK AVE. HACKENSACK, NJ 07601

SAKS YON
SAKS FIFTH AVE. (DO NOT HAVE EXACT STORES)
MENS SHOE DEPT.031
555 TUCKAHOE RD.
YONKER, NY 10710

Post-it* Fax Note	1671 Date 8/3/4	pages 4
То	From	b6 -1,9
Co./Dept.	— 	b7c -1,9
Phone #	(((((((((((((((((((438-77-33
Fax = 202 324-11	94 Fax #	

(CLOSED)
now at 5th Avenue + 54th Street

Herd 8/30/44 from UMA States

As Im town all who chan

were restricted.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet

Dete:

To: Los Angeles Police Department 555 Ramirez Street Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

Lab No. 41006017 S/D UJ QJ

Reference: UPS receit dated August 19, 1994

Your No.

94-08-17431

Re: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT; NICOLE SIMPSON, RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS; HOMOCIDE

b6 -1 b7C -1

Specimens received:

August 19, 1994

Specimens:

K-35 Right BRUND MAGLI "Lorenzo" style shoe, size 12, style number 36840.

K-36 Right BRUND MAGLI "Lyon" style shoe, size 9 1/2, style number 36540.

M35, Size 12 utilings Eve 46 out sice supered by stigs / K36 - Emsier 42 Sile N-35 Lorenzo - high hel courte.

M36 - Lyon-low hel courte.

K35/36 rutal - \$160 recommended

receive k35/kg from UMA/ BRNO MAGEN 028/19/44


135 pearl sholan to Deadnie cook unhahut

b6 -1 b7C -1


REAL 8/19/91

, ,,,,,,,,,,





FBI(24-cv-1564)-2965





FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

Los Angeles Police Department 555 Ramirez Street Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

41018001 D UJ QJ Lab No.

Communication received 10/14/94 Reference:

94-08-17431 Your No.

ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT; NICOLE SIMPSON; RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS; HOMOCIDE

b6 -1 b7C -1

Specimens received: October 14, 1994

Specimens:

0-87 One 3 x 5 inch photograph, labeled P#1627, of dress, item #86

0-88 Four 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#1623 through P#1626 of dress, item #86

Q-89-Five 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#1628 through P#1632, of jeans, item #79

Q-90-Twenty-one 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#1154 through P1174, of jeans, item #79

Five 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#1175 through P#1179, of white socks, item #80 Q-91-

/ Q=92-Eighteen 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#1180 through P#1197, of clothing item #81.

= K57+ 687-98 jn edem porter por segente. 6{ - 199 all 15 photos / crameter proporte. No crisi enie (la lisa 10)

lovether Franklowk, 2d, 11-, free sent also a Bea retene such be FBI(24-cv-1564)-2968

Six 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#1198 through / Q=93-P#1203, of dress, item #86. Three 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#1204 through /Q-94 P#1206 of underwear, item #87. Seven 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#36 through Q-95= P#42, of victim SIMPSON and adjacent tiled walkway Thirteen 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#45 through Q-96 P#57 of footwear impressions on tiled walkway. Six 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#62 through Q=97 P#67, of footwear impressions on steps Three 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#70 through Q-98-P#72, of steps Twenty 3 x 5 inch photographs, labeled P#368 through موود و P#386 and P#390, of footwear impressions on walkway Twenty five 3 x 5 inch photographs labeled P1040 K-37 through P1063, of PATAUGAS boots of victim GOLDMAN, European size 44, US size 11 item #78

752 (Rev. 2-21-91)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

To: Los Angeles Police Department 555 Ramirez Street, SP. 270 Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

Lab No. 41019001 D/S UJ QJ

Reference:

Examination at Los Angeles Police Department

September 1, 1994

Your No.

94-08-17431

Re: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT; NICOLE SIMPSON - VICTIM; RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIM; HOMOCIDE fue exa_ 8/31-9/0/94

10/19/19

b6 -1 b7C -1

Specimens received:

September 1, 1994

Specimens:

Q-100 Photographs of luminol processing of floor mat, item #33, on September 1, 1994 and accompanying photographic log.

Q-101 Color photographs of carpet and Leuco Crystal Violet processing of floor mat, item #33, on September 1, 1994 and accompanying photographic log.

actions to final enhance improme - 0100 + 0101 (APIP) wegetin -

0100 too landel for anships of ingraman

101 reflets some pattern, Attempt to porture assent it with 02887 day an explan-hour, som if the parter neglets a constitue such to the 02887 ER. Frontpersorders to 1006: (photo: 4 capet \$173-201 do not refer sup detail to the Condinue.)

Copies of 0100-0101 photos to Deedure a 10/19194 for retur to LA.

FBI(24-cv-1564)-2972

Unret - elter as a grant randy 2 for carped.

8/31/94 at LAPD LAB

took 2 sets of photogers of prouds show with Brunimage:
uponton to muche hastlen

set fortour school for Elifiq process of carpet.

9/1/94 Pround capeting for Ford Brown - (Se photolog)

9/1/64 at LARY Larston, 555 Roming Street b6 -3,6 Phix UANATTER, MICHELE MESTICA med with INO b7C -3,6 - Personal who trapels of for impromous at see Ford Bronce - LAPD stem 033 was firm min Carpeting and from the 20% Supposs hayler sind I dreit I have I Postweet for lumine photograpy -Phrographic in position I will, Avering legts 1/4 see F16 ASA 3200 (Planie now a sack 152 mm + 6" apart) [Carpet durine by covery one half bumme and of 18th sather of Man 33 w/ 3200 PISA F 5.16 Shutter 3 (gra) great were b6 -3 Ist exposure total darkness 215 b7C -3 2nd exposur - 215 w/ assamuel light 3rd exposite 285 type takens uident Aged by Lumene Shot of 200 Section (154 Section by exceed) (2 shots 3200 ASA FIL to see will army light take find) Ist Expone w/bund 3 minute (+the had) for lund given en out - present b6 -3 Int Exposure 3 mind (W/ Allande hall) b7C -3 J Ros Raguel (LAPS) I have dryng -Photographed below conget +33 win bolor 120 fel tradel win Lever Course Violet Coprame)

reaction win 2 area glas Sone Spot

photo a color of 120 again 30 mm engy.

FBI(24 cv 1564) 29/4

9/1/94 at LAPS ld

medeta to prouse ster # 33 (cops)
were ster #39 envelope of glass - contain parts Sp in blood

item # 18 - Recht shor of Sugar - are differ day the gusted whenens

the 79 Blue gears of gullon - Nursers blood stain - item has 2 Sy -

the 486 Black does of Nucle Super - blood stars on book - possele upon necled ghots gaze enhant provely chamic exponent

PHOTOGRAPHIC LOG

SEPTEMBER 1, 1994 AT LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPT. LAB.

BLACK AND WHITE, T-MAX 3200 PHOTOGRAPHY OF CARPETING, ITEM #33

- FRAME #1 CAMERA OPERATION TEST
- FRAME #2 GRAY SCALE AND DATE FRAME #3 " " " " " " "
- FRAME #4 COPY SHOT 1ST HALF OF CARPET
- FRAME #5 "
- FRAME #6 2 MINUTE, 15 SEC EXPOSURE, TOTAL DARKNESS W/LUMINOL
- FRAME #7 2 MINUTE, 15 SEC. EXPOSURE, TOTAL DARKNESS/W LUMINOL AND ATTENUATED LIGHT
- FRAME #8 2 MINUTE, 15 SEC EXPOSURE, TOTAL DARKNESS W/LUMINOL
- FRAME #9 RECORD SHOT OF 2ND HALF OF CARPET
- FRAME #10 RECORD SHOT OF 2ND HALF OF CARPET
- FRAME #11 3 MINUTES, TOTAL DARKNESS, W/ LUMINOL
- FRAME #12 3 MINUTES, TOTAL DARKNESS, W/ LUMINOL W/ATTENUATED LIGHT

END OF BLACK AND WHITE LUMINOL PHOTOGRAPHY

KODAK PRO 400; 120MM FILM COLOR TAKEN AFTER ABOVE LUMINOL PROCEDURE W/60MM LENS

- FRAME #1 RECORD COPY SHOT
- FRAME #2 RECORD COPY SHOT

PROCESS WITH LEUCO CRYSTAL VIOLET (LCV)

- FRAME #3 COLOR SHOT OF LCV (WET)
- FRAME #4 COLOR SHOT OF LCV (WET)
- FRAME #5 COLOR SHOT OF LCV (DRY)
- FRAME #6 COLOR SHOT OF LCV (DRY)

WITH 80MM LENS

CLOSEUP OF IMPRESSIONED AREA

END OF COLOR PHOTOGRAPHS

- FRAME #7 COLOR SHOT OF LCV
- FRAME #8 COLOR SHOT OF LCV
- FRAME #9 COLOR SHOT OF LCV
- FRAME #10 COLOR SHOT OF LCV

b6 -1 b7C -1 * 7-2 (Rev. 2-21-91)

RECORDED 10/26/94 nrl

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

10/26/94

b6 -1 b7C -1

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

To: The Honorable Lance A. Ito Criminal Courts Building Department 103 210 West Temple Street Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-

Lab No. 41026003 S/D UJ QJ

Reference: Communication dated October 26, 1994

Your No.

Re: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT; NICOLE SIMPSON AND RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS; HOMICIDE

12/20/94

Specimens received: October 26, 1994

Specimens personally delivered by Detective Philip L. Vannatter on October 26, 1994:

Q102 Jeans (#79)

Q103 Dress (#86)

Q104 Glass microscope slide (#332)


RESUBMITTED ITEMS FROM FBI LABORATORY NUMBER 40808026 S/D UJ QJ:

Q8A-Q8C Containers

Q8B1 Glass microscope slide

nex 0/02/133 10/24/94 + notal 10/24/14


See ; hut FBI(24-cv-1564)-2978




FBI(24-cv-1564)-2979

b6 -1 b7C −1

Evidence Receipt (to be used in i 7-16 (Rev. 4-7-82)	lieu of correspondence	covering evidence	submissions to the L	_aborato~/)	
Please Furnish Complete Information Agency submitting evidence	ation			Date	
		□ FB		10/26/94	
Los Angeles Police Dept.		□ Fed . Ø Loc	deral cal or State	Laboratory #	
Delivered by		Accepted by		BuFile #	
				- QH - AZP	
Suspect(s)		<u> </u>	Victim(s)		
Desamila	- , .		Micm	18 Sun a 1	
ORENTHAL :	4. SIMPSON		Routh	LE SIMPSON LB GOLDMAN	
Offense			_[
Homicioe			Place and date of o	nense	
Agency case #					
Date of hearing, grand jury, trial, or	reason why expeditious	handing is necess	ary		
Prev exams this case	Evid located	Report to be	directed to		
ØYes □ No	Room # _3931	_			
Copies to	,	Evid	dence to be returned to Mailed Back		
			☑ Picked Up by Cor	ntributor	
Brief Facts covering case					
Description of evidence			Exams requested		
•					
		•			
,				(This space for blocking)	
•					







b6 -1


b7C -1

7-2 (Rev. 2-21-91)

RECORDED 11/14/94 xxx

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet



To: Detective

City of LA Police Department 150 N. Los Angeles Street Los Angles, California 90012 Date:

FBI File No.

95A-HQ-1075008

Lab No.

41114001 S/D UJ, QJ

Reference:

Federal Express #6303571234

Your No.

Re: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUBJECT; NICOLE BROWN SIMPSON, RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS; HOMICIDE ne 11/14/84

CIDE

Specimens received:

November 14, 1994

Specimens:

Q105-116 Twelve (12) color photographs of footwear impressions

Q117-146 Thirty (30) color photographs of general crime scene and footwear impressions

Q147 Black/White photograph of sidewalk depicting footwear impressions

0105-9050+69; 0102-851,070 | 6407+852,71,72,108,100 |

0111/112+853+73; 2113 +077; 0115 ->075, 8184 -5076 | 014 8165 > 181 wh2 b6-1
670-1

0104-961,77; 0119-3668;


0116-7 Emb Conton & perute 144 4664

(of 1 / 105 - 117 min splations.)

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;	Evidence Receipt (to be used in lieu of 7-16 (Rev. 4-7-82)	f correspr dence covering evidence	submissions to the Labora'	•	
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	Please Furnish Complete Information				
	Agency submitting evidence LAS Defined by FeDEX Course	Accepted by	Bi ederal ocal or State	Date	b7C -1,
	FeDEX Course Suspect(s) OJSIMPSON	5	Victim(s) NICULE B RONALD	ROWN SIMPS	5
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	wate of hearing, grand jury, that, or reas		ne directed to		
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	Brief Facts covering case	•			
	Forty two (42) one (1) Bfw ple footween impressi	color photographs, stograph depicting ons of crime sce	Exams requested		
				HO-1075008	b6 −1 b7C −1
	verse side if necessar	ry for additional evidence)			

FBI(24-cv-1564)-2988

7-2 (Rev. 2-21-91)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

To: Los Angeles Police Department

FRI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

Lab No. 41216001 S/D UJ QJ

Reference: Field Exam

Your No.

Re: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUBJECT; NICOLE BROWN SIMPSON - VICTIMS, RONALD GOLDMAN

1919

b6 −1 b7c −1

Specimens received:

November 7, 1994 Field Exam

Specimens:

DP-0-12-1-1-1			
Q148	White bloodstained envelope containing eyeglasses and bearing footwear impressions (item 39)		
K55	Left REEBOK shoe, size 12, belonging to ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON (item 18)		
K56	Right REEBOK shoe, size 12, belonging to ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON (item 18)		
K57	Left PATAUGAS boot, size 11, belonging to RONALD GOLDMAN (item 78)		
K58	Right PATAUGAS boot, size 11, belonging to RONALD GOLDMAN (item 78)		
Q	148, K55-58 plat a corole for wito -		

11/7/94

inarle length ~ 298 mm over length - L+R 310 mm, shos have little wear Inche - oursala Dinamas for 1856 cd 1855 an unamely identical.

"PATAUGAS" bodo

0113

item 18 - Reelak Shots - low top - white

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ou bottom "HH" Size 11

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
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
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
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



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





















7-2 (Rev. 2-21-91)

RECORDED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1/10/95

b6 -1

b7C -1

Laboratory Work Sheet

Date:

The Honorable Lance A. Ito
Criminal Courts Building
Department 103
210 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

Lab No. 50110004 S/D UJ QJ

Reference: Communication dated January 10, 1995

Your No.

Re: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT; NICOLE SIMPSON AND RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIMS; HOMICIDE b6 -1 b7C -1

+ 97 1/10/95

Specimens received: January 10, 1995

•

Specimens personally delivered by Mr. January 10, 1995:

on b6 -11 b7c -11

Q160 Shirt (Item number 97)

Q161 Shirt (Item number 101)

Q162 Shirt (Item number 102)

Q163 Piece of paper (Item number 62 and 63)

Q164-Q169 Six (6) negatives (C133165, #20-25)

Q170-Q173 Four (4) negatives (C#132369, #9-12)

Q174-Q184 Eleven (11) negatives (C133219, #1-11)

Q185-Q186 Two (2) negatives (C133969, 2 B&W)

Q187-Q196 Ten (10) negatives (C#133219, 1-10)

Q197-Q202 Six (6) negatives (C#133295, #1-5)

Photo: 164-202 5. 50110007

2/64-3/69 gloves Averan 170-172 No eran 173-184 brow Cart 187-201 9 202 don- weran 2185-186 prom No sean

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

b6 -1 b7C -1

January 20, 1995 Date:

The Honorable Lance A. Ito Criminal Courts Building Department 103 210 West Temple Street Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

50118030 D/S UJ QJ Lab No.

FEDERAL EXPRESS

Communication dated 1/17/95 Reference:

Your No.

ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUBJECT; NICOLE BROWN SIMPSON, RONALD GOLDMAN - VICTIM(S); HOMICIDE

Specimens received:

January 18, 1995

Specimens:

Thirty-six color photographs depicting the shoes of b6 -6 officers

b7C -6

Results of examination:

The design evident in the questioned footwear impressions in blood, previously submitted in this case, do not correspond with the design characteristics of the shoes depicted in K64.

K64 is returned herewith.

b6 -1 b7C -1

This Report Is Furnished For Official Use Only

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

ъ6 -1 ъ7С -1

Date:

January 20, 1995

To: The Honorable Lance A. Ito Criminal Courts Building Department 103 210 West Temple Street Los Angeles, California 90012

FBI File No. 95A-HQ-1075008

Lab No. 50120001 D QJ

Reference:

Communication dated January 20, 1995

Your No.

94-08-17431

Re: ORENTHAL J. SIMPSON - SUSPECT;
NICOLE SIMPSON AND RONALD GOLDMAN VICTIMS;
HOMICIDE

Specimens received:

January 20, 1995

Specimens:

Q-203

Piece of paper with footwear impressions

Results of examination:

Q203 and an electrostatic lift of Q203 have been photographed. Copies of those photographs and the Q203 item are returned herewith.

No footwear impressions of the "U 2887" SILGA design, represented by the K22 through K31 items, were present on the Q203 item.


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
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
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
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
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





































































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









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




































































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
























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